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ABSTRACT 
southeastern North America was the scene of 
international, intercultural, and interethnic frontiers during 
the first two-thirds of the eighteenth century. Europeans and 
Indians existed there in greater relative concentrations than 
anywhere else in North America, and each European colony and 
Indian nation constituted a different locus of trade, 
diplomacy, and war. Because of the relatively high population 
density and national and ethnic complexity of the region, 
commercial, diplomatic, and military relations there exhibited 
a different character than in earlier-colonized regions from 
virginia northward and in the Caribbean. 
The southeastern Indians existed in a state of dependency 
in the eighteenth century which grew as the century wore on. 
The Indians• position relative to the Europeans was mitigated 
by the competition of three imperial powers for their trade 
and alliance. All major Indian powers in the region had a 
choice of at least two Europeans as trading partners and 
allies, and the Creeks bordered all three. The creeks 
followed a conscious policy of balance-of-power after 1715 
which helped maintain the political and diplomatic status quo 
on the frontier for half a century. 
Europeans tried to alter the imperial status guo several 
times before 1763 but were unsuccessful each time. This was 
partly due to their own status of dependency on Europe; their 
policies were not always their own to devise. Economic, 
political, and military dependence on European capitals, 
intercolonial disputes, and internal politics made each colony 
less than effective in carrying out policies designed to 
better their position relative to other European and Indian 
powers. 
This study first analyses southeastern Indian culture 
and the region°s history to 1732 to establish the cultural, 
economic, ethnic, political and imperial background against 
which Indians and Europeans interacted in the Southeast. 
Subsequent chapters focus on specific episodes and events to 
1763 that illustrate how a precarious balance between and 
among Indian and European powers operated, and why no power 
was able to upset that balance. Finally it shows that when 
the balance was upset after 1760 it was the result of 
intervention by outside forces. 
vi 
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Introduction 
The struggle among European imperial powers for hegemony 
in North America is the history of that continent for nearly 
two-thirds of the eighteenth century. Strategies devised in 
European capitals and tactics employed on the American 
frontier were executed solely for ridding the continent of 
unwanted rivals. Moreover, European imperial machinations 
never failed to consider native American involvement as an 
expendable means to an end in achieving the spoils of empire. 
Regardless of the location--Quebec, New England, Louisiana, 
or Florida--imperial ambitions were fueled by individual 
greed, corporate manipulation, and official intrigue. 
As was the case throughout the continent, these European 
forces and the native American response to them were clearly 
evidenced in the borderlands empire that composed North 
America's eighteenth-century southeastern frontier. 
Nevertheless, much of what occurred in that region at that 
time has been repeatedly cast in a lesser light by colonial 
historians. The probable reason for that benign neglect is 
that, when France and England engaged in the decisive contest 
for North America, that drama unfolded on the northeastern 
frontier, and those events have traditionally been spotlighted 
2 
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3 
by historians. Events on the southeastern frontier, 
nevertheless, demonstrate that in the half century or so 
before the Conquest England, France, an.d Spain engaged in a 
heated rivalry for the purpose of bringing the region and its 
native population into their respective political and economic 
orbits. France, Spain, and England all had their colonial 
marches in the Southeast, and each had its plan for the 
region. The success of these strategies, however, depended 
in some measure on the response of the region's native 
inhabitants. The five major Indian nations or confederacies 
and countless smaller tribes and bands, on the other hand, had 
goals of their own. on occasion, disparate groups of 
Europeans and Indians were able to trade and work together to 
accomplish mutually beneficial goals; at other times, no 
accommodation was possible and conflict ensued. 
Trade, diplomacy, and war preoccupied almost everyone on 
the southeastern frontier from the beginning of European 
settlement until the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763. 
For Europeans, trade with the natives was conducted for many 
reasons, from acquiring the basic necessities of life to 
amassing wealth and the accompanying prestige. Similarly, 
for Indian leaders, the patronage of Europeans could mean not 
only the acquisition of more and better trade goods for their 
own people, but also the means of building a secure power base 
within their nation. Thus, for both groups, commerce was 
regarded not only as a means to an economic end, but as a 
powerful political tool. The decision therefore to trade or 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 
not trade, be it taken by European or Indian, involved the 
most basic issues of politics, diplo~acy, and war. 
Trade and alliance between Europeans aiid native Americans 
was always subject to internal and external political 
pressures. Within European colonies, merchants vied with 
planters, assemblies challenged governors, and government 
officials at all levels fought with each other over the 
establishment, financing, and conduct of Indian relations. 
Within Indian nations and confederacies, factions favored 
competing European powers, "white" and "redn chiefs contested 
issues of war and peace, and parties of young warriors upset 
the best-laid plans of everyone. While each group tried to 
reconcile internal differences, it simultaneously sought to 
present a unified position to its friends and enemies. The 
establishment of alliances between Europeans and Indians in 
the Southeast was a complex undertaking. 
Trade and diplomacy wera the two principle activities of 
the southeastern economy, and neither could take place without 
the other. Contrary to the opinion of contemporary European 
commentators, trade goods and presents were not enough in 
themselves to secure the alliance of an Indian nation. Each 
nation had its own agenda and chose its allies to further its 
ambitions. These alliances, however, were fragile creations 
which could be imperiled by the ignorance, neglect, or 
dishonesty of either side. Constant attention in the form of 
frontier diplomacy was necessary to initiate and maintain 
friendly alliances, and to disrupt those of competitors. As 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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might be expected, not all European and Indian players in the 
game of alliances possessed the same skill; some ran circles 
around their competitors. 
Conflict and peace in the Southeast, as elsewhere, 
depended upon the ebb and flow of politics and diplomacy. 
Combat between Europeans was usually confined to periodic 
AngJ.o-Spanish border clashes. Europeans, however, did not 
hesitate to instigate, lead, or participate in Indian raids 
on fellow Indians or Europeans. More often, Indians fought 
Indians, for their own reasons or as proxies of their European 
"allies." Sometimes, as in the case of the Choctaws, the 
tribe turned in on itself as the result of the pull of rival 
Europeans powers and civil war ensued. Nevertheless, in 
warfare, as in every other aspect of life in the Southeast, 
after 1763 things would never be the same. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE SOUTHEASTERN FRONTIER TO 1699 
The southeast is bounded on the north by the coastal 
plain of the carolinas, the Appalachian Mountains, the Ohio 
River, and the Ozark Mountains, and extends south to the Gulf 
of Mexico, east to the Atlantic Ocean, and west to the plains 
of East Texas. The region is blessed with a mild climate, 
good soil over most of its range, abundant rainfall, and easy 
communication over its vast distances by land and water. This 
environment produced a regional culture which was "socially 
diverse but culturally similar. 111 
Whatever the Indians of the Southeast lacked in science 
and technology vis-a-vis the Europeans they made up in sheer 
numbers. Although European populations were increasing in 
the first two-thirds of the eighteenth century and Indian 
populations were decreasing, over the region as a whole the 
Indians outnumbered the subjects of the three European powers 
combined. Indian population figures are hard to establish 
with certainty, but all available indicators point to a fact 
that the colonists faced every day: they were greatly 
outnumbered. According to the most recent figures, at the 
6 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7 
beginning of the eighteenth century the southeast contained 
approximately 130,600 Indians, 70,900 Whites, and 8,700 
Blacks. By 1760, however, those figures had changed 
significantly. Near the end of the Seven Years• War, the 
Southeast contained 53,000 Indians, 333,700 Whites, and 
226,700 Blacks. 2 
An important tie between thes~ diverse peoples and 
regions was Mobilian jargon, the trade language of the Lower 
Mississippi Valley. Though its origins are obscure, Mobilian, 
so named by the French for the Indians from whom they learned 
it, seems to have evolved from the western Muskogean Choctaw 
and Chickasaw languages. Mobilian evolved its own phonology 
and grammar, and borrowed words from other Muskogean 
languages, as well as from such diverse sources as Algonkian, 
French, and Spanish. Mobilian functioned as a contact 
language, allowing communication between Muskogeans speaking 
different languages and later between Indians and Europeans. 
The status of Mobilian before the arrival of theFrench remains 
uncertain, but it is clear that the French helped to spread 
the jargon and increase its use. Mobilian remained a true 
contact language; rather than becoming creolized, it was 
always a second language, and never adopted by any people as 
their first or only tongue. 3 
Large and often densely settled native populations were 
possible because southeastern flora and fauna provided the 
Indians with a wide variety of excellent food sources. Indian 
subsistence was based upon gathering, hunting, and 
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agriculture. Because of the relatively short, mild winters, 
some varieties of fruits, nuts, roots, berries, and tubers 
were available in almost every season. Gathering was a year-
round activity of the women, children, and old people. Acorns 
were an important food source, because they could be eaten or 
used to produce oil. Certain seeds were also collected, such 
as sunflower seeds, which could either be eaten directly or 
ground into meal. 4 
Hunting and fishing provided the southeastern Indians 
with much of their yearly food supply. The forests, rivers, 
lakes, and ocean shores provided an abundant harvest for the 
natives. Among large game animals deer, bear, and in the 
western areas buffalo provided the Indians with ample supplies 
of meat, leather, and oil. Small reptiles, mammals, and birds 
were available year-round. Along the Mississippi and Atlantic 
flyways every year migrated millions of birds, providing fall 
and spring food sources. Hunting was usually done with the 
bow and arrow, blow gun, or spear. Fish were abundant 
throughout the region. Fishing methods included hook and 
line, nets, weirs, traps, bow and arrow, and even roping of 
certa.in species. 5 
Agriculture was practiced by all native peoples in the 
Southeast, and for most it was the major subsistence activity. 
Corn, beans, and squash were the major crops, in that order. 
These three crops grow well together, and they are 
particularly well suited to the river-bottom, highly acidic 
soils so characteristic of the Southeast. Sunflower, bottle 
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gourd, and other useful species were also planted. Because .. 
of the long growing season, some plants were harvested twice 
a year. 6 
Most southeastern Indians were not strictly gatherers or 
agriculturalists, but practiced both in a mixed economy. By 
combining hunting and agriculture the Indians were able to 
maximize potential food sources and respond to temporary 
climatic conditions that might limit one or more of the usual 
food sources. Rainfall was usually abundant, but droughts did 
occur, and would affect hunting and fishing as well as 
agriculture. Thus in good years, tribes lived in compact 
villages and depended on hunting for only one-third of their 
food supply. In bad years they dispersed into the woods and 
relied on hunting and gathering of secondary food sources for 
one-half or more of their subsistence. 7 
The cement that held Indian society together was the 
kinship system. Indian culture was organized by clans, with 
membership determined through the female line. A complex 
system had evolved to classify relationships, and this system 
determined how individual Indians were related. Even the 
clans themselves were ranked in a hierarchy that determined 
relationships between members of different clans. Thus, the 
rules governing kinship also influenced relationships between 
groups, towns, nations, and even societies and cultures. The 
division of the larger nations into "red" and "white" towns 
is one example of this, because it prescribed social, 
ceremonial, and military relationships among the towns. 8 
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Politically the majority of southeastern Indians were 
organized into chiefdoms. A chiefdom stood between a highly 
decentralized tribal society and a formal, centralized state. 
Chiefdoms were subject to varying degrees of control by the 
chief or chiefs. In some chiefdoms the leader enjoyed wide 
discretionary power over his "subjects," while in others he 
had no power to compel and led through his oratorical ability, 
prowess in war, and ability to redistribute his own and the 
nation' s wealth. Within the chiefdom each individual was 
ranked according to age, clan, wealth, and war honors from the 
highest to the lowest. These rankings were fluid, however, 
and any individual warrior with the proper martial or 
oratorical skills could become leader of a chiefdom. 9 
Early explorers gave evidence of great power possessed 
by some chiefs and great devotion on the part of their 
subjects. De Soto even encountered female rule in at least 
one chiefdom. But the nature of chiefly authority changed 
significantly due to contact with Europeans. Though there 
are few historical sources to document the decline of chiefly 
authority during the seventeenth century, the scant historical 
record points to this development; archaeological evidence 
from village sites of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
also indicate the disintegration of the chiefdoms. By the 
late seventeenth century, when the historical record largely 
resumes, only the Natchez still had an all-powerful chief 1 the 
Great Sun, and nowhere was female rule practiced. 10 
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one aspect of Indian life that did not change by the 
early eighteenth century was the importamce of war, which 
affected practically every other aspect of life. The hunt 
was conducted in many ways like war and was viewed as practice 
for war. More important, however, without war honors a young 
male could not become recognized as a warrior. Once the young 
man had killed an enemy he w·as given a new name and accepted 
as a full member of his tribe. So important did horses become 
to the southeastern Indians that the capture or killing of an 
enemy horse was considered the equivalent of taking a scalp, 
and could earn a young man the coveted warrior status. 11 
Indian warfare was very different from contemporary 
European conceptions. War was seldom undertaken for the 
acquisition of territory or even for the destruction of the 
enemy; usually retaliation, the desire to win war honors, or 
the need to replace lost members of the tribe were reason 
enough. Warfare was undertaken by small parties, killing or 
capturing as many of the enemy as they could supervise, and 
then retreating swiftly home. If a war party lost the element 
of surprise, the warriors usually returned home without 
striking a blow, no matter how great their numerical 
superiority over the enemy. 12 
The complex rituals and taboos that governed warfare were 
reflections of the moral and religious belief system on which 
native life was based. The collateral requirements of 
separation and purity were an important part of this system. 
The physical world was divided into opposites, and strict 
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These rules 
governed every area of life, from relationships between males 
and females to preparation of food and, of course, observance 
of religious and social ceremonies. Thus, much of 
southeastern religious ce:r.emony and practice was aimed at 
enforcing separation to achieve balance and avoid pollution. 
When pollution occurred, ceremony and practice were aimed at 
wiping it away to restore purity and balance. 13 
Purity and balance were important to the southeastern 
Indians because they lived in a universe peopled by 
supernatural beings and forces which rewarded good and 
punished evil. Like most oral peoples, the Indians believed 
in both white or good magic, which was practiced by conjurE\rs, 
and harmful black magic, practiced by witches. Dreams were 
especially powerful omens and exerted powerful influence over 
the actions of individuals and tribes. An omen-filled dream 
by any member of a war party, from the leader to the youngest 
warrior, could send the entire party back to the village. Not 
even the greatest warrior would ignore such an omen, secure 
in the knowledge he would have the sanction of the entire 
nation. 14 
European powers came to the Southeast for varied reasons, 
as reflected in the nature of their colonial establishments. 
Spain was first. Conquistadors from Havana and Mexico City 
explored the interior in an ultimately vain search for another 
Aztec or Inca empire to conquer. Ponce de Leon, Lucas Vasquez 
d~ Ayllon, Hernando de Soto, and Panfillo de Narvaez all died 
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attempting to establish a Spanish toehold in the Southeast, 
which they christened the land of "Florida. 11 Though their 
expeditions collected vaJ.uabJ.e knowledge about the region and 
its inhabitants, they found nothing to propel Spain into the 
Southeast in a meaningful way. Thus, throughout the early 
sixteenth century, Spain concentrated on colonizing elsewhere 
in the New world. 15 
It was not until the 1560s that Spain undertook a 
permanent settlement in Florida. st. Augustine, established 
in September 1565, became the first permanent European 
settlement in the Southeast. The Florida peninsula was 
strategically important to Spain because it lay beside the 
Bahama Channel, a major communications link between Old and 
New Spain through which the bullion fleet regularly sailed. 
Since occupation of the Florida coast by rival European powers 
could wreck the orderly administration of Spain's New World 
empire, Spanish settlement there was essential. But with or 
without a foreign threat, the establishment of a Spanish 
province in Florida was a natural and long-anticipated 
extension of Spain's New World empire. 16 
As elsewhere in New Spain, with Spanish government came 
Spanish missionaries. In 1572 the ,Jesuits established a 
mission on the Chesapeake Bay which lasted only two years 
before being destroyed by Indians. 17 A year later the 
Franciscans took charge of the Florida missions. There they 
would labor for almost two hundred years. During the next 
one hundred years they established thirty-four missions from 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14 
st. Augustine north to st. catherine's Island and west to the 
modern site of Tallahassee, Florida, all part of the vast 
field which the Spanish called the province of Guale. 
Marauding pirates compounded the misery of harsh living 
conditions; neophytes and co:.iV'erts occasionally revolted 
against the rigorous regime imposed by the moral austerity of 
Spanish catholicism and the physical demands of mission 
agriculture. Guale was not a peaceful place, frcm within or 
without. 18 
By the 1560s, France and England were beginning to show 
interest in the region. France was the first to challenge 
Spain's title to Florida. Jean Ribault established the 
Huguenot settlement of Port Royal and its Fort Caroline on 
the Broad River, near modern Beaufort, south Carolina in 1562. 
By the time the Spaniards learned of the colony and sent an 
expedition to destroy it, the settlement had already been 
abandoned. Then, in 1564, Rene de Laudonniere returned to the 
Florida coast, attempting to plant a colony just north of the 
mouth of st. John's River. Spain's response to this effort 
was founded upon both imperial considerations and religious 
fanaticism. Pedro de Menendez de Aviles not only destroyed 
the colony, killing most of its settlers, but heeven went so 
far as to continue up the coast to locate and capture the few 
Protestant survivors of the earlier French colony who were 
still living among the Indians. 19 
Except for the activities of coastal explorers and 
pirates, English efforts in the Southeast were confined 
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Both the 
unsuccessful "lost" colony of Roanoke in North caroli-na and 
the successful settlement of Jamestown in 1607 proved to be 
English colonizing efforts too remote from st. Augustine to 
unduly concern Spain. Moreover 1 Spain was really in no 
position to confront the English. Still recovering from the 
defeat of the Armada and seeking more and more dynastic 
control of Europe, Spain did not have the time or resources 
to expend on the remote northern marches of New Spain. 20 
With the establishment of south carolina in 1670, 
however, the English were positioned to challenge the safety 
of one of Spain's most important sea lanes. No outpost, the 
new colony was intended to be a major settlement center. South 
Carolina was the child of Barbados, and organized by 
proprietors experienced in colonial ventures; they would not 
need decades to consolidate their position before turning 
their attentions outward. These Barbado-Carolinians, 
moreover, had a long history of conflict with Spain, and they 
would not wait to launch a new phase of that old rivalry. 21 
The South Carolinians moved quickly to consolidate their 
position as a vi.able colony and did this through the 
establishment of a profitable trade with the Indians. Indeed, 
it was soon apparent that the colony was particularly well-
suited to develop a wide-ranging trade with the Indians of the 
southeast. Inhibiting mountains extended only to the colony's 
northern fringes, and the overland routes, th~)ugh long and 
tiring to man and horse, provided near-direct access to the 
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natives. These trade contacts went far to speed the colony's 
expansion west and south. Not only did the English carry more 
and often better goods to the Indians, but they were usually 
willing to sell them rum, which the French preferred not to 
do, and guns, which the Spanish were loath to put into Indian 
hands. The English willingness to trade in Indian slaves also 
expanded their commercial sphere and enhanced their contacts 
with the natives. 22 
As English interests spread across South carolina there 
was little doubt that they would soon encounter thair Spanish 
counterparts in northern Florida. The Carolinians began 
almost immediately to plan for the expulsion of the Spaniards 
from their borderland province. In 1674 an alliance was 
concluded with the Westos, who lived near modern-day Augusta, 
Georgia. Trade with the Westos was mainly in deerskins, furs, 
and Indian slaves. More important, the Westos were armed and 
served to "protect" South Carolina from Spanish and Indian 
enemies. Soon the English began to encourage Westo raids into 
Spanish mission country, and by 1680 the Westos were making 
direct attacks on the missions. Ironically, that same year 
the Westos became troublesome and were themselves destroyed 
by the Carolinians. By then, however, South Carolina had 
developed other trading partners and proxies. 23 
France, like England, concentrated its colonizing efforts 
in the northeastern parts of North America during.most of the 
seventeenth century. It was not until New France was more 
than six decades old and firmly under royal control that 
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Frenchmen began to move into the interior of the continent in 
large numbers. But once they had penetrated to the Great 
Lakes and the Upper Mississippi Valley, the continent itself 
seemed to drive them towards the southeast. Minister of the 
Marine Louis Phelypeaux, comte de Pontchartrain was opposed 
to the expansion of New France in·i:o the Great Lakes and 
beyond, but the pursuit of fur-trade profits drove all before 
it. When Governor-General Louis de Buade, comte de Frontenac, 
and his lieutenant, Robert-Rene cavalier de La Salle, moved 
their sphere of influence westward by establishing forts and 
trading posts without ministerial permission, the fait 
accompli was accepted at Versailles. 24 
The French government 1 s displeasure with Frontenac's 
western expansion was somewhat tempered when rumors began to 
fly that a great river flowed from near the Great Lakes 
westward to the "sea." The possible discovery of the long-
sought "Northwest Passage" to the Pacific and the fabled 
wealth of the Orient gave a new impetus to French exploration 
of North America. Thus in 1672 Frontenac dispatched fur 
trader Louis Jolliet and Jesuit Jacques Marquette to determine 
the course of the great river. Upon Jolliet•s return to 
Quebec in August 1674, he was able to state definitely that 
the Mississippi emptied into the Gulf of Mexico. This was 
disappointing for Frontenac and La Salle, but they sought to 
make the best of it. 25 
La Salle would die in his attempt at empire building, 
but his scheme left its mark on the history of the entire 
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Frontenac helped La Salle obtain a fur trade 
monopoly in the Mississippi Valley and the right to establish 
posts along the river and its tributaries. La Salle was 
re~~red to pay for all costs of exploration and development, 
but through his scheme he planned to make himself the virtual 
king of the North American interior. Seven years were 
required to penetrate the mid-continent, descend the 
Mississippi to its mouth, and claim the entire valley for 
France. His ruthless attempts to monopolize the interior fur 
trade pushed his own operations and those of his rivals 
constantly westward in search of the furs on which their 
fortunes depended. In the process, he helped spawn a new 
breed of men, Canada's legendary coureurs de bois. 26 
Having discovered the mouth of the Mississippi, La Salle 
next sought to establish a colony there. But when the 
explorer returned to the Gulf Coast, instead of stopping at 
the mouth of the Mississippi, he sailed on and landed on the 
gulf coast of Texas. La Salle probably knew exactly where he 
was, and hoped from there to obtain some of the fabled wealth 
of the 11mines of Mexico. 11 As soon as the Spaniards of Mexico 
heard rumors about the colony from the Indians, they 
determined to crush it. Before the Spanish could find the 
mysterious white men, however, La Salle's colony had fallen 
apart from lack of adequate planning and the hostility of the 
local natives. La Salle was killed by his own men while 
attempting to go overland to the Illinois country for help. 27 
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If La Salle's explorations seem less epic than De Soto•s 
marches, their results set the stage for much of the next 
century's struggles among Europeans and between Europeans and 
Indians. The Frenchman's claim to the Mississippi Valley and 
his failed Texas colony helped to set in motion the final 
settlement of Louisiana and western Florida, even though this 
development was delayed a decade due to the demands of war in 
Europe and America. Acco·unts of La Salle's exploits and their 
aftermath not only gave Europeans their first detailed look 
at the interior of North America, but also helped convince 
Spain, England, and France of the importance of planting 
colonies there. 28 La Salle, his lieutenants, and the books 
written about Louisiana contributed significantly to expanding 
the cartographic frontiers of North America, though in this 
as in other things La Salle's contribution was not wholly 
positive. 29 
The southeastern frontier was settled significantly later 
than other parts of Spanish, English, and French North 
America. For all three European powers, moreover, the region 
stayed on the marches of empire through the imperial contest 
which ended in 1763. No sparkling colonial capitals 
flourished there; no major centers ~f wealth emerged; and no 
great wars were fought in the region. The slower development 
of the southeastern colonies was not due to lack of human 
motivation on the part of the Europeans, but rather because 
of their relations with one another and with the numerically 
superior Indians of the Southeast. 
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The arrival of Europeans in the early sixteenth century 
began a long train of events that would eventually transform 
nearly every aspect of southeastern life. Contact with 
Europeans introduced new microbes into the environment that 
caused massive depopulation. Loss of population led to great 
changes in Indians' socio-political systems. At the same 
time, moreover, Europeans introduced merchandise and 
technology which brought the Indians suddenly from a "Stone 
Age" material culture to that of porcelain, glass, cloth, and 
iron. Natives adopted and adapted ~uch from the Europeans, 
though not always in ways intended by the newcomers. The 
adoption of European technology did not lead to the 
abandonment of 'lative culture, but that culture would not 
emerge from the exchange unchanged. 
With the discovery and settlement of the Americas, the 
natives of the Southeast, like their brethren elsewhere, were 
gradually incorporated into the expanding world market of 
European mercantilism, a development which would eventually 
result in native "dependency" on their European trading 
partners and allies. In early contacts the Indians often 
dealt with Europeans from a position of relative strength, but 
as time wore on the Indians were placed increasingly in an 
inferior numerical, economic, and military position to the 
Europeans. Although this trend did not culminate by 1763, it 
exerted much influence on Indians and Europeans alike. 30 
European explorers brought not only their technology and 
goods to the New World but also their way of doing things. 
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European ideas about commerce, international relations, and 
warfare were greatly different from those of the Indians. 
Whether they came to America as conquistadors, missionaries, 
traders, or settlers, the Europeans who came in contact with 
the Indians of the southeastern woodlands were driven by a 
world view that placed their own philosophy above that of all 
others and fueled their determination to accomplish their 
goals at almost any cost. 
The European in colonial America was the product of a 
culture and a movement that made him peculiarly well suited 
to the task of exploring and subduing the New World. 
Scientific and technical advances in navigation, cartography, 
and military sciences that grew out of the Renaissance allowed 
Europeans not only to reach the Americas, but also to 
establish their domination over cultures far less technically 
advanced. Evangelistic Christianity reinforced the obvious 
material superiority over the Indians with a religious 
imperative to "reduce" the pagan savages to a state of grace. 
Conquest as well as conversion required that the Indians be 
acculturated to European notions of religion, government, and 
material culture. Europeans had the means and the will to 
force change upon the Indians if they would not be led 
willingly. 
If Indian material culture was far simpler than that of 
the Europeans, the natives were more than a match for the 
Europeans as traders and diplomats. Within their own 
understanding of the value of things, which at times differed 
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greatly from that of Europeans, they were hard bargainers who 
knew how to get the most from their trade goods. When Indians 
were bested in trade it was usually the result of unscrupulous 
European traders, or, more frequently, a combination of bad 
traders and worse rum. If Europeans thought they were taking 
advantage of their trading partners with some of their deals, 
the Indians probably thought the same thing of the same 
transactions. 
As diplomats, the Indians were the equals of Europeans. 
Because of their own traditions and practices, they were well 
versed in the diplomatic arts and knew how to maximize the 
benefits of an alliance while minimizing its costs. Moreover, 
some of their practices, such as their avoidance of saying 
11no11 directly and their strong desire not to offend anyone, 
made them difficult to understand and therefore less 
predictable from a European perspective. The existence of 
native factionalism and the need for unanimity of policy also 
unwittingly played into the hands of the Indians. The plea 
that one more convoy of trade goods, one more post or fort in 
the nation, or some other such boon might just bring over the 
rest of the nation was a powerful inducement for a governor, 
commandant, or Indian agent to sweeten what was probably 
already a large pot for the Indians. 
During the first third of the eighteenth century 
Europeans and Indians variously expanded, contracted, lost, 
or consolidated their positions on the southeastern marches. 
By 1733 basic spheres of influence, alliances, and enmities 
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were formed. The second third of the century would be spent 
in a many-sided contest for supremacy and survival within 
those parameters. The southeastern frontier may have seemed 
of little consequence in England, France, and Spain, or even 
New England, New France, and New Spain. But for the Europeans 
and Indians who lived there, the Southeast was at the center 
of a universe witnessing the most basic struggle of life and 
death. 
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Chapter II 
The Indians on an Evolving Frontier, 1699-1732 
Quite willingly, the southeastern Indians increasingly 
became part of the world-wide trade and imperial struggles of 
the Europeans after 1699. Trade and alliance with the 
Europeans had much to recommend themselves to southeastern 
natives at the turn of the century. The Europeans were on 
the whole settled on lands unoccupied by the natives and were 
mostly confined to the coast, far from the most populous 
tribes. The Europeans had goods to trade, including copper 
kettles, guns, beads, cloth, and host of items far more 
desirable than their native counterparts of bone, stone, and 
leather. And above all this, as military allies a~d arms 
merchants the Europeans could be useful auxiliaries against 
traditional native enemies. By 1732, those tribes that 
survived would know what the Westoes learned before them: the 
Europeans could be valuable trading partners and allies, but 
they could also be dangerous, and required careful handling. 
With the establishment of permanent colonial settlements 
in the Southeast, its native population was drawn into a new 
political and economic order which bore little resemblance to 
27 
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indigenous culture. Gradually surrounded by European imperial 
powers, the Indians had to choose sides in a struggle they 
could not understand initially because it arose from a 
political system so radically different from their own. As 
their own numbers dwindled and those of the Europeans 
increased, their position on the frontier became increasingly 
precarious and their freedom to choose their own policies 
lessened. Native chiefdoms were at a distinct disadvantage 
in any long-range contest with European kingdoms. 1 
Economically, the southeastern Indians were at a 
disadvantage as well. Native peoples who knew no marketplace 
in the European sense were confronted by traders and settlers 
who bought and sold according to far different rules~ a people 
unacquainted with the concept of private property were 
suddenly confronted by strangers who considered 
acquisitiveness one of the cardinal virtues. If they lived 
far enough away from the Europeans and had commodities to 
exchange which the Europeans prized, the natives could benefit 
and even prosper from their European trade. Once they 
outlived their economic usefulness or European settlement drew 
too near, they were either destroyed or forced further 
inland. 2 
The mainspring of trade and diplomacy in the Southeast 
was the deerskin trade. Of little importance to Florida 
except locally, the deerskin trade was counted on heavily by 
the organizers of both South Carolina and Louisiana as the 
underpinning of their economies. South Carol ina • s proprietors 
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saw the deerskin, or "leather r 11 trade as a source of immediate 
profits to insure the success of the entire project. They 
employed the active and experienced Henry Woodward as their 
agent and he pushed the trade deep into the interior. Not 
only the economy but the growth of South carolina's 
settlements would be profoundly influenced by the leather 
trade. 3 Pontchartrain saw this same expansion as a grave 
threat to French North America and ordered the establishment 
of Louisiana precisely to counter it. Once in Louisiana, 
Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville sought to engross the trade for 
France by allowing free trade for the coureurs de bois, 
establishing tanneries throughout the region, and drawing all 
the Indians of the Southeast into an alliance with France. 4 
Leather was the largest renewable resource available to 
the southeastern Indians, and the deerskin trade fit perfectly 
into the mercantilist needs of the Europeans. Leather was 
needed in the tanneries of Europe and could be traded for the 
mother country's manufactured goods. In the case of England, 
goods made from American leather were exported, helping to 
maintain a favorable balance-of-trade with foreigners. 
Although leather was not as profitable for the natives as 
northern furs, for many nations it sufficed to purchase all 
their European needs. 5 
At the end of the eighteenth century another powerful 
economic influence at work was the slave trade. The English 
began trading in slaves from the beginning of Carolina's 
settlement, mainly from the south at the expense of Spain's 
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allies. By 1698 Carolinians had begun to make regular trips 
to the Chickasaws for leather and slaves. In the early years 
slaves were an important factor in the Anglo-Chickasaw trade, 
a source of great profits for both sides. 6 Slave-taking in 
war was an established part of traditional Indian culture, but 
to obtain enough slaves to satisfy the Carolina traders the 
Chickasaws increased war parties to all nations in the region 
dramatically. Chickasaws raided traditional enemies such as 
the Choctaws, Colapissas, Chawashas, and Yazoos of the Lower 
Mississippi River and Gulf Coast and expanded their attacks 
on the Indians of the Illinois country and the lower Red and 
Arkansas rivers. 7 
Slave raiding had political consequences as great as its 
economic and demographic impact. The destruction of the 
Spanish missions and the continuing Anglo-Spanish contest was 
not caused by the slave trade, but the profit in Indian slaves 
was a factor in much of the fighting. But if Florida was 
enfeebled by the slave trade, Louisiana ironically was 
strengthened by it. The Chickasaws became South Carolina's 
strongest ally on the strength of the slave trade, and that 
slave trade drove the Choctaws inexorably into an alliance 
with France that would last for over six decades and survive 
even a Choctaw civil war. As feeble as Louisiana was, its 
survival to 1763, which was due partly to the Choctaws, kept 
England out of the trans-Mississippi West at the settlement 
of the Great War for Empire, possibly cheating England of her 
best chance to become master of North America. 8 
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Leather and slaves traded for export were an important 
part of the southeastern economy, but they were only the tip 
of a large iceberg. Although government officials and traders 
attempted to regulate or even monopolize the Indian trade 
within narrow boundaries, almost all Indians, Europeans, and 
Negroes participated in the regional economy to varying 
degrees. The extent to which European settlers and soldiers 
and African slaves participated in the local interethnic 
economy varied according to time and place, but it was always 
an important fact of life. 9 
In Louisiana, this face-to-face exchange involved 
practically everyone in the colony. In the early years 
settlers used skins acquired from the local natives to pay 
for manufactured goods in the royal warehouses, with skins 
serving as the universal medium of exchange. Some were 
involved in such exchanges only occasionally, but others made 
a lifetime practice of trading with the local natives. Some 
of the "petit nations" near Mobile and New Orleans relied on 
this small-scale personal trade for almost all their European 
goods. 10 In South carolina the relatively small Indian 
populations near the settlements operated in a similar fashion 
and correspondingly accounted for a much smaller percentage 
of the regional economy. But Indians 1 participation in 
agriculture, day labor, and even the skilled trades made them 
an important part of the local and provincial economy 
nonetheless. 11 
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With the establishment of south carolina in 1670 and 
Louisiana in 1699, the southeastern Indians had two competing 
European-based regional economies superimposed upon their own 
indigenous trading networks. Although there were powerful 
attractions for the Indians in these new systems, there were 
powerful disadvantages as well. Most important in the short 
run, natives were placing not only their economy, but their 
very security, at the mercy of the Europeans. The Indians 
could not manufacture the goods they purchased from the 
Europeans and, in the case of the all-important gun, they 
could not repair them or supply ammunition as well. But they 
needed guns not only to protect themselves from nations that 
had them, but also to kill the deer needed to trade for 
everything else they wanted. 12 
The addition of English and French spheres to the Spanish 
presence in the Southeast afforded most of the Indian nations 
a choice among European allies. Geography, economics, and 
diplomacy were considerations for all nations, and each nation 
weighted them in importance according to their own thinking. 
Ease of communication along natural water or land routes and 
good prices were important considerations, but they could be 
offset by European-Indian conflict or by the enmity of the 
European's other native trading partners. A less attractive 
trade might be acceptable with a more reliable military ally 
and arms supplier. 13 
Each of the European colonies offered different 
attractions to the southeastern Indians. Spain, feeblest of 
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the Europeans, offered the most but delivered the least. 
Spanish missionaries offered the Ir1dians eternal salvation 
and membership in the Spanish empire. New Spain had few 
missionaries or soldiers to post on her extreme northern 
frontier, however, and could not prevent the virtual 
extermination of the missions by the English in the War of 
the Spanish succession. Spain was a viable ally after this 
time only along the Gulf coast and among the Lower Creeks, 
where there was always at least a small, but influential, 
Spanish party. 14 
South carolina, the most populous of the southeastern 
colonies, offered the southeastern Indians all or nothing, 
plenty or death. Those Indians who lived on lands sought by 
Englishmen or adjacent to the English settlements could either 
sell their land to the English and move further inland, or be 
killed or sold as slaves by Carolina's native allies. Those 
nations who lived beyond the frontier of settlement and who 
had goods to trade could profit handsomely through an alliance 
with South Carolina, trading for all the European goods they 
could possibly afford. Indians who were not careful, however, 
sometimes traded for more than they could ever afford to 
repay. As the British would discover to their regret, the 
Indians found ways to avoid paying legally or illegally 
acquired debts. 15 
France arrived last in the Southeast, offering much and 
seemingly asking for little in return. Governor Iberville 
proposed to all the nations of the Southeast that they join 
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in a pan-Indian peace under French auspices, and asked only 
for a few small parcels of land on which to establish forts 
and small settlements. There were, however, two problems with 
this plan. Firstly, it required the Indians to renounce 
warfare against each other, or at least among Louisiana's 
native allies, which was contrary to some of the Indians' most 
basic cultural institutions. But secondly, France was never 
able to supply adequately the Choctaws, much less all the 
large and small nations of the Southeast. ·:Sut France did have 
guns and ammunition to trade, and she did offer at least some 
defense against South Carolina's slaver allies. France did 
not always have enough goods to go around, but she always knew 
what to say and how to say it, and oratory was a powerful 
force on the square ground and in the council house. 16 
The Chickasaws' alliance with England was the result of 
both economic and security considerations. The English 
reached the Chickasaws before Iberville did and offered them 
a lucrative and dependable trade, despite the hundreds of 
overland leagues that lay between Charles Town and the 
Chickasaws. Beyond ·that, however, south carolina was the 
perfect ally for diplomatic and security considerations. 
south carolina's settlements were far from the Chickasaws, so 
there was no chance for friction between the allies over such 
common incidents between neighboring allies as unauthorized 
English squatters, l:ndian killing of cattle, or even the 
occasional murders committed on both sides of the frontier. 
south carolina was not the least bit hesitant to sell the 
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Relations were also 
strengthened in the traditional Indian fashion when traders 
took Chickasaw wives, cementing commercial relations with 
kinship ties. The South Carolina-Chickasaw alliance was one 
of the firmest in the s,:.::atheast. 17 
The Choctaws 1 alliance with France was influenced by 
geography but mandated by diplomacy. The settlements of 
French Louisiana were linked to the Choctaw villages by the 
natural water routes of the Mobile River and its branches. 
As a commercial partner, France left much to be desired. Her 
supplies were always insufficient and sometimes totally 
lacking, her prices for deerskins too low, and her European 
manufactures too expensive. But the French armed the Choctaws 
against the Chickasaws, and without those arms the Choctaws• 
very existence was threatened. In the early years of 
Louisiana 1 s settlement the Choctaws, cut off from South 
Carolina by traditional Creek enemies, had nowhere else to 
turn for trade goods but toward the south. But as they became 
increasingly aware of their importance to Louisiana, they 
would considerably raise the cost of their friendship. 18 
The Creeks inhabited the geographical center of the 
Southeast and their land bordered all three European powers. 
As a large, heterogeneous confederation of various tribal and 
even linguistic groups, it was natural for various units of 
the Creeks to form alliances with different European powers. 
Although there would always be a pro-Spanish party among the 
Lower Creeks, the lucrative trade offered by South Carolina 
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was too good for many Creeks to resist. In addition to the 
highly profitable trade in slaves with th~ English, at the 
expense of traditional creek enemies the Apalachees, there was 
also a lively trade to be had in horses. The South 
Carolinians were short of horses in the early years and the 
missions were full of them. Far enough away from South 
Carolina's frontier of settlement in 1699, the creeks were in 
a perfect position to draw the maximum possible benefits from 
an alliance with the English. 19 
The Cherokees, northernmost Indians of the Southeast, 
had few options in 1699 but to ally themselves with South 
Carolina. The Cherokees were separated from Florida by 
Carolina, which had furthermore armed traditional Cherokee 
enemies, the Creeks. Louisiana was far away, and a French 
sphere of influence would not be able to reach the Cherokee 
villages for several decades. The journey from Charles Town 
to the Cherokees mountain villages was not an easy one, but 
the British traders made it nonetheless. British goods were 
desirable, plentiful, and affordable. Cherokee deerskins were 
the thickest and therefore the most valuable in the entire 
Southeast, making an Anglo-Carolina alliance highly 
profitable to both sides. But over and above this, with their 
traditional enemies armed, the Cherokees could not afford to 
fall behind in the eighteenth-century Southeastern arms race. 20 
At the other end of the southeast was another nation with 
little practical choice in allies, the Natchez. Because of 
the nation's size, location, and agricultural surpluses, its 
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friendship was of vital importance to France. In the early 
years of the eighteenth century the Natchez were well supplied 
by the French. Iberville and his successors courted the 
Natchez with ample presents, trade goods, priests, and, in 
1716, the establishment of Fort Rosalie de Natchez. The site 
was even for a time considered the best place for the colony's 
capital. The Natchez were the only large nation in the 
Southeast to have a European settlement on their doorstep, and 
their experience would show that such mixed settlements 
containing large numbers of Europeans was not a viable 
arrangement. 21 
Although the largest nations and confederacies of the 
Southeast had some choice in their allies, most of the smaller 
nations had none. Whether they lived near Frenchmen, 
Spaniards, or Britons, they had only two choices: accommodate 
or die. Those who accommodated usually lived in small villages 
that lay close to European farms and settlements. In 
peacetime they contributed their labor, produce, and the 
fruits of their hunt to the local interethnic economy. In 
wartime they either went on the warpath with the Europeans or 
remained behind to guard the settlements while the Europeans 
used larger Indian allies to do their fighting. Many of these 
11peaceful 11 Indians converted to Christianity and adopted 
European styles of dress and ev-en language, although this 
process varied greatly in tribes and with individuals. 2?. 
As politicians and diplomats, the southeastern l:'.;.Uans 
were at no disadvantage to their European counterparts. As 
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the Indians learned more about the Europeans and realized 
their economic and imperial importance, they adjusted their 
diplomacy accordingly. Europeans who expected naive innocents 
or mindless savages were at a disadvantage when negotiating 
with native headmen who were experienced at clan, village, 
tribal and national politics. According to the Chickasaw 
trader James Adair, who knew them well, "they are possessed 
of a strong comprehensive judgement, 
surprisingly crafty schemes. 1123 
[and] can form 
The "craftiness" of Indian diplomacy was due partly to 
the differences between European and native political 
practices, which strengthened the natives in their 
negotiations with the Europeans by making them unpredictable 
to their adversaries. To a large ~egree this was due to the 
lack of coercive authority on the part of headmen. No Indian 
had the authority or power to commit any other Indian to any 
particular policy or action. Agreements between a headman or 
group of headmen and a European government were in reality 
promises to try to get the nation to adopt the policy or 
course of action in question. There were many ways to 
convince the nation, and oratory was only one of them; bold 
individual action, especially involving the murder of enemies, 
could often commit a nation to a particular course despite its 
majority inclination otherwise. But in the end such decisions 
were usually made by the nation in council. When allied 
headmen could not deliver their nation, Europeans usually 
ascribed the failure to negative character traits such as 
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treachery, inconstancy, venality, or simple mendacity.~ 
Because of this government by consensus, Southeastern 
Indians prized harmony highly and would go to great lengths 
to avoid situations that created disharmony, contention, or 
loss of face. While this was understandable in light of 
native culture, Europeans misunderstood the Indians on many 
occasions to have agreed to a proposition or course of action, 
when actually the Indian had either only expressed a hope that 
the nation would go along with it, or had rejected it as 
politely as he knew how. Thus when events proved other than 
the European expected through his misunderstanding, he again 
rationalized the situation by ascribing it to native character 
faults. When Europeans did not understand the art of native 
diplomacy, they found the Indians unpredictable and therefore 
dangerous. The inability of most Europeans to devise 
strategies that anticipated Indian actions gave the natives 
an important edge in their dealings with the Europeans. 25 
The labyrinth of Indian politics was further complicated 
for the Europeans by the existence of minority parties in each 
nation that did not favor the majority's choice of European 
etllies. Because they genuinely hoped to change the majority• s 
choice, this native "loyal opposition" often acted either in 
open or in secret against the wishes of the majority party, 
and felt no shame or di~honor in doing so. When the minority 
failed to "deliver" the nation to their favored European, 
despite good-faith efforts, the Europeans often accused them 
of faithlessness. But they were too valuable to be discarded, 
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which the Indians soon learned all too well. Thus, in 
addition to the well-known division of the Creeks into 
Spanish, French, and 
Chickasaws sustained 
British factions, over 
a pro-French party ,26 the 
time the 
Choctaws 
developed a British faction that almost succeeded in weaning 
their nation away from the French, 27 and the Cherokees harbored 
a French party that brought the nation into war with South 
Carolina at the end of the Seven Years• War.~ 
Individual hea~en and national councils concluded 
alliances with Europeans for traditional reasons: to obtain 
desirable goods and security. In the creation or the 
continual operation of alliances, Indians attempted to gain 
the most advantages from their alliance by resorting to 
strategies and tactics traditionally used with native allies. 
No less than the Europeans, southeastern natives conducted 
their affairs within the constructs of their own traditions. 
Whatever Europeans may have thought, native Americans had 
their own reasons for acting as they did.~ 
Southeastern Indians provided useful and even necessary 
service as military reserves for their respective allies. 
The Indians provided these services, not out of blind 
submission to European superpowers, but for both general and 
specific, short-term and long-term benefits. In a general 
way, warfare in alliance with the Europeans provided the 
traditional means for their young men to become recognized 
warriors by winning war honors. But there were immediate 
rewards as well to be had in plunder, payment for scalps, and 
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a booming slave trade. 30 The slave trade itself was a 
traditional institution that was transformed by Europeans, 
but remained for the Indians a familiar exercise. constituting 
only one aspect of warfare before the arrival of the 
Europeans, the Indians suddenly began to make war expressly 
in order to obtain slaves, to take advantage of the new 
economic incentives offered by Europeans. 31 
Service as military allies could even be used as a 
bargaining tool with which to obtain better trading conditions 
from the Europeans. One Alabama chief told Bienville that 
some of his nation's warriors had taken part in Oglethorpe's 
unsuccessful expedition against st. Augustine in 1742 on the 
promise of a one-third reduction in prices from Carolina 
traders. But the Indian confessed that even with such 
incentives, not many of his nation took advantage of the 
offer. Contrary to the opinion of many contemporary European 
observers, economic inducements alone, in the absence of a 
traditional rationale or some perceived personal or national 
benefit, were seldom enough to "buy" a southeastern Indian. 32 
In the Southeast, European settlements usually began on 
lands uninhabited by Indians. Nearby Indians either became 
friends with the Europeans and established mutually beneficial 
alliances, or became enemies and suffered gradual or sudden 
depopulation through disease or the slaving wars of the 
Europeans and their native allies. But European-Indian 
alliances l1ere fragile creations and susceptible to many 
pressures. Colonial settlements expanded closer and closer 
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to the more populous tribes of the interior, and imperial 
military, diplomatic, and commercial rivalries increased as 
the eighteenth century wore on. Those same forces made 
European-Indian relations evermore susceptible to conflict. 33 
Given the exploratory nature of European-Indian alliances 
in the first decades of the eighteenth century it should not 
be surprising that the two great interracial wars that took 
place before 1733 were not between long-time enemies but 
erstwhile allies. In both cases, moreover, each of the 
European participants was drawn into a costly war, in lives 
and money, due not to the machinations of its European rivals, 
but the actions and policies of its own subjects. Though the 
causes of the wars were different from the European side, the 
responses of the Indians were the same. When they were pushed 
too far by Europeans and found themselves in a no-win 
situation, they struck back in traditional fashion, through 
war. 
The war that broke out unexpectedly between the 
southeastern Indians and South Carolina was not caused by the 
machinations of Frenchmen or Spaniards, but by problems in 
the Indian trade. One problem was lack of effective 
regulation of traders. Traders cheated and abused Indians 
economically, physically, and sexually, often after getting 
them drunk on rum first. The Indians accumulated great debt, 
much of it fraudulently contracted. Coupled with this, 
however, was a more impersonal factor. Overhunting reduced 
the deer population drastically, practically eliminating it 
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in some areas, so that by the middle 1710s many Indians found 
it impossible to acquire enough deerskins to pay their debts. 34 
The war erupted on Good Friday, April 15, 1715 and 
quickly spread death and destruction across the entire 
frontier of South Carolina. Among the cowetas, Talapoosas, 
Abihkas, Alabamas, and Choctaws, some British traders were 
killed, while others were protected by their Indian friends 
but lost their goods and warehouses. The Yuchees, Apalachees, 
savannahs, and smaller tribes took part in the war in varying 
degrees. The Chickasaws protected their traders and did not 
become involved in the war at all. Hundreds of settlers lost 
their lives in the initial attacks and hundreds more fled 
their farms, ranches, and plantations for the safety of 
Charles Town. Many desired to flee the colony entirely, but 
were prevented by Governor Charles Craven. 35 
The Carolinians put up the best defense they could and 
eventually received help from their fellow colonists to the 
north. But the most crucial factor in the preservation of 
the colony was South Carolina 1 s success in preserving Cherokee 
neutrality in the war. On their own, the Creeks nearly 
destroyed the colony; with the Cherokees against them as well, 
the Carolinians could not have survived except by flight. But 
during the fall of 1715 the traders Eleazar Wigan and Robert 
Gilcrest made a diplomatic foray into Cherokee country that 
saved the colony. They returned to Charles To~~ in October 
with 8 headmen, 12 head warriors, and 100 attendants. In the 
relieved capital the Indians solemnly promised to meet with 
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the English in force and to march with them against the 
creeks. Many planters were so heartened that they returned 
to their plantations.~ 
The colony was not yet out of danger, however. When the 
Cherokees did not make the planned rendezvous, a force of 
three hundred Carolinians marched into the heart of Cherokee 
country under Colonel Maurice Moore to resolve all doubts 
about Cherokee inte'1tions. In council at Tugaloo on December 
20, they learned that the Cherokees were divided into two 
parties over the war. One party from the lower towns, led by 
the Conjuror, was for peace with the English but rlid not want 
to attack any of England's enemies except the Yuchees, 
Savannahs, and Apalachees. The overhill towns, led by Caesar 
of Chota, favored an all-out attack on England's enemies. The 
Cherokees had agreed to make peace with the Creeks, and Caesar 
held his warriors in check while they waited for a delegation 
of Creek headmen to deliver up English prisoners and arrange 
a peace. The Creeks arrived late, however, and their talk at 
Tugaloo was not of peace with England but of a Creek-Cherokee 
alliance to drive the English off the land. Instead of being 
won over by this talk, the Conjuror's "peace" party killed all 
of the Creek diplomats, effectively preventing an anti-
Carolina coalition. After this the Yamasee war entered into 
its mopping-up phase. Although sporadic fighting continued 
and peace was not concluded with the Creeks until 1717, the 
war had been effectively won, more by Indian diplomacy than 
by force of arms. 37 
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The Yamasees, who, among the larger tribes, lived closest 
to Charles Town, suffered most from the abuses of the traders, 
and they lost most in the war which bears their name. Many 
of their people were killed in the fighting, but many were 
taken captive and sold into slavery in the West Indies. 
Drastically reduced in number and driven from their homes, the 
remaining Yamasees were welcomed in Florida and settled in 
three villages near St. Augustine. There they remained a 
thorn in the side of Carolina and served as a diplomatic link 
between Florida and the Lower Creeks, to whom many of the 
Yamasees were related.~ 
The most important legacy of the Yamasee War for the 
Indians was a major realignment of the Creek confederacy into 
a position of neutrality in the imperial struggles of the 
Europeans. In 1712 the abuses of the English traders prompted 
the Alabamas to make peace with Louisiana, despite eight years 
of bitter intermittent warfare with the colony. This peace 
also included the Choctaws, Mobilians, and other French 
allies. When the Yamasee War broke out, t:.he Upper Creeks were 
able to secure a peace between the Lower Creeks and Louisiana 
as well. In order permanently to use Louisiana as a defense 
against Carolina, the Alabamas offered Louisiana the 
opportunity to establish a fort near their villages. There 
they would have a ready supply of European goods on their 
doorstep, a bla~ksmith to repair their guns, knives and hoes, 
and other practical advantages. But more importantly, they 
would have a check on Carolina and an ally if the English once 
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more became so troublesome. Fort Toulouse des Alibamons would 
serve the Indians as well as, and perhaps better than, it did 
\:he French. 39 
The Natchez Indians also allowed the French to place a 
fort and settlement on their doorstep, although it was more 
for commercial than strategic purposes. The Natchez were 
receptive to an English trade, but by 1713, when Frenchmen 
invested the area, English traders could not yet make regular 
trips to their villages. By 1715 the nearby trading post and 
concession of the La Loire brothers was the site of regular 
trading and expanding agricultural operations. In 1716 
Bienville established Fort Rosalie de Natchez on the high 
bluff overlooking the Mississippi River. Considering its 
strategic location, fortifications, and agricultural and 
commercial potential, the site looked to be the success story 
Louisiana had been waiting for. 40 
By this time, however, there was already trouble between 
Natchez and Frenchmen. On a visit to the nation, Governor 
Antoine La Mathe Cadillac: who generally hated and always 
mistrusted the Indians, refused to smoke the calumet of peace 
with the Natchgez at a visit to their nation. At least some 
of the Natchez chiefs considered this an act of war, which it 
clearly was in native terms, an interpretation reportedly 
supported by several English traders then in the nation. As 
a result four French traders were killed. The incident 
precipitated a power struggle within the Natchez ruling 
council that lieutenant-governor Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne de 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47 
Bienville was able to turn to his advantage, but which 
undoubtedly created ill-will toward the French among some 
influential Natchez leaders. 41 
Debt caused problems in Louisiana as well as carolina. 
In the fall of 1722 an altercation began between a soldier 
and an elderly Indian who owed the soldier some corn. An 
Indian was killed in the ensuing melee. When the soldier was 
not punished, the Natchez raided several concessions. A peace 
was patched together, but the Natchez, feeling slighted, 
boycotted the French trade entirely and continued sporadic 
attacks. Almost one year after this "second Natchez war" 
began, Bienville went to the nation personally to resolve the 
matter. Feeling that the Natchez had been wronged, Bienville 
concluded what he considered a fair peace, but what many 
habitants considered capitulation to the Indians. Bienville 1 s 
terms, however, included the execution of twelve Indians, 
including several chiefs. Peace and trade were restored to 
their former footing, but many Natchez were now disillusioned 
with the French. 42 
The Natchez had even more room for disillusionment after 
considering the quality and conduct of Fort Rosalie's 
commandants after Etienne Perier became governor in 1'125. 
Charles du Tisne, the first, mistreated soldiers and settlers 
alike, and his administration precipitated gradually 
deteriorating relations with the Natchez as well. Commandant 
De Chepart, Du Tisne•s successor: was even worse. Although 
he was officially rebuked several times by Perier, he and the 
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governor became partners in a concession at Natchez. During 
the summer of 1729 De Chepart decided that the best place for 
the concession was the site of the Natchez Grand Village. 
When the Great Sun gently tried to convince the commandant to 
choose another site, he could see that the Frenchman would not 
listen to reason. To stall for time, the sun asked De Chepart 
if they could delay leaving the village for three months, as 
opposed to the three days demanded by the commandant, in order 
that they might harvest their corn crop, which they would give 
to the commandant in ar.>preciation for the extra time. To this 
De Chepart graciously assented.~ 
In the meantime, the Natchez made plans for the 
destruction of the French. Because of the apparent cupidity 
of De Chepart, who failed to heed several warnings of 
impending trouble, the Natchez had several months to prepare 
unmolested their destruction of the French. The plan was 
simple and carried out with ruthless efficiency. on the 
morning of November 29, 1729, the Natchez entered Fort Rosalie 
under guise of a friendly visit and killed the garrison; 
simultaneous attacks on the many nearby plantations resulted 
in the deaths of over 250 French men, women, children and the 
capture of over 150 French women and children and 100 Negro 
slaves. In the immediate aftermath of the revolt, while the 
French dithered in terror and doubt, the Natchez celebrated 
their great victory untroubled for almost two months. But 
their victory was short-lived. 44 
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On January 27, 1730, a party of French and Choctaw under 
Jean-Paul Le Sueur surprised the Natchez at their village on 
st. Catherine's Creek. They killed or captured almost 100 
Natchez, and rescued 54 French and 100 Negro captives. The 
Natchez took refuge in two forts they had on either side of 
the creek. In February another French and Choctaw party 
reached Natchez, this one with an artillery train, and the two 
forces together laid siege to the fort. The siege was lifted 
two weeks later when the Natchez agreed to release their 
remaining French captives and Negro slaves if the French would 
withdraw their artillery. The transfer was completed on 
February 27, but the French, not feeling bound by a promise 
made to such "barbarians, " planned to resume the attack in 
full the next morning. The Indians did not trust the French, 
however, and stole away from their forts in the middle of the 
night. 45 
The Natchez retreated across the Mississippi and took 
refuge in the swamps along the Ouachita River in present-day 
central Louisiana. The country was so dense with swamps, 
bayous, and canebrakes that, despite numerous Indian 
reconnaissance expeditions, the Natchez fort was not located 
until a Franco-Choctaw army practically stUF~led upon it in 
January 1731. There, once again, despite the bad faith of 
the French, a large number of Natchez men, women, and children 
managed to escape a fort under siege by Frenchmen and 
Choctaws. The Natchez fled further westward, and in October 
1731 were decisively defeated by a band of Frenchmen and 
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Natchitoches Indians under Louis Juchereau de st. Denis. The 
remaining Natchez dispersed into three bands, one of which 
found refuge among the Chickasaws immediately, while the other 
two remained for some time west of the Mississippi.~ 
During the first three decades of the eighteenth century 
the southeastern Indians increasingly accommodated themselves 
to the world-wide trade and conflicts of the three European 
powers who established themselves on these marches of empire. 
Far from powerless pawns, the southeastern Indians variously 
accepted or rejected the European program for the region and 
did so according to their own plans and devices. The success 
achieved by tribes, nations, and confederacies in adjusting 
to the European presence varied. Different factors such as 
their size relative to nearby Europeans, their strategic and 
economic relationship with other Indians and Europeans, and 
their ability to understand and anticipate the actions of the 
Europeans all influenced the fate of the Indians. Despite 
their best efforts, however, as the eighteenth century 
progressed the southeastern Indians found themselves 
increasingly imperiled in their own land. 
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CHAPTER III 
IMPERIAL CONFLICTS ON AN EVOLVING FRONTIER, 
1699-1733 
Important changes occurred in the composition and 
strength of the European colonies on the southeastern frontier 
during the first three decades of the eighteenth century. The 
English expanded their sphere of influence westward and 
southward, though their advance was not without serious 
obstacles. The French established permanent settlements in 
the vast country they called Louisiana, but struggled to 
maintain control of the Mississippi River, the lifeline of the 
colony. The Spaniards extended control of Florida westward 
to Pensacola, but nearly lost that vital harbor to France. 
Thus, during the first third of the eighteenth century 
Europeans established the zones of influence in which they 
would seek to extend their empires for another three decades. 
Nevertheless, in the many-sided imperial contest of the day 
the Southeast was on the geographical and political periphery. 
During the half-decade from 1697 to 1702 Europe and North 
America enjoyed a brief respite from what must have seemed to 
most observers the interminable wars between Louis XIV and the 
rest of the world. But whereas many regions saw at least a 
few calm seasons during this peace, the southeastern part of 
55 
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North America experienced a frenzy of activity on the part of 
England, France, and Spain to establish, strengthen, or expand 
colonies. Thus, when the next round of intercolonial wars 
began in 1702, the southeast was the scene of renewed colonial 
activity. The expansion of English and Spanish spheres and 
the creation of a new French sphere meant that Europeans and 
natives had to adjust their strategy and tactics accoringly. 
1. Carolana 
The cessation of hostilities brought about by the Treaty 
of Ryswick meant that long-delayed colonial ventures of 
England, France, and Spain could now go forward. In England 
the principle agent of the new wave of imperialism was Dr. 
Daniel Coxe. A man of many interests, Coxe was a physician, 
scientist, author, and member of the Royal Society. As early 
as 1684 coxe bought land in West Jer·sey; eventually he 
acquired land in East Jersey and the proprietary right to 
the colony. In the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution, he 
sold these lands and rights to William Penn and others. He 
did not, however, abandon interest in colonization. 
Unsuccessful in obtaining a grant in the northern latitudes, 
he acquired title to 11Carolana 11 some time before 1698. This 
grant, originally made in 1629, included everything between 
Albermarle Sound in Virginia and the mouth of the st. John's 
River in Florida, and west to the "South Sea". Although 
Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina occupied the 
eastern limits of this grant by 1698, the remaining lands 
still amounted to the largest grant ever made by the British 
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crown to an individual in North America. 1 
During the next several years, Coxe planned to transform 
his grant into a great English commonwealth. A plan of 
government was devised, a company planned, and lands 
transferred to the name of would-be settlement promoters. 
Coxe was never reticent about his schemes. He published a 
one-page pamphlet entitled "Proposals for Settling a Colony 
in Florida" which beckoned Protestants from northern Europe 
and England to settle there. In October 1698 two brigs 
carrying French Huguenots left England for Carolana. When 
the would-be colonists stopped in Charles Town for supplies, 
they decided to winter there before going on to the 
Mississippi River. One ship remained behind, but in May 1699 
the other ship's replacement, the 12-gun corvette carolina 
Galley, Captain William Bond commanding, sailed for Carolana. 2 
Bond sailed westward along the gulf 1 s northern shore 
seeking the Mississippi's mouth. Somehow he missed sighting 
the recently established settlements of Pensacola and Biloxi 
and sailed past the Mississippi well into Spanish waters. 
Doubling back, Bond found the mouth of the Mississippi on 
August 29, 1699. After ascending the river some twenty-three 
leagues, he encountered a French scouting party under command 
of Jean Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville3 taking soundings of 
the river. Bienville informed the Englishmen of France's 
claim to Louisiana, and added that the English captain was 
mistaken to believe that he was on the Mississippi, which 
flowed some distance away. Whether or not Bond believed 
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Bienville's story, he turned back, promising to return with 
a larger force to settle the country. 4 
carol ana died with Bond • s retreat, but even in its 
stillbirth the project would have far-reaching consequences. 
Bond 1 s entry into the Mississippi marked the first Anglo-
French confrontation in the Mississippi Valley, and it was 
Coxe•s plan for Carolana that prompted Spain and France to 
take possession of the Gulf coast at the time and in the 
manner which they did. Moreover, while Coxe as program of 
western expansion proved impractical in his own day, it 
nevertheless gathered strength as the eighteenth century 
unfolded. The Carolana probe set off alarm signals in the 
French and Spanish colonial ministries, which soon renewed 
their.efforts to dominate the Southeast. Thus the stage was 
set for a decades-long contest in the region among the 
Europeans and their Indian allies. 5 
2. Florida 
If English plans for settling the Gulf Coast were limited 
to private efforts, the French and Spanish governments on the 
other hand had developed strategies and had already sent their 
agents abroad. Neither court underestimated the English 
threat. Spain viewed the Gulf of Mexico as a Spanish lake, 
and claimed its entire continental littoral as Spanish 
territory. The news that France, too, was planning to 
establish a colony on the Gulf Coast under the intrepid Pierre 
Le Moyne d 1 Iberville spurred the usually lethargic Spanish 
bureaucracy to decisive action. Although an outpost had been 
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decreed for Florida's Bahia Santa Maria de Galve as early as 
1694, it had not been established. 6 Spain correctly feared 
that the French were bound for this spot rather than the 
Mississippi River, since it had the best natural harbor on the 
northern Gulf Coast. Spanish occupation of the bay was now 
of immediate concern. 
Andres de Arriola hurried from vera Cruz with a small 
contingent of Spanish troops and arrived in the bay only weeks 
before Iberville. Arriola threw up an earthwork fort as 
quickly as he could, and through a desperate and bold 
performance managed to convince Iberville that his presidio 
was much stronger and better manned than it was in fact. 
Pensacola is the oldest settlement on the coast, but for many 
years it was one of the weakest. 7 
The fortification at Pensacola was a strategic necessity 
that was kept barely functional by the Madrid government. Far 
from Havana and remote even from St. Augustine, Pensacola 
de~eloped a symbiotic relationship with the French outpost of 
Mobile that helped to keep both viable. Pensacola attracted 
few settlers and agriculture was practically nonexistent. 
Because the supply ships from Havana were perennially short 
on foodstuffs, Pensacola depended upon Mobile for much--and 
often all--of its food supply. But the Spaniards paid for 
their supplies with Mexican gold and silver, which was 
generally the only specie circulating in Louisiana. Trade 
goods occasionally passed between the two colonial outposts, 
in contravention of the laws of both crowns. Officials on 
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both sides of the frontier realized it was often the only way 
to survive. 8 
The relationship between Florida and Louisiana extended 
far beyond food and finance, however. In the colonial contest 
for the Southeast the two colonies traded intelligence freely 
and worked together in their relationships with the Indians. 
Amity was temporarily interrupted during the Franco-Spanish 
war of 1719-1721. Although the fighting was limited mostly 
to Europe, Bienville saw the war as an opportunity to fulfill 
his long-held dream of seizing Pensacola for France and 
thereby gain a better position from which to oppose the 
British. French forces captured Pensacola twice and were 
holding it when the war ended. Bienville urged French 
retention of Pensacola, but France, desperately needing the 
Spanish alliance, returned Pensacola to Spain. For Bienville 
it was no doubt a bitter pill. 9 
Although Florida exerted far less influence on the 
southeastern fron~ier than South Carolina or Louisiana, its 
role was by no means insignificant. The Spanish party among 
the Creeks was always a factor to concern South Carolina, and 
later Georgia, and Spanish pirates preyed upon Carolina's 
coastal shipping and plantations. More importantly, however, 
British preoccupation with Florida gave the French time to 
consolidate their.hold on the Mississippi Valley. If even 
a fraction of the resources expended on the conquest of 
Florida, first against the missions in the early 1700s and 
then against st. Augustine in the 1740s, had been directed 
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against Louisiana--as was several times proposed--Louisiana 
probably would have become British territory, causing a 
significant shift in the balance of power in North America. 
France could hardly have had a better, or cheaper, buffer for 
Louisiana than Florida. 
3. Louisiana, 1699-li32 
France, like Spain, was spurred to action by Coxe•s 
activities. Out of geopolitical necessity Minister of Marine 
Louis Phelypeux, comte de Pontchartrain, dusted off La Salle's 
old plan for a colony in Louisiana. But to the argument that 
Louisiana was the place from which to gain access to Mexico's 
fabled silver mines, La Salle's former lieutenant Henri de 
Tonti added a new and more compelling argument. If the 
English occupied Carolina/Louisiana, as they were preparing 
to do, Canada would be ruined. From the Mississippi River the 
English could engross the fur trade first of the Miamis, 
Illinois, and Ottawas, then all the nations of the north. 
Tonti assured the French court in a series of memorials that 
the English were already established on branches of the Ohio, 
an arm of the Mississippi. Thus French occupation of 
Louisiana was vi tal in protecting the back door to New 
France. 10 
To effect this check on English and Spanish plans for 
the Gulf Coast, Pontchartrain enlisted the services of Pierre 
Le Moyne d'Iberville. Iberville had taken part in several 
hard-fought campaigns against the Iroquois and their New 
England allies, and had made a name for himself as the hero 
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of Hudson's Bay, where he won a decisive victory in September 
1697 over a mobile and more heavily armed three-ship English 
flotilla. A Canadian, able to command at sea, who possessed 
an intimate knowledge of the Indians and their ways, Iberville 
was the natural choice to establish France's presence on the 
Gulf coast. With him came Canadians who, along with their 
offspring, would play a major part in the colony's affairs for 
many decades to come. 11 
Even though the occupation of the Mississippi was deemed 
vital to France, it did not necessarily follow that Louis XIV 
was prepared to spend much money on the project. Rather than 
a full-fledged settlement colony, Louisiana was projected to 
be no more than a garrison of 280 men. 12 Iberville's initial 
voyage to the colony was undertaken in only four light-draft 
vessels, with a total cc;:~:uk>7i.~,,~~<:.<l.lt of less than 300 men. 'I'he 
flotilla reached Santa Rosa Island, near Pensacola, on January 
23, 1699. Iberville hoped to make his base there, but the 
recently arrived Arriola persuaded him that the harbor was 
firmly held Spanish territory. on January 31 Iberville 
anchored off Mobile Bay, and on March 2 he began to explore 
the lower reaches of the Mississippi. 13 
Iberville knew that the only firm foundation for a French 
presence in Louisiana was the friendship of the natives. As 
the French made contact with the Indians along the Mississippi 
Gulf Coast, and then along the lower reaches of the 
Mississippi River, they were careful to make friends and 
conclude alliances with everyone . they met. Iberville's 
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strategy was to construct a system of alliances whereby all 
the Indians of the Southeast would serve as the bulwarks of 
the colony. As military allies, the Indians would serve as 
Louisiana's front-line troops and defenders against all foes. 
As trading partners the Indians would provide France with raw 
materials, such as furs, which were not available in Europe, 
and a market for French goods, which Iberville was sure they 
would readily adopt. Additionally and most important in the 
short term, the Indians would protect and provision the 
pitifully small garrisons entrusted with the implementation 
of this grandiose scheme. 14 
From the beginning Iberville faced several serious 
obstacles in the implementation of his plan. one was South 
Carolina. Carolina traders were already active among the 
Chickasaws, who were important to both empires because of 
their location near the Mississippi River. Indian culture 
also worked against Iberville's pan-Indian peace. War was 
such an integral part of Indian life that it would have been 
difficult for any nation to forgo, even for plentiful European 
trade goods. More than that, however, the Chickasaws were 
doing a brisk business with carolina in Choctaw slaves, and 
a Choctaw-Chickasaw peace was at the center of Iberville's 
grand alliance. 15 
Fortunately for Iberville, he had the best possible help 
in concluding alliances with the Chickasaws, Natchez, and 
other Indian nations. While Iberville directed the 
construction of the first camps and forts along the gulf coast 
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and Lower Mississippi River he was joined by Henri de Tonti 
and Pierre Le Sueur, veteran traders who had spent almost two 
decades in the region. Tonti brought with him nearly two 
dozen Canadians, knowledge of the Indians and their languages, 
and the respect of all the nations along the river. La 
Salle's project was at last completed. 16 
In the fall of 1700 a revolution erupted in Europe that 
was to influence greatly the development of Louisiana. When 
Charles II of Spain died in November 1700, he left his throne 
to Philip D'Anjou, a great-grandson of Louis XIV. France's 
acceptance of this inheritance of course meant war. A union 
between France and Spain would create the most powerful 
alliance in the world at the time, and would automatically be 
opposed by England, Austria, the United Provinces, and other 
European powers. Iberville saw in the shifting balance of 
power an opportunity to end the English threat in North 
America once and for all. 
Iberville was convinced that if left unchecked, the 
English would soon move west of the Appalachians and extend 
their domination to the Mississippi and beyond. Since the 
Spanish in Florida and along the northern Gulf of Mexico were 
too weak to prevent this, Iberville proposed to Louis XIV that 
France assume a more active role in the region. He reiterated 
his proposal to draw all the southeastern Indians into a 
French alliance, and even suggested that Spain be persuaded 
to cede Pensacola so that he might make the entire northern 
gulf shore an effective barrier to English aggression. Then 
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Iberville introduced a bold plan to seize Boston and New York. 
i.'''l~: :'i'-·and schemes do not easily translate into reality. 17 
:.'lith Tonti 1 s help, Iberville laid the groundwork for his 
pan-Indian peace, beginning in 1702 by making peace between 
the Choctaws and Chickasaws. Simply getting the Chickasaws 
to Mobile to meet with Iberville and the Choctaws was a feat, 
and would probably have been impossible without the boldness 
and experience of Tonti. 18 But concluding a peace treaty was 
only the first step. The terms of the treaty required the 
Chickasaws to renounce all commerce with the English, but at 
the same time it stipulated that Louisiana was obligated to 
supply the Chickasaws with a trade of the same quality, 
quantity, and price as Carolina. This Louisiana was never 
be able to do. 19 
The outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1702 
plunged Louisiana into a decade of isolation, privation, and 
danger. The English navy was very successful in establishing 
a blockade of the Gulf of Mexico, and the Louisiana colony 
went for years at a time without any contact with France. 
Because they could not grow their own food, the few French 
settlers living along the coast from Biloxi to Mobile were 
often without food and were forced to live with the Indians 
as the only alternative to starvation. 2° France's virtual 
abandonment of Louisiana during the War of the Spanish 
Succession killed all hopes Iberville had of fully 
implementing his Indian peace and aggressive anti-British 
schemes. Without presents and merchandise for the Indians, 
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a strong garrison, and a vibrant export trade to finance this 
bold initiative it was out of the question. 21 
The Indians 1 importance to Louisiana made it doubly 
necessary that all aspects of Franco-Indian contact be 
strictly controlled by the government. Internal order, which 
was so easily and often fatally upset, required that traders 
and settlers as well as Indians understand clearly the rules 
governing the trade. 
and the natives, 
A tariff, agreed upon by the government 
determined prices and was revised 
periodically to compensate for rising European prices. The 
Superior Council of Louisiana often had to decide 
controversies about prices, quality, or quantity brought by 
colonists and Indians alike. 22 
The need for internal order notwithstanding, Louisiana 
could not fulfill its strategic purpose in the absence of 
good relations with the Indians. Bad relations with the 
Indians could spell the death of the colony, so trade and 
diplomacy were strictly controlled by colonial officials. 
Diplomatic relations were always carried out by the governor 
or his subordinates, and most of the trade was controlled by 
these individuals as well. At sensitive interior posts 
commandants were given monopolies on the trade of their 
nation, not only to provide for their income but to ensure an 
orderly trade as well.~ 
Bienville, who succeeded his brother as governor, 
recognized early that he would not be given the proper tools 
to carry out the Herculean tasks assigned him and his colony, 
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and used everything he knew about the Indians to keep his 
colony not only viable but effective. He learned as much as 
possible about every nation in the region and their possible 
usefulness or danger to Louisiana. He placed young French 
noblemen in the villages, both to learn Indian languages and 
to collect intelligence. Although he could not match English 
merchandise or presents, either in quantity or quality, he 
spoke to the Indians in native languages, showed them great 
friendship, and treated them as equals. He also took care to 
serve as a peace-keeper among them and never to be discovered 
lying to them. Although he did not hesitate to use subterfuge 
against his friends or his enemies, it was always done to put 
France in the most favorable light possible. In such a way 
Bienville and his successors were able to keep Louisiana alive 
in the face of overwhelming odds. 24 
Unable and unwilling to develop Louisiana, the French 
crown qave the monoDol v on the colonv to a succession of 
- - - .. 
individuals and companies who did little better than keep the 
colony alive. The first proprietor was the financier Antoine 
Crozat. Despite his worldwide trading empire and experience 
in colonial affairs, Crozat held the colony for less than five 
years before handing it back to the crown as an unprofitable 
burden. 25 In 1717 John Law took Louisiana under the wings of 
the Compagnie des Indes Occidentales, and for a few seasons 
Louisiana was the scene of frenzied colonial activity. When 
the "Mississippi Bubble" burst, however, Louisiana once again 
became the neglected stepchild of French North America. The 
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Compagnie des Indes was reorganized, but Louisiana was all but 
forgotten by the company and the crown.u 
Not all of Bienville • s successors as governor appreciated 
the importance of the Indians to Louisiana. Antoine La Mothe 
Cadillac, Jean-Michel de Lepinay, and Etienne Perier all 
looked on the Indians with distaste and gave the natives 
little time or thought in their governance of the colony. 
Cadillac grossly insulted the Indians on several occasions, 
and the colony was saved from disaster only by the adroit 
maneuvering of Bienville, at the time demoted to 
lieutenant-governor. Perier, who had replaced Bienville as 
governor a few years later, had no one to compensate for his 
bad judgment, and as a result the colony almost perished in 
the Natchez Revolt. 27 
Economic policies of the proprietary companies were not 
always designed to cultivate native friendship. Crozat was 
determined to profit from his monopoly, but in the end his 
economic policies were self-defeating. Rather than investing 
sufficient capital and patiently developing the colony, Crozat 
hoped to make maximum profits from minimum investment. Crozat 
forbade all commerce going to Louisiana from Illinois or 
France other than his own, he raised the prices on his goods 
sold in the colony 100 to 300 percent, and he correspondingly 
lowered prices he paid for the few products coming out of 
Louisiana. This affected the Indians almost as much as the 
French; French prices paid for deerskins were so low that the 
Indians were practically forced to trade with the 
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Carolinians. 28 
Because of Crozat•s pricing policy and Cadillac's 
offensiveness, when the Carolina entrepreneur Price Hughes 
arrived among the Choctaws in 1715 offering a plentiful trade 
at good prices, the Choctaws were naturally ready to talk. 
In a great stroke of luck for Louisiana, however, this English 
initiative occurred just when Cadillac set out on an extended 
search for mines in the upper country. Bienville convinced 
the Indians that Cadillac had left the colony for good and he 
promised to make everything right. When Bienville persuaded 
the Choctaws to hand over Price Hughes as his prisoner, he 
effected a powerful check on the carolina traders 1 whole 
western program. Potential profits in the Choctaw tra~e were 
simply not worth the risk of being betrayed to the French. 
Because this check coincided with the beginning of the Yamasee 
Revolt, the English were not able to repair the damage 
quickly, and it would be two decades before Carolina would 
again gain a significant party among the Choctaws.~ 
The proprietary period in Louisiana was not without its 
successes, one of the more significant of which was the 
establishment of Fort Toulouse des Alibamons. The Alaba~a 
Indians, because of the central geographical position and the 
eminence they enjoyed among the Creek tribes, were one of the 
most influential tribes in the Southeast, and both Louisiana 
and south Carolina had long sought to establish a permanent 
presence among them. For Louisiana the .post was crucial. 
From there the French could monitor English activities among 
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the Creeks and bar Carolina's path to the Choctaws. Bienville 
wanted to place a fort there from the earliest days of the 
colony, but the project was not approved until 1715, when the 
Yamasee War seemingly prodded the French bureaucracy to 
action. Cadillac's hed.tation to move into this volatile but 
necessary position almost fatally doomed its implementation. 30 
Cadillac's successor arrived in Louisiana in March 1717 
and four months later sent a force of twenty men and an 
officer to establish a post and construct a fort. The 
Frenchmen arrived not a moment too soon; an English force with 
identical intentions arrived less than a month later. Unlike 
the French, the Carolina traders carried presents with them, 
and but for the diplomatic savvy of the French commandant the 
French would have been dislodged, a potential bonanza 
squandered. 31 
Fort Toulouse, like Louisiana itself, was a tactical 
necessity which served its purpose simply by its existence, 
not its strength. A fort was decreed and therefore built, 
but support for its ongoing maintenance was niggardly at best. 
It was manned by an officer and twenty men, too few to do 
anything but serve as a point of contact with the Indians and 
to threaten the occasional Englishman. Chronically 
ill-supplied, the garrison could not supply the numerous 
Alabamas their needs, let alone those of all their neighbors. 
The Indians respected strength and had only contempt for 
weakness, and Fort Toulouse was nct:hing if not weak. But the 
fort would be as useful to the Alabamas as it was to the 
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French, so it was allowed to exist. 32 
some progress was made in developing Louisiana between 
1717 and 1723, but the collapse and reorganization of Law's 
company ended the dream of a strong settlement colony. No 
longer the focus of attention in French North America, 
Louisiana once more became the neglected stepchild. In order 
to strengthen the commerce of the French West Indies, which 
gave the company the fastest return on its investment, the 
directors slashed expenses in Louisiana. The posts of Dauphin 
Island and Biloxi, which guarded the coast, and Arkansas and 
Yazoo, which kept watch on the Mississippi River, were ordered 
abandoned. Bienville was able to save the Yazoo post, 
however, since it was the only possible means to prevent the 
English from making inroads among the Choctaws. 33 
By any objective measure, the colony was severely 
undermanned. In all Louisiana there were only eight companies 
of fifty men each. New Orleans was garrisoned by 130 men, 
Mobile by only 85. When all th~ sick, lame, and elderly 
soldiers--of which there were always many in Louisiana--were 
accounted for, the colony was protected by only a handful of 
men. Jesuit missionaries were sent in their place. The 
missionaries were supposed to bring the nations from the Ohio 
to the Natchez country into the French alliance, thus blocking 
the path to the Mississippi to the British. The Jesuits were 
expected to prove as efficacious in influencing and 
controlling the Indians in Louisiana as they haci been in 
Canada. In canada, however, the Jesuits worked along with a 
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strong military presence, not in place of one.~ 
To make matters worse, between 1723 and 1727 Louisiana 
suffered from an almost total administrative collapse. 
Louisiana was administered by two bodies, the conseil de 
commerce, which was charged with civil administration, and 
the conseil superieur, which administered justice. The head 
of the conseil de commerce was thus put in opposition to the 
governor, Bienville, and his military authority. Constant 
fighting between the two officials was not ended until 1725 
with the recall of Bienville, head of one of the factions and 
one of the chief combatants. 35 
Bienville's recall was to have a dramatic impact on 
French relations with the natives. For all his shortcomings, 
Bienville knew the Indians, and his ability to influence 
native policies and actions kept the French position in the 
Mississippi Valley viable despite internal and external 
problems. Bienville was replaced by a Etienne de Perier, a 
sea captain who did not appreciate the importance of the 
Indians to Louisiana. Because of Perier's mismanagement of 
Indian relations, the colony was brought to the very brink of 
destruction by the Natchez Uprising. 
Perier' s explanation of the uprising as a carolina-
inspired conjuration qenerale des sauvaqes was not endorsed 
by many of his contemporaries, either in Louisiana or France. 
He needed a conspiracy to mask his own weaknesses as governor, 
and probably hoped that bringing the English into it would 
distract metropolitan officials. Unfortunately for Perier, 
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there was never any proof offered to validate his charges. 
The misguided policies which precipitated the revolt and the 
inept manner of the French response were both rejected by his 
superiors and he was recalled.~ 
The Natchez Uprising was the watershed event of the 
French experience in Louisiana and set into motion fundamental 
changes in policy, personnel, and practice which were to colo:: 
the next thirty years.· The abandonment of Natchez and 
incipient settlements on the Yazoo were of immediate 
consequence. Although Natchez was resettled within few years, 
other potential sites in present-day Mississippi had to wait 
for Spanish and even American settlers. More important, by 
late 1730 the Company of the Indies had incurred so many 
losses as the result of the uprising that in January 1731 the 
company returned title to Louisiana to the crown. Louisiana 
had never been profitable to the company. In the upper 
country, problems with the Sac and Fox Indians and 
disenchantment even among the Illinois, had been vexing to 
company officials; with new losses and the expense of 
destroying the Natchez, now even the lower colony had become 
an insupportable burden. 37 
After the retrocession of the colony, the most important 
immediate political consequence of the Natchez Uprising was 
the reappointment of Bienville to his third term as governor 
of Louisiana. "The Father of Louisiana" had been recalled in 
1726 because of the ruinous political battles raging in the 
colony, but after the disastrous half-decade of Perier • s 
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maladministration, colonists and natives in Louisiana and 
royal officials in France saw him as the one man who could 
restore order and peace in the troubled colony. He was 
reappointed on September 2, 1732 and took the reins of power 
at New Orleans in early 1733.~ 
Almost immediately Bienville embarked on an ambitious 
program designed to check English expansion, gain effective 
control over the Indians of the region, and establish a 
lasting peace in the region which would permit Louisiana to 
fulfill its long-and much-heralded potential for the first 
time. Although this program had its tr .i.umphs, equivocal 
successes, and disastrous failures, it shaped the contours of 
Louisiana's British program and Indian diplomacy for the next 
three decades. 
4. SOUTH CAROLINA 
For South Carolina the period from 1699 to 1732 was also 
a watershed; and, as in Louisiana, a war with the Indians 
ushered in basic changes in the colony's constitution. In 
South Carolina, too, Indian troubles sprang not from foreign 
intrigues but from the actions of colonists, in this case 
Indian traders. A well-regulated Indian trade was the sine 
qua non of the colony's existence in the early years, both for 
the money thus made for individual traders and the proprietors 
and for the security provided by good relations between 
Carolina and the Indian nations. But colonists, traders, and 
proprietors had different interests relative to trade with the 
natives and related issues. over the years, efforts to 
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regulate Indian trade, and thus in some ways the Indians 
themselves, became enmeshed in general colonial politics. 
In South Carolina, unlike Louisiana, the War of the 
Spanish succession was more an opportunity than a curse. 
Carolinians had long viewed the missions of Spanish Guale with 
revulsion, and war between England and Spain was excuse enough 
to strike at them. In May 1702 Governor James Moore led a 
force of Englishmen and Lower Creeks which destroyed the 
Timucuan mission of Santa Fe. The following fall Moore failed 
in an attempt to take the fort of Saint Augustine, but he 
succeeded in leveling the town and destroying all the missions 
north of the st. Johns River. 39 In January 1704 Moore, no 
longer governor, led fifty colonists and over a thousand 
Indians in a campaign that destroyed the Apalachee mission of 
Ayubale. By 1706 Timucua was in ruins, although in that same 
year a combined force of French privateers and Spanish troops 
managed to make a half-hearted attack near Charles Town. 
south Carolina pushed her southern marchlands almost all the 
way to Saint Augustine. 40 
The war was devastating for the missions built with such 
difficulty by the Franciscans. Moore claimed that in the 
attack on Ayubale he either killed or captured as slaves 325 
men, and took 4,000 women and children slaves, and all with 
the loss of only 4 colonists and 15 Indians. The Apalachee 
population bore the brunt of the war and shrank from 8,000 
Indians in fourteen villages at the war's beginning to just 
200 souls remaining in four towns. In 1708 the governor of 
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Florida estimated that 10, 000 to 20, 000 Indians had been 
carried into slavery by the English during the war. 41 
The destruction of the Guale missions and the contraction 
of Spanish influence expanded the area open to carolina 
traders, but it did not come as an unmixed blessing. The 
inability of South Carolinians to reach a bipartisan consensus 
on regulating the Indian trade resulted in a pattern of abuses 
by traders. In 1707 some of the worst abuses were outlawed, 
including the extortion of presents for governors, the 
enslaving of Indian allies, the sale of rum to the Indians, 
and the selling of arms and ammunition to hostile Indians. 
At the same time, the colony's board of Indian commissioners 
attempted to prevent the amassing of Indian debts, which gave 
the traders great influence over large groups of Indians. 
This debt was usually incu~red after the traders had met the 
Indians returning from hunting or war parties and plied them 
with rum. The traders then "purchased" the Indians' slaves 
or skins for little or nothing, which very much chagrined the 
natives when they sobered up. But even when sober, the Indian 
would go into great debt, on the shaky collateral of the skins 
of future hunts, to obtain rum. By 1714 the system of 
licenses, through which colonial officials attempted to 
control trade and traders, was so ineffective that almost no 
bothered to obtain the certificate. 42 
In addition to the problems caused by traders, the 
Indians also felt the pressure of expanding English 
settlement. By the 1690s, cattle-ranching was becoming an 
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important and widespread activity near the Yamasee lands in 
the southern parts of the colony. In 1707 an act of the 
provincial legislature, attempting to minimize the 
disturbances caused by intrusions on Indian lands, created a 
Yamasee reservation which consisted basically of Grenville 
County minus its sea islands. In 1711 the Yamasees complained 
that several colonists had moved onto the reservation, and the 
offenders were legally prosecuted and removed. Indian fears 
that they would lose their lands were also raised by rumors 
that hinted that Port Royal, at the coastal boundary of the 
reserve, would be made into a major settlement. 43 
In 1715 the Yamasee War resulted from the complete 
breakdown of diplomatic and economic relations between Indians 
and Carolinians. As in Louisiana, this major Indian war led 
to the transfer of title to the colony passing from the 
proprietors to the crown. In South Carolina it was fifteen 
years before the proprietors formally surrendered the charter 
to the colony, a dF~,de after the crown had assumed effgctive 
control. Colonists had long been dissatisfied with 
proprietary rule; the effort to prosecute and pay for the 
Yamasee War cost Carolinians dearly. In addition to over four 
hundred deaths, agriculture had been abandoned for a time, and 
many who fled to Charles Town for safety went hungry. War 
costs had to be paid for by increased taxes, the Indian trade 
had to be brought under control, and new settlers had to be 
attracted to the colony. During the war the proprietors did 
almost nothing to aid the colony, sending over less than £1000 
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sterling to prosecute a war that the assembly in 1717 
estimated had cost the colony £116,000 sterling. As early as 
1715, one prominent Carolinian was writing to England that 
many in the colony wished for royal control.~ 
The proprietors 1 standing was not enhanced by their 
mishandling of the colony's reconstruction. In the summer of 
1718 pirates occupied Charles Town Harbor for five weeks. 
The proprietors did nothing about this grave menace, so South 
Carolinians, with the assistance of Virginia, destroyed the 
pirates on their own. During the following summer the 
proprietors made even more enemies when they reorganized the 
council to exclude anti-proprietary forces, struck down 
popular laws, and forced Governor Robert Johnson to dissolve 
the assembly. The final straw, however, proved to be an 
apparently well-founded rumor circulating in November 1719 
that a Spanish fleet outfitting at Vera cruz planned to attack 
first Mobile, then Charles Town. Fearing they would once 
again be left to their own devices, leaders of the 
anti-proprietary faction used the occasion of elections for 
a new assembly to call on Governor Johnson to take over the 
government in the name of the king. Johnson declined to 
accept the mandate of the rebels, and the provisional rebel 
government never did gain complete control of the colony. But 
the damage done to proprietary government was enough to cause 
the crown to accept responsibility for administering the 
colony. A royal governor subsequently arrived in South 
carolina in May 1721. 45 
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For the next ten years the governments of South Carolina 
concentrated on the military and diplomatic organization of 
the colony's southern frontier. Although France and Spain 
fought a Gulf Coast war over the possession of Pensacola, the 
fear that they would soon reconcile their differences, which 
they did, raised an unwelcome specter over the long, exposed 
frontier. So, too, did the attitude of the Creeks. Although 
there was always a pro-carolina faction centered in the 
Abihka-Talapoosa villages, the prospect of a triumph of the 
French party always appeared present. Thus, the governors• 
program centered on a system of frontier forts and the militia 
to utilize them in emergencies, and the regulation of Indian 
traders and Indian nations through trade laws and diplomacy. 
Until the Yamasee War there were no forts on the southern 
frontier of South Carolina; fortified trader storehouses 
served as rallying points and supply depots when necessary. 
But the war prompted the establishment of Fort Moore on the 
Savannah River (1715) and the fort at the Congarees 
(1718-1722). During the next few years small forts or 
fortified posts were erected at strategic points with an eye 
toward defending the province from the Indians, as well as 
from the Indians• European friends, on the southern marches. 
Fort King George was built on the banks of the Altamaha in 
1721, the Palachacolas fort was erected at the mouth of the 
savannah in 1723, and the old Beaufort fort at Port Royal was 
overhauled that same year. Along with this new defensive 
system of forts, South Carolina began to employ a corps of 
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rangers. Recruited from the militia, they patrolled three 
areas along the southern Indian line and were augmented by the 
Port Royal scout boats.~ 
Men and forts were only half the solution to the Indian 
problem: diplomacy was the other crucial element. South 
carolina's program for creating a barrier of friendly Indians 
on its southern flank had failed; in the aftermath of the 
Yamasee War the only Indians who could be settled in the old 
Spanish province of Guale were a few bands of Chickasaws 
fleeing problems in their own country. Neither the Creeks nor 
the Yamasees could be persuaded to return to the lands Letween 
the Altamaha and Savannah Rivers. England's temporary eclipse 
in the region allowed the French to gain a permanent advantage 
there with the establishment of Fort Toulouse des Alibamons 
among the Upper Creeks, which permitted them to influence the 
Lower Creeks as well. In 1717 the Creeks finally signed a 
peace treaty with the English, but as they would not make 
peace with the Cherokees, whom the English armel'i against them, 
the diplomatic maneuvering of the Carolinians remained complex 
and fraught with peril. 47 
With the universal acknowledgment that trader abuses 
brought on the Yamasee War, the merchants on the council were 
now powerless to prevent a full-scale reform of Indian trade 
regulation. In June 1716 an act of the assembly created a 
public monopoly on the Indian trade, subject to the control 
of the commons and administered by five commissioners. In 
order to keep traders out of the villages, where they could 
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not be controlled and where most of the abuses occured, the 
assembly attempted to implement a system of frontier factories 
at which all Indian trade would be conducted under close 
supervision. This innovation failed, however, because the 
Indians demanded that the goods go to them, not vice-versa. 
Attempts to favor certain nations by offering them lower 
prices than those quoted to their neighbors also failed. 
Undercapitalized from the start by the cost.:.conscious commons, 
the public monopoly began to disintegrate as early as 1719 
when the law creating it was struck down by the proprietors, 
one of several actions which helped hasten the overthrow of 
the proprietary regime.~ 
After two years of a mixed public and private system, in 
1723 a fully private trade was reintroduced in South Carolina. 
Although newly-arrived royal governor Francis Nichnlson 
assumed full control of the Indian trade upon his arrival in 
May 1721, he soon realized that without the help of the 
assembly he could not reconcile the competing interests of 
planter and merchant, coast and frontier. By act of the 
assembly in 1724 South carolina reorganized the Indian trade 
under a single commissioner appointed by and under the control 
of the commons. The commissioner issued licenses and 
instructions to the traders, and was required to visit the 
frontier garrisons on an annual basis. In 1727 he was further 
required to make annual visits to the Creek and Cherokee towns 
as well. Although the commissioner was responsible to the 
commons and the governor, in emergencies he was expected to 
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use his own discretion and to appoint special commissioners 
with authority over certain tribes, a practice regularized 
after 1731. 49 
In 1731 South carolina adopted the system which lasted 
virtually unchanged until the creation of the Indian 
superintendencies a generation later. This system required 
traders to take licenses, which were good only for one or more 
specific villages and, except for the largest towns, amounted 
to a monopoly on the trade of that village. Each trader was 
allowed only two assistants in each town, for whose good 
behavior a bond was required, and who could r&ot be slaves or 
free Negroes. These provisions were mainly designed to 
eliminate ruinous competition and provocative behavior. This 
act was copied almost verbatim by Georgia in 1735.50 
Like Iberville in Louisiana before them, the Carolinians 
found that their program of establishing peace between all 
allied Indians did not work and some blamed the policy for the 
Yamasee War. But the alternate policy, which was also pursued 
in Louisiana, of promoting just enough strife between 
fellow-allies of South Carolina to keep them from combining 
against the colony, was not an easy one to maintain. Tensions 
had to be kept high enough to prevent combinations, but low 
enough to prevent ruinous conflicts from developing. 
Informing one ally of another ally's plans for attacks in 
order to avert wars, blaming duplicitous-looking actions on 
Frenchmen, Spaniards, or traders, or simply offering to act 
as conciliators between mutual friends were only a few of the 
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tools used by Carolinians i.n Indian diplomacy. 51 
By the late 1720s, South Carolina had reestablished her 
regional trading network and looked forward to moving beyond 
her pre-Yamasee War sphere of influence. The Chickasaws drew 
ever closer to the English as the result of Louisiana 1 s 
policies and, despite their long history of enmity, threatened 
to draw the Choctaws into the English orbit with them. It was 
fear that the Choctaws might open trade with the English, by 
way of the Chickasaws, that induced Bienville to have the 
Choctaws make an all-out attack on the Chickasaws in January 
1723. The attack was successful in alienating the Choctaws 
from the Chickasaws and the English, but it also confirmed the 
majority of the Chickasaws in their attachment to England and 
their enmity to France. But after the recall of Bienville in 
1725, Choctaws once again began to appear in the Chickasaw 
villages looking for the trade goods and presents that 
Louisiana was seemingly never able to deliver as promised. 
South Carolina's aggressive pursuit of the Choctaw trade and 
alliance was the main preoccupation of Louis ian • s Indian 
policy for decades to come. 52 
Just as these constitutional changes and diplomatic 
understandings were taking shape, the establishment of Georgia 
added a new dimension to European-Indian relations on the 
marchlands. This last of the North American colonies was 
established for two equally valid purposes, one humanitarian 
and philanthropic, another coldly imperial and military. Both 
purposes would influence its development and its relations 
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with its neighbors. As a colony on the marches of England's 
North American empire, Georgia would ha·:e to deal with 
Frenchmen, Spaniards, and Indians both friendly and 
unfriendly: as a competitor for the trade and allegiance of 
the Indians it would become a rival of South Carolina as well. 
With the establishment of Georgia all the players were in 
place to begin a new round in the diplomacy of the 
southeastern frontier. 
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Chapter IV 
Philanthropists, Peddlers, And Pikemen: 
The Establishment of Georgia, 1733-1743 
The establishment of Georgia meant different things to 
different people. To the Trustees for Establishing the 
Colony of Georgia in North America, it was a chance to realize 
some of the best impulses of the Anglican gospel and the 
British Enlightenment. To British and continental 
Protestants, it was a new home in which to make a better life 
in the strc>ng light of the gospels. To South Carolina, it was 
a march colony, a buffer against the incursions of native, 
French, and Spanish enemies. To Louisiana and Florida, it was 
one more outpost of British imperialism, an advance post which 
threatened France's and Spain's control of their respective 
spheres of influence. To the Indians of the Southeast, 
Georgia was one more European locus of trade, alliance, and 
political or military advantage. 
The creation of Georgia and the determination of its 
location was the result of the convergence of two separate 
developments in England and North America, one visionary and 
humanitarian, the other military and strategic. On the one 
89 
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hand, the colony was conceived by a group of high-minded 
Anglican reformers as a place of refuge for the debt-ridden 
poor of England and oppressed Protestants from the continent. 
In Georgia, free from unjust laws and religious persecution, 
they could develop as individuals and Christians. Like the 
colonizers of New England a century earlier, they hoped to 
create a Protestant body politic, free of non-Christian 
infl ue:nces • , 
on the other hand, South Carolina had been unable to 
settle her southern flank, partly because of opposition from 
Florida, but more because of problems with the Indians. 
Although the colony's relations with neighboring tribes were 
generally pacific, the Yamasse War severely inhibited the 
growth of South Carolina, which took many years to reestablish 
the security of its southern and western frontiers. One of 
the most important means by which it did this was to promote 
the establishment of a colony on its southern flank. 2 
several projects had been advanced over the years to 
colonize the lands south of the Savannah River. In June 1717 
the Scots baronet Sir Robert Montgomery proposed the 
establishment of the Margravate of Azilia. 3 Montgomery 1 s 
public propaganda emphasized the trade, agriculture, and 
prosperity of the new colony. But to the Board of Trade, 
which supported the Azilia project, Montgomery emphasized the 
colony's strategic value relative to Louisiana and Florida. 
While both the Yamasee war and the bursting of the South Sea 
Bubble ruined the chances of the Margravate of Azilia, the 
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need for a colony south of South Carolina remained. 4 
In June 1730 the first steps were taken tcward the 
establishment of the long hoped-for march colony. on June 10 
the Board of Trade instructed South Carolina • s governor, 
Robert Johnson, to extend that colony's settlements as far 
south as the Altamaha River. At almost the same time, James 
Edward Oglethorpe and John Percival, the future earl of 
Eqmont, were looking for a place to establish a charitable 
colony in which to settle poor Englishmen ~nd oppressed 
Protestants from the Continent. Among the circle that 
included Oglethorpe and Eqmont were at least two members of 
the Board of Trade, who undoubtedly had spoken to their 
colleagues concerning the decision to push forward the 
southern settlement of Carolina. Thus did the "long-maturing 
policy of the colonial administration to occupy and protect 
the exposed southern border" of British North America became 
enmeshed with the humanitarian and reformist concerns of 
Oglethorpe, Percival, and their fellow philanthropists. 5 
After two-and-a-half years of planning, in June 1732 
Oglethorpe, Eqmont, and nineteen others created the "Trustees 
for Establishing the Colony of Georgia in America. 116 
The Georgia trustees were sincere in their desire to 
build a colony that would develop into a true Christian 
commonwealth. The best way to do that, they reasoned, was to 
build a society, government, and economy based on the small 
farm. To ensure that the colony developed along these lines, 
very specific regulations were promulgated in England and 
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enforced in America. Individuals immigrating at the expense 
of the trust were granted only fifty acres of land, while even 
the wealthiest of private immigrants were awarded only five 
hundred acres. Land was held in tail-male in favor of the 
trust, so that females could not inherit land in Georgia, and 
no property could be alienated without the trustees• consent. 
In addition to the adoption of other regulations which 
consciously limited the amount of land any one colonist could 
acquire, the prohibition against the use of slave labor in 
Georgia was part of a determined effort to prohibit the 
development of plantation agriculture. 7 
The Georgia trustees planned a colony based on small 
farms, but their first immigrants were chosen for their need 
for charity, not their experience with a hoe or a plow. 
Although fe~ debtors actually made it to Georgia, the bulk of 
early British immigrants were from the "worthy" urban poor, 
most of whom had no experience with agriculture; many of them 
were tradesmen and artisans and looked down on agricultural 
labor as beneath their dignity. Those that might be 
considered most appropriate for life in an agricultural march 
colony--farmers, soldiers, and sailors--were considered too 
valuable to rob from the homeland for employment in the 
colonies. 8 
The trustees were more fortunate in attracting foreign 
immigrants. German-speaking Protestants from the c:ontinent 
arrived in several waves from 1733 to 1742. Most numerous 
were the Salzburgers, the first to arrive and to suffer 
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through most of the trust 1 s ill-advised policies on settlement 
and land tenure. Despite having to settle first on land 
inappropriate for the small farms they were expected to make 
flourish, and having to move from their original settlement 
at Ebenezer, the Salzburgers and other German-speaking 
immigrants were important to the survival of Georgia. 9 
But others came as well. A large number of Highland 
Scots came to Georgia as soldiers between 1735 and 1741. 
Although they suffered many casual ties in Oglethorpe • s Florida 
wars, they made significant contributions to the colony's 
commercial and agricultural development. 10 Despite 
equivocation among the trustees concerning the propriety of 
allowing Jews to settle in Georgia, several Jewish families 
were among the earliest settlers. In addition to providing 
several sorely needed professionals and artisans to the 
colony, one of the Jews became the first militia officer 
appointed by Oglethorpe. 11 
For all of their effort, however, the Trustees never 
attracted more than 5,000 European immigrants to Georgia, and 
of those less than half were transported as charity cases by 
the trust. Because of Oglethorpe's continuing conflict with 
Florida, many of Georgia's surviving settlers left the colony 
in the early 1740s rather than risk invasion by Spanish 
catholics. Because of this, when the crown acquired title to 
Georgia in 1754, there were only 2,000 Europeans and 1,000 
slaves, who had developed only 153,000 acres of land. Much 
of that population growth and development, moreover, had 
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occurred after 1752, when the restrictions on land-holding and 
slavery had been relaxed. 12 
Although the colony owed its origins to humanitarianism, 
its early layout was determined not by its agricultural 
potential or the salubrity of its lands, but by military and 
strategic considerations. Each of the early settlements was 
planned with an eye toward defense from Indians, Spaniards, 
and Frenchmen, and communication with South carolina by land 
or by sea. Located principally along the Savannah and 
Ogeechee Rivers and their tributaries, these early 
settlements, with their accompanying fortifications, were 
located on well-worn Indian trails. Some were meant to 
facilitate communication with Georgia's allies, while others 
kept watch on the Yamasee invasion route out of Florida. 13 
Georgia • s settlements were also planned to encourage 
the development of the Indian trade. Deerskins, which were 
referred to as 11 leather11 or 11skins11 by the British, were 
brought to Charles Town by traders from the Catawbas, 
Cherokees, Creeks, Chickasaws and other nations of the 
Southeast. The skin trade made up a substantial part of South 
Carolina's economy, but the Georgians hoped to attract the 
skins to their infant colony instead. 14 
There were several good reasons to think that they might 
succeed. savanriah, the capital of Georgia, was located at the 
mouth of the Savannah River, which was not only closer to the 
Indians than Charles Town but served as the Indians• major 
highway as well. Moreover, Georgia and South Carolina traders 
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both made their headquarters up the Savannah at Augusta, so 
that all of the traders sent their trade goods through 
savannah to Augusta, and the skins returned the same way. All 
the skins had to be sent to Europe from Charles Town, however, 
and the coastal transshipment was long and dangerous due to 
shallow waters, pirates, and often overloaded boats. 
Shipments directly to England from savannah would have been 
much cheaper. 15 
Despite its natural advantages, Savannah would never 
garner the bulk of the trade or shipping away from the Charles 
Town merchants. Georgia was by far the poorer colony and 
Jacked the capital to build the infrastructure of boatyards, 
docks, and harbors necessary to compete with Charles Town. 
Moreover, the Trustees of Georgia looked toward agriculture 
for the colony's prosperity and from the beginning placed 
restrictions on the Indian trade to prevent Georgia traders 
from winning the lion's share of the trade. But there were 
external constraints as well. Georgia 1 s proximity to the 
Florida inhibited growth and the expansion of trade, as did 
the active opposition of the Charles Town merchants and their 
allies on the Board of Trade to Georgia's ascendancy in the 
Indian trade. 16 
Savannah did not become the center of the export trade, 
but the gro~~h of Augusta as the center of the Indian trade 
was a substantial factor in Georgia's growth. Augusta, with 
south Carol ina ' s Fort Moore across the Savannah River, quickly 
became the major entrepot for merchant warehouses. Traders 
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and their packhorsemen collected their merchandise at Augusta 
and sent the skins downriver to savannah for transshipment to 
Charles Town. Augusta was the crossroads of the Anglo-Indian 
Southeast; paths radiated south to the Spanish, southeast to 
Savannah, west to the Upper and Lower Creeks and the 
Chickasaws, and north to the Cherokees and Catawbas. 17 
Oglethorpe, who represented the trustees in Georgia 
during the colony's early years, could have been appointed 
governor of Georgia and was offered the governorship of south 
Carolina, but to accept either he would have had to give up 
his seat in parliament, which he did not want to do; while 
applying for a charter some of the future trustees thought 
even this position might disqualify them for their seats. 18 
Oglethorpe realized that his infant settlements could not 
survive without a lot of help from their friends. The most 
important of these, of course, was South Carolina. Georgia 
was tied to her northern neighbor not only by proximity but 
by its very raison d'etre, and South Carolina had far from 
disinterested motives in seeing Georgia solidly established. 
When Oglethorpe visited the Carolina capital on his way to 
Georgia, Governor Robert Johnson and the leaders of the 
assembly all assured him of their desire to see Georgia 
succeed and their willingness to cooperate in any way possible 
to help the colony along. 19 
After South Carolina, Georgia's most important friendly 
neighbors were the Creek Indians. After choosing a site for 
and laying out his capital city, which he named Savannah for 
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the river on which it was situated, 20 Oglethorpe quickly won 
the friendship of the local natives. Within a month, 
Oglethorpe had cemented ties with the Lower Creeks, Upper 
Creeks, and Yuchees, which he estimated to contain 1, 000, 
1,100, and 200 w·arriors respectively. Not only that, he 
proudly informed his fellow trustees that he had already been 
accepted as a peacemaker among them. 21 
Oglethorpe 1 s friendship with the nearby Lower Creek 
Yamacraw Indians paid immediate dividends. A few of the 
natives grumbled about the coming of the Georgians, but their 
mica Tomochichi, his "queen," and their warriors met the 
arriving Oglethorpe and with appropriate colorful ceremony 
welcomed him. The following day the general gave them 
presents, the first of many. The Indians thereafter began 
selling venison to the colonists at what one colonist called 
"a very moderate rate. 1122 
On May 18, 1733 Oglethorpe met with many of the "micas," 
(whom the English styled "kings") and head warriors of the 
Lower Creek towns. Oueekachumpa, Long King of the Oconees, 
spoke for all the Creeks in giving up all the lands they did 
not use themselves to the English, but reserving all land 
south of the savannah River to their nation. The mico also 
asked for instruction in the Christian religion for his 
people, and offered to help Oglethorpe take revenge against 
the Cherokees for some insults lately committed against the 
English. 23 On May 21, Oglethorpe and the Indians signed a 
treaty of peace and alliance. 24 
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Oglethorpe politely refused the proffered war party, but 
he did accept Oueekachmpa•s advice that the general should 
establish a close friendship with the Yamacraw mico 
Tomochichi. The Yamacraw village was apparently a collection 
of outcasts, which like Tomochichi himself was a mixture of 
Creek and Yamasee. Tomochichi's band seems to have wandered 
for some years and to have settled the Yamacraw Bluff, near 
the future site of Savannah, only shortly before Oglethorpe 
arrived. Oglethorpe's decision to allow the Yamacraws to 
remain there was matched by Mico Yahoo Lakee of coweta, home 
of the Creek "emperorship," who invited the Yamacraws to call 
all their relatives together in one town. 25 
Far from wanting to evict the Yaroacraw mico, Oglethorpe 
did everything he could to enhance Tomochichi 's standing among 
the creeks. More like his French counterparts than fellow 
British officers, Oglethorpe realized that treaties were not 
enough to hold Indian loyalty; he wanted ties that were 
personal as well as political. To elevate 'l'omochichi above 
other micos, Oglethorpe took him and his nephew Tooanabey to 
England in 1734, where the mico concluded a treaty of alliance 
on behalf of all Creeks with George II himself. Having met 
the king-over-the-water was powerful medicine for an Indian 
leader; Little Carpenter of the Cherokees would invoke his 
1730 audience with the English king many times over in the 
next three-and-a-half decades. on his return to Georgia, 
Oglethorpe instructed Georgia's Indian agent Patrick Mackay 
to favor Tomochichi in all things, and always to give him 
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presents for redistribution to the other Creeks. When 
Tomochichi died in october 1739 he was buried with full honors 
in the square at savannah, with Oglethorpe himself and other 
chief officers of the colony as pall bearers. While many 
Europeans might have scoffed at such ostentation, the pomp and 
circumstance appealed to the ceremonial instincts of the 
Indians, who were undoubtedly impressed by the Englishmen's 
attachment to this native chief. 26 
Oglethorpe enlisted some of Tomochichi 's men in the 
service of Georgia. He created two twenty-man companies, and 
gave each of their lead9rs a commission as captain of the 
"Militia Company of the Indian allies." Each man was paid one 
bushel of corn per month while they were employed in war or 
hunting. Each warrior was given a gun on enlistment and a 
blanket every year. 27 
The general also made another important friend among the 
Creeks, the metis Coosaponakeesa, known in English as Mary, 
"the queen of the Creeks." Her mother was Creek and her 
father English, but in the Muskogean matrilineal kinship 
system this made her creek; more importantly, her mother's 
brother, her closest male relative, was the Emperor Brims. 
Mary and her husband John Musgrove operated a trading post 
near the Yamacraw Bluff and Tomochichi 's village, where 
because of their location and Mary's connections among the 
Creeks they built a business that was by 1733 handling 12,000 
deerskins annually, almost one-sixth of the total Charles Town 
annual business. 28 
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Oglet!lorpe saw the Musgroves, especially Mary, as good 
friends for Georgia to have. As he did with Tomochichi, 
Oglethorpe built up Mary's position with the Creeks, using 
her as an interpreter and emissary and favoring her husband's 
access to the skins coming to the Yamacraw Bluff. Though many 
Georgia commentators, looking toward the later "Bosomworth 
Claims, 11 emphasize the "troubles" Mary caused Georgia/9 
Oglethorpe realized her importance; without her he might not 
have been able to cement ties with the Creeks so quickly or 
so firmly. 30 
Oglethorpe's taking Creek chiefs to London went a long 
way toward reinforcing those ties, but more was needed. 
Oglethorpe realized the importance of a well-regulated trade 
in maintaining the Indians in friendship and alliance with 
the English colonies, and more specifically Georgia. An ill-
managed trade might cause war, while a well-managed trade 
would not only produce income for the colony but secure the 
Indians to England's, and Georgia's, interests as well. But 
at present the trade seemed nothing if not ill-managed. 31 
In Georgia and England the Creeks registered many 
complaints concerning unfair trading practices with English 
officials. The Indians wanted the price, quality, and weight 
of trade goods fixed; wild fluctuations in all three were the 
cause of many conflicts between Indians and Europeans. They 
also want:ed all traders licensed, with one trader in each 
town, that they might know who was responsible when problems 
arose. 32 
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Acknowledging the importance of a smoothly-run trade to 
the growth of the colony, the common Council on January 9, 
1734 passed two important pieces of legislation aimed at 
solving the trade problem. "An Act for maintaining the Peace 
with the Indians" required licenses for anyone having regular 
trade or contact of any kind with the Indians. The act 
provided for a commissioner to grant licenses, a secretary to 
keep records, and such agents as might be considered 
necessary. Fees and fines were also provided for, from which 
the colony would pay for this regulatory apparatus. 33 
The Indian tr.ade act was specific concerning the duties 
of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the responsibilities 
incumbent upon traders. The commissioner was empowered to 
hear and resolve complaints from the Indians and could use the 
local militia to enforce his decisions. Traders were closely 
regulated as to their behavior toward the Indians, where and 
with whom they could trade, how much credit they could extend 
to the Indians, and whom they could employ to assist them in 
Indian country.~ 
Along with the Indian Trade Act was passed another piece 
of legislation considered crucial by Oglethorpe and the 
Trustees: the Rum Act. Oglethorpe felt deeply that the use 
of rum (and brandy) was as much a threat to Georgia as foreign 
enemies aild the· institution of slavery. 35 The act forbid the 
use of rum, brandy, and hard spirits of any kind in Georgia 
and the Creek nation, and required all of it found in the 
colony to be staved and split and its owner fined. After June 
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1735 it would be illegal to sell strong spirits to either 
Europeans or Indians, and licenses would be required to sell 
wine, beer, ale or other liquors. 36 At the same time, however, 
officials tried to supply stores with strong beer, molasses 
for brewing beer, and Madeira wine, all at reasonable rates. 
Magistrates were also empowered to license retailers. 37 
The administrative structure necessary to enforce these 
laws was soon created. Oglethorpe, not surprisingly, was 
appointed commissioner in charge of implementing th·r:: act for 
Indian affairs. Thomas Causton, the trustees' storekeeper at 
savannah, was commissioned to implement the rum act. 38 
Oglethorpe in turn appointed Captain Patrick Mackay as his 
agent to the Creeks. This particular agency was crucial to 
the colony because of the preponderant influence of the Creeks 
on the Georgia trade. Governor Johnson underscored the 
importance of this office by appointing Mackay as South 
Carolina's agent to the Creeks. Johnson was so committed to 
intercolonial unity on this issue that when South Carolina 
Indian Commissioner Tobias Fitch refused to cooperate with 
Mackay, he suspended the recalcitrant official from his post. 39 
He also made it clear to Fitch's successor that he was to 
follow the same orders. 40 
The Indians may have been happy with Georgia's new trade 
regulations, but South Carolina merchants were not. The 
Georgia act was copied almost verbatim from the South Carolina 
law, which had been designed to keep Virginia out of the 
Cherokee trade. Now that the tables were turned and their own 
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device was being used to freeze them out of the Creek trade, 
the Carolinians were fighting mad. Governor Johnson was a 
good friend of Georgia, but in south Carolina his political 
base was among the planters rather than the merchants. He 
died in July 1735 and was replaced by Thomas Broughton, a 
difficult man who represented Georgia 1 s antagonists, the 
merchants. Broughton's handling of the trade dispute with 
Georgia proved to be "the worst blunder" of a man 11who erred 
frequently as governor. 1141 
The stage was set in November 1734 when South Carolina 
passed a new Indian Act. In addition to placing a duty of 
six pence on every skin exported from the colony, the act also 
required a £51 license fee. The skin trade from the Cherokees 
had dried up and the purpose of the act was to ruin it 
entirely so that it might be reconstructed under the aegis of 
a single company controlled by the Charles Town merchants. 
Samuel Ever leigh, a leading trader and one of Georgia 1 s 
warmest friends in South Carolina, lobbied against this bill 
as actively as he knew how, but he knew that the act was aimed 
against himself and a few others thought too "pro-Georgia" by 
some Carol ina merchants. 42 
At the same time they were passing the new Indian Act, 
South carolina authorities relaxed control over their own 
traders. Licenses were granted to all who requested them, 
and great quantities of rum were traded in Indian country. 
Mackay tried to prevent rum being brought to the Indians, but 
his admonitions fell on deaf ears. Because Mackay was not 
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officially appointed the South Carolina Indian agent, as had 
been promised, he could exercise no authority or influence 
over the traders. 43 
With Georgians and South Carolinians jealous of each 
other's trade with the Indians, it only needed a spark to set 
off an inter-colonial feud, and Mackay provided that spark. 
As Oglethorpe prepared to leave Georgia for England in April 
1734, he instructed Mackay to make a tour of the Creek country 
with his regiment. There he could reinforce the Creek 
alliance, collect intelligence on Louisiana and Florida, and 
obtain permission to build a fort among the Upper Creeks. 
Mackay was to visit all the major towns, then hold a 
conference with their headmen concerning the proposed fort and 
garrison. As agent and constable, Mackay was expected to 
redress Indian grievances, to punish traders for infractions 
of the law, and to compel acquiescence with the new trade laws 
of Georgia if necessary.« 
Mackay's journey was long and beset by many difficulties, 
but he accomplished the main purpose of his visit. In March 
1735 he reported to the Trustees that the Indians were more 
civil and respectful than ever before, which he imputed to 
Oglethorpe's taking the Creeks to England. Mackay also felt 
hopeful about garnering the Choctaw trade. He noted that a 
few Choctaws who lived on the frontiers of their country 
traded with the Englishman Thomas Jones, and Mackay clearly 
expected to increase their numbers. 45 
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But not all Indians looked on expanding British influence 
with favor. Some Creek headmen feared that Mackay 1s foray 
into their country with many soldiers presaged many forts and 
large numbers of cattle, which would put severe pressure on 
Indian lands and would lead to their destruction. Part of the 
problem resulted from the red ensign Mackay carried with his 
troops. Red symbolized war to the Indians; Mackay's sporting 
it raised their suspicion, and gave credence to some of the 
rumors circulating which hinted at sinister English designs. 46 
It took the combined efforts of Causton, Tomochichi, the 
mico of coweta, and five gallons of wine to ease doubts about 
English intentions. When Causton sent the newly-arrived 
regiment of Scots Highlanders to take possession of Barnwell's 
Bluff, the mico sent advance ·word of their arrival and purpose 
and provided them with an Indian escort of six warriors to 
show them the country and to hunt for them. To further 
facilitate a smooth operation, Tomochichi this time sent along 
a hogshead of beer. 47 
But if Mackay at times was offensive to the Indians, to 
the South Carolinians he provided a real causus belli. 
Neither Oglethorpe nor Mackay made any secret of their 
intentions to control all Indian trade from Georgia by 1735. 
It was this publicly-professed plan that engendered the 
opposition of South Carolina Indian Commissioner Tobias Fitch 
and led to his firing by Governor Robert Johnson.~ On the 
grounds that there were too many traders' licenses to support 
a decent l~vel of income for all of them, which might lead to 
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abuses, Mackay decided to revoke the licenses of some traders 
so as to reduce the total number of traders among the Creeks. 
Traders were summarily notified by Mackay that their licenses 
were revoked and that they must remove from their assigned 
towns. 49 
South Carolina 1 s reaction was predictable. The merchants 
were determined to do whatever was necessary to support free 
trade with the Indians on the customary basis, including 
sending militia forces into Indian country to protect the 
trade. 50 By summer 1735 the controversy with Georgia was the 
chief topic of conversation in south Carolina taverns. In 
addition to Mackay, Oglethorpe and Ever leigh were particularly 
singled out as villains in the affair. 51 Lieutenant-Governor 
Brouqhton was doubly angry with Mackay. Broughton warned 
Mackay that south Carolina was prepared to protect its traders 
against any interference. At the same time, however, the 
governor demanded to know what Mackay had been doing relative 
to Louisiana and Florida. 52 
Broughton's fears were not entirely groundless because 
Mackay's talks to the Indians were severely prejudicial to 
France and Spain. Commandant Martin Diron D'Artaguiette of 
Mobile sent a formal protest to Oglethorpe complaining that 
Mackay's harangues against the French were so violent that at 
first he assumed that war had been declared. Mackay not only 
spoke disparagingly of the French nation, but prodded the 
Creeks to demolish the Alabama fort and kill all the French 
there. other traders similarly tried to reduce French stature 
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by saying that the French had to buy their trade goods from 
the English. D'Artaguiette warned that if such discourses 
were not stopped, he would be forced to send additional troops 
to Creek country to suppress such belligerence and to seize 
the worst offenders. 53 
When Mackay learned that Spaniards planned to reoccupy 
the Apalachee Old Fields, he decided to prevent that by 
sending a creek named Lika tc St. AUg'tlstina tc kill SpaniaLds. 
One Spaniard was killed, which raised a threat of war that 
frightened everyone on the frontier. Spanish-allied Indians 
even threatened Mackay for his provocations. 54 Lika 1 s presence 
at a meeting of the Upper and Lower Creek headmen with Georgia 
officials only aggravated an already tense situation. 55 
Because he did not expect Georgia officials to settle 
the dispute fairly, Broughton sent commissioners into the 
Creek country to regulate the trade and protect traders and 
their property. Broughton ordered the commissioners not to 
disturb any Georgia-licensed traders, but he also notified 
Georgia officials that South Carolina would withhold funds 
raised for the construction of the proposed fort in the Creek 
country and the duty placed on skins if he received any more 
news of interference with the traders. Broughton also 
demanded that Mackay send him a copy of his journal for the 
Creek expedition. 56 
In addition to everyone else, Mackay and Causton even 
managed to offend the trustees. Mackay did not trust 
Tomochichi and questioned giving him all the presents to be 
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redist=ibuted to the rest of the Creeks. He suspected that 
Tomochichi would give the royal and trustee presents to 
private friends rather than headmen. He forbade Tomochichi 
to invite anyone down without his knowledge and cautioned 
causton against Tomochichi distributing the presents before 
the headmen arrived. 57 Though his orders specified that 
the presents be given to Tomochichi to distribute to the Creek 
headmen, Causton agreed with Mackay that they should be given 
to those with the most political clout. Because of Mackay's 
dealings with the headmen, Causton sent Mackay a list of 
headmen to receive presents that he might verify the 
worthiness of the recipients. 58 
This policy of by-passing Tomochichi to reach other Creek 
headmen was e~actly the opposite of the trustees' intention 
to use all of their political and economic power to elevate 
Tomochichi above his fellow Creek headmen. When they found 
out about the irregularities in distributing the presents, 
they quickly fired off letters to Causton and Mackay. Causton 
was reminded that the presents came not only from themselves 
but from the king as well, and that the goods were 
specifically intended for Tomochichi to distribute. The 
trustees even expressed surprise "how you dare to put 
Constructions on their Orders," and informed causton that it 
was his job to execute their orders, not to interpret them. 59 
Mackay was warned that it was his task to support and assist 
the interest of Tomochichi, and that he was not supposed to 
be concerned with the distribution of presents at all. The 
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hapless official was informed that Oglethorpe was returning 
to the colony, with specific orders concerning Indian affairs. 
Mackay was to wait for the general if he was in Savannah, or 
to return there if he was found in the creek nation.~ 
Oglethorpe 1 s tardy return to Georgia did not help to 
settle the affair. He arrived in Savannah on February 6, 
1736, but he did not take up the dispute with South Carolina 
for five months. Although he sent Broughton a conciliatory 
letter on the affair, Oglethorpe spent the next five months 
building his southern defenses and preoccupied with imperial 
concerns, ignoring the dispute with South carolina. This only 
made Broughton more implacable. 61 
The inter-colonial feud did not escape the attention of 
the English public. On June 8, 1736 the London Gazette 
published a letter from a supporter of Georgia which charged 
south Carolina with purposefully trying to alienate the 
Indians from Georgia by "aspersing" Oglethorpe's character, 
as well as Georgia's. On June 24, the Gazette ran an answer 
by "Philo-Americus," a former resident and a partisan of south 
carolina. He defended south Carolina's financial, logistical, 
and moral support of Georgia, then profiled the upstart 
colony 1 s efforts to ruin south carolina • s trade wi·th the 
natives. 62 
Despite an ostensibly conciliatory manner, Oglethorpe 
seemed determined to carry out his program despite South 
carolina's violent opposition. In Mackay's place Oglethorpe 
appointed two agents to enforce the Georgia Indian trade laws. 
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Ranger Captain Roger Lacy was named agent to the Cherokees, 
and John Tanner, Jr. , was named aqent to the Creeks. In early 
June 1736 they were ordered into their respective nations with 
instructions to enforce Georgia laws by seizing the goods and 
property of those traders who had not taken out Georgia 
licenses. Noble Jones, one of Georgia's most prominent early 
citizens, was sent to Fort Moore as Oglethorpe's personal 
representative to notify all traders that they would be 
required to obey the Georgia law. Lacy did his job 
efficiently and both confused and angered the Cherokees by 
seizing the goods of their long-time and often well-liked 
traders. Tanner was not allowed to do much mischief among the 
Creeks, some of whom threatened to do him violence, and was 
forced to beat a diplomatic retreat to Savannah.~ 
Far from helping to establish a Georgia monopoly, 
Tanner's journey into the Creek nation pushed the Indians ever 
closer to South Carolina. On July 3, 1736, King Opayhatchoo 
of the Upper Creeks, along with representatives of the 
Abihkas, Cussitaws, and Lower Creeks, held a talk with the 
governor and council of South Carolina. The Indians were 
confused by events, the king said, and did not understand the 
differences between Georgia and South Carolina, "for the white 
people were all one to him, he not having nor expecting any 
difference betwixt them." He declared his desire to treat 
with the "chief" of South Carolina rather than Georgia and 
stressed that he did not want the Savannah River blocked to 
rum. The Indian also reiterated that the land south of the 
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river belonged to the Indians. Although Mackay had been given 
permission to build a fort there, no more forts would be 
allowed. 64 
The South Carolinians, of course, were determined to 
protect their share of the trade. Broughton, like Oglethorpe, 
felt that his was the aggrieved party. To foster the 
resentment of the merchants, he forced through both houses of 
the assembly a bill that would indemnify any trader victimized 
by the Georgians for losses up to £2000 current money. He 
also prevailed upon a reluctant assembly to agree to refer the 
whole dispute to the Board of Trade. The adoption of these 
extreme measures even before the beginning of the long-delayed 
conference between Oglethorpe and the joint committee of the 
South Carolina assembly doomed any possible compromise. 
Broughton probably wanted the negotiations to fail. 
Oglethorpe and Georgia had many friends in South Carolina, 
several among the colony's most influential citizens. The 
governor and the merchants probably felt that they could get 
a better deal from the Board of Trade than from their fellow-
South Carolinians. 65 
With the failure of the August talks, feelings hardened 
on both sides. Georgia reintensified its efforts to enforce 
its Indian trade and rum laws, and South Carolina elected an 
assembly which did not contain many of Georgia's friends. 
The conflict was temporarily put aside for most of 1737, 
however, because of the threat of war with Spain on the 
southern frontier. Broughton died soon after the eclipse of 
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that crisis, and the trade dispute was not revived. Georgia 
learned to live with its share of the trade, and South 
Carolina resumed her natural role as the recognized locus of 
British political and economic power on the southern 
frontier. 66 
In imperial affairs, however, Oglethorpe was determined 
to make Georgia a major factor in the Southeast. Oglethorpe 
was an unabashed imperial expansionist who devoted much of 
the time he spent in America to driving the Spanish from 
Florida. The time seemed ripe for a British thrust across 
the marches of empire. By 1736 Oglethorpe had secured the 
friendship of the Indians, and saw his infant colony solidly 
established in several districts. War clouds were already 
forming on the horizon of Anglo-Spanish relations in the mid-
1730s. Both Spain and England were unhappy with the asiento, 
the privilege England exercised of supplying slaves to the 
Spanish Indies, and Britian 1s privilege of sending one legal 
cargo per year to trade at Cartagena and Vera Cruz. Spain was 
unhappy with the very existence of England 1 s legal and illegal 
trade in Spanish America: British politicians and merchants 
wanted to see it increase. Oglethorpe, whose expansion toward 
st. Augustine precipitated a few clouds of its own, was 
determined to profit from the storm. 67 
Long-simmering discontent with the commercial and 
imperial status quo between Spain and England was increased 
by the establishment of Georgia, then intensified by 
Oglethorpe 1 s undisguised intention to expand to the southward. 
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In particular, the May 1736 establishment of Fort st. George 
at the mouth of the st. John's River was more than annoying 
to the Spaniards. Located barely fifty miles from st. 
Augustine, Fort St. George was ostensibly placed there to 
prevent the Creeks from annoying Florida. Its real purpose, 
as the Spaniards rightly feared, was to serve as an advance 
base for the conquest of Florida.~ 
Florida was totally unprepared for an attack. Governor 
Moral bolstered Florida 1 s northern defenses, but requested 
funds from Spain to significantly increase his manpower and 
fortifications and more presents for the Indians. In 
response, the council of the Indies sent the engineer Antonio 
de Arredondo to survey Florida 1 s defenses. Arredondo • s report 
confirmed everything the governor had reported concerning 
Florida's inability to withstand an attack across old Guale. 
All Moral received from Spain, however, was an increase in his 
forces of one hundred men; his request for funds to improve 
his admittedly inadequate fortifications went unanswered in 
1736. 69 
To gain time to prepare for what he knew was the 
inevitable assault, Moral entered into negotiations with 
Oglethorpe over boundary differences, Indian incursions, and 
Fort St. George. In October 1736 Moral and Oglethorpe reached 
an agreement. Both sides agreed to control their respective 
Indian allies; Oglethorpe would evacuate Fort st. George, but 
without prejudice to Great Britain 1 s title, and Spaniards 
would not occupy it; and the question of the boundary would 
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be referred to the governments in Europe. Moral's exercise 
in realpolitik was denounced in Spain for having formally 
recognized British title to Georgia, but for Moral the treaty 
was only a stratagem to gain time to prepare for the 
inevitable assault.ro 
Oglethorpe, however, was doing the same thing. Having 
returned to London early in 1737, he cultivated the support 
of the cautious Walpole ministry at the same time that he 
stoked the anti-Spanish resentment of the belligerent 
opposition. After october 1736 the Georgia-Florida boundary 
dispute was part of the parliamentary struggle over war or 
peace with Spain. 71 Oglethorpe's success with both sides is 
reflected in his summer 1737 appointment as "General & 
Commander in Chief" of the military forces of Georgia and 
South carolina, and the fall 1737 decision to raise a regiment 
of 684 officers and men for service in Georgia.n 
To accomplish his goals, Oglethorpe was not above 
deceiving even the government. When Newcastle asked 
Oglethorpe in March 1738 to enumerate the forts under his 
command in America, his reply intentionally identified Fort 
St. George on the St. Johns with the old Fort King George on 
the Al tamaha, which was much farther north and far less 
provocative to Spain.~ 
In America, both sides prepared for war. Spain 
considered a preemptive strike against Georgia in 1737. The 
fleet was within hours of sailing from Cuba to Florida when 
word was received that the king had cancelled the operation. 
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The assemblage of men and materiel for the campaign was not 
totally wasted, however. From the war materiel the governor 
of CUba decided to send to Florida four hundred troops, almost 
a hundred skilled and unskilled laborers, and materiel to 
rebuild the fortifications of St. Augustine. Without the 
reinforcements Montiano would have been ill prepared to 
receive the British diplomatically, much less militarily.~ 
Oglethorpe returned to Georgia in September 1738 with 
his new regiment and prepared for war. After suppressing a 
mutiny that threatened to wreck his regiment before it could 
ever see battle, Oglethorpe strengthened his forces along the 
frontier and put agents in the Indian nations to collect 
intelligence on his friends and his enemies. The June 1739 
suspension of war preparations by both sides was even turned 
to his advantage. In July and August 1739 Oglethorpe toured 
the Creek nation. He did not enlist many Creek warriors in 
his campaign, but at the least he probably assured himself 
about Creek neutrality once fighting began.~ 
While Georgians prepared for a war that promised to 
deliver them from their enemies, South Carolinians experienced 
a brush with a war that they had long feared would lead to 
their own destruction. In September 1739 a group of mostly 
Angola-born slaves living near the Stono River decided to kill 
their masters and other white residents of the district and 
escape to Florida, where it was known they would be welcomed 
as free men by the provincial government. They killed twenty-
three whites, but the local militia quickly put down the 
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rebellion, killing scores of rebels and scattering the rest.n 
Spanish incitement of desertion had long been a thorn in 
the side of the British frontier, and the Stono Rebellion only 
increased Oglethorpe's determination for war. Two weeks after 
learning of the slave rebellion, Oglethorpe received royal 
orders to put Georgia and South Carolina into a defensive 
posture and to "annoy" his enemy. Oglethorpe gave his orders 
the widest possible interpretation and prepared for the 
conquest of St. Auqustine.n 
For all his dreams and plans, however, Oglethorpe would 
three times bring British forces to the walls of St. Augustine 
only to fall back to Georgia in failure. Despite his contempt 
for the Spaniards and their defenses, the general could not 
reduce either into submission. Alone, even with his regiment, 
Oglethorpe was not strong enough to take Florida. Despite his 
best efforts, he could not get enough help from the Indians, 
South Carolina, or the British navy. 
The Indians in Oglethorpe's army were mainly Cherokees 
and savannah River Chickasaws. Not even the prospect of war 
honors and booty could induce more than a few Creek warriors 
to join the campaign. Enough Lower creeks were in the Spanish 
orbit to keep their faction officially neutral. Upper Creeks, 
especially the Alabamas, did not want to see British power 
increased. The Creeks understood well the importance of a 
balance of power, and they did not want to see the scales 
tipped too much in favor of the British.n 
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South Carolinians were in no way neutral in Oglethorpe's 
conflict with Florida, but they were reluctant to invest too 
much financial, material, and human capital in a scheme 
concocted by a man they did not fully trust. The Georgian's 
attempt to engross the skin trade had created resentments 
which had not healed with the passage of time. But there were 
practical considerations as well. The Stone Rebellion preyed 
on the minds of many South Carolinians and they were nervous 
about sending the militia so far away. And even though 
Oglethorpe had a reputation for being a good fighter, South 
Carolinians had tried before to take St. Augustine and failed. 
After several months of indecision, including two months of 
lobbying by Oglethorpe, and with the news that five ships from 
the royal navy had orders to support the expedition, the 
Assembly finally voted aid in April 1740. South carolina 
promised Oglethorpe almost 500 men, ten small boats, and 
supplies for their own forces plus 500 Indians. 79 
The royal navy squadron was under orders to assist 
Oglethorpe, but South Carolina's indecision pushed the 
campaign ever closer to the hurricane season. Oglethorpe was 
told early in his preparations that the ships could not remain 
in Florida after July 5, when the danger of hurri~anes made 
their departure essential. Despite the fact that he was not 
ready to begin his offensive until the second week in May 
1740, Oglethorpe decided to press ahead with the reduction of 
Florida. 80 
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Oglethorpe's summer campaign against St. Augustine was 
a miserable failure. Although British forces landed in 
Georgia on May 9, Oglethorpe did not begin his siege until 
June 12, which meant that he could count on navy support for 
at most three weeks. To compound the general's poor use of 
his land forces, the navy failed to prevent Spanish ships from 
bypassing the British blockade to resupply st. Augustine. 
Despite pleas from the commander of the South carolina militia 
to continue the siege without :navy support, Oglethorpe ordered 
a retreat on July 4. 81 
Oglethorpe blamed South Carolina for his failure, on the 
ground that a prompt reply to his request for aid would have 
allowed him to gain his objective before st. Augustine could 
be supplied. South Carolinians would have none of that, 
however. The Assembly appointed a joint investigating 
committee to study the affair, which not surprisingly blamed 
Oglethorpe for everything that had gone wrong. They honored 
their financial commitment to the campaign and promptly moved 
on to the other, internal, concerns.~ 
It took Oglethorpe almost two months to recover from the 
physical and psychological exhaustion he felt after the 
Florida campaign. Once he recovered, however, he set about 
strengthening his defenses for the counterattack that he was 
sure would come. He was also ce::tain that when the attack 
came, he could expect little help from South Carolina or the 
British navy. south carolina, having once more been 
disappointed by Oglethorpe, had completely lost its taste for 
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schemes of imperial aggrandizement. The British navy, still 
fighting the war of Jenkin's Ear, simply had more important 
concerns than Florida.~ 
In June 1742 the expected invasion finally arrived. The 
initial target was st. Simon's Island. The Spanish army was 
supposed to defeat Oglethorpe's regiment, then lay waste the 
coastal countryside northward to Charles Town. Having 
terrorized and demoralized the British, they were then 
supposed to quickly retreat to st. Augustine, having lost few 
Spanish lives or supplies. The Spanish invasion of Georgia, 
however, did not turn out well for the invaders. A successful 
landing on st. Simon's Island on July s, 1742, which caused 
a panic in Savannah and Charles Town, was the high point of 
the Spanish campaign. On July 7 the British prevailed in two 
small skirmishes, one led by Oglethorpe, and they would not 
thereafter relinquish the initiative. Oglethorpe had his 
revenge for 1740. The arrival of a fleet of five ships from 
South carolina was decisive for both forces. 
Montiano ordered a retreat to st. Augustine. 
Governor 
Oglethorpe 
followed the Spaniards home, but lack of a sufficient invasion 
force and bad weather forced him to sail for home after a week 
of largely ineffectual maneuvering.~ 
Except for Oglethorpe's March 1743 raid into Florida, 
which produced barely a shot fired, for the remainder of the 
war Georgia and Florida were content to confine their conflict 
to surrogate Indian raiding. 85 Despite all Oglethorpe• s 
effort, and his expenditure of more than £60,000 of his 
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personal funds, the ardent imperialist could not change the 
status guo ante bellum. Oglethorpe returned to England in 
July 1743 to attend to personal affairs, defend himself 
against a court-martial, and lobby parliament, of which he was 
still a member, for a refund on his wartime expenditures. He 
was vindicated by the court-martial and voted the funds he 
sought, but he never saw Georgia again.~ 
Oglethorpe's departure for England in 1743 marked the 
end of an era for Georgia. The engrossment of the 
southeastern Anglo-Indian trade and the conquest of Florida, 
two key aspects of the trustees• plan for Georgia, were dismal 
failures. Although Georgia remained in the shadow of south 
carolina throughout the colonial period, the colony was still 
an important factor in the life of the southeastern frontier 
after 1733. For Europeans on the frontier, the creation of 
a buffer colony on the southeastern marches introduced a new 
element in the imperial equation in North America. Although 
the new colony could not reduce Florida, its avowed intention 
to do so worried not only Spain, but France, and led to a 
general strengthening of garrisons throughout the region. 
For Indians in the Southeast, the creation of a new 
European capital in the region meant potentially greater 
opportunities for presents and trade, and ironically, for 
some, even greater security. The creation of a new British 
colony on the borderlands increased Indian bargaining power 
not only with Louisiana and Florida but with South Carolina 
as well. For a time, at least, many Indians on the marchlands 
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of empire might have agreed that the more centers of European 
power, the better their own chances of preserving their people 
and their land. Sparsely populated colonies such as Florida, 
Louisiana, and Georgia were just what the Indians needed--
large enough to support a lively trade in European goods, but 
too small to constitute an overwhelming threat to Indians and 
their lands. Oglethorpe was not the only European to bring 
an army to his enemy's gates only to be defeated: in 
Bienville's case, however, those gates would be native. 
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Chapter V 
The Franco-Chickasaw War, 1733-1743 
The Natchez war was a watershed in Louisiana history, 
but it was scarcely less important for the Southeast as a 
whole. Louisiana and the Natchez were both severely weakened 
by the conflict, and bot!':·. would struggle for over a decade to 
recoup their losses. But the exile of the Natchez and 
Louisiana's near destruction would have consequences for 
others as well. The Chickasaws offered the Natchez a home, 
increasing the enmity Louisiana already felt for the 
Chickasaws and the likelihood of war. Al thc-:.lgh Louisiana 
almost succeeded in destroying the Natchez, she was weakened 
significantly in the effort. Many Choctaws questioned 
Louisiana's viability as an ally and trading partner after 
the Natchez War, and began to explore the opening of trade 
with the only alternative in the Southeast, the British. The 
attempt of some Choctaws to realign their nation with the 
Chickasaws and English would reverberate on the southeastern 
frontier for almost two-and-a-half decades. 
The Choctaws had many reasons to be dissatisfied with the 
French alliance. Even in the best of times, which for 
131 
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Louisiana was still not very good, the colony was never able 
to supply the Choctaws with all the European trade goods they 
desired. The only products the Choctaws had to trade for 
European goods were deerskins, but unlike England, France did 
not have a very big domestic market for leather. The court 
of Louis XV made feeble efforts to subsidize the Louisiana 
trade, but was unwilling or unable to provide the colony the 
number of consumer goods it required for either the colonists 
or the Indians. Although a lively interethnic economy existed 
within the colony, there were simply not enough European goods 
to satisfy the Choctaws, who outnumbered the French in 
Louisiana by four or five to one. 1 
Even before the Franco-Natchez War, traders from south 
Carolina had visited the Choctaws in an attempt to open a 
regular trade. While Louisiana could muster enough economic, 
diplomatic, and military strength to check such initiatives, 
there was little chance of any such trade developing. But in 
the aftermath of the war, many factors in the southeastern 
balance-of-power had been altered. The war had weakened 
Louisiana in every way and had diverted much of the colony's 
supplies from the Choctaw trade. Consequently, arguments that 
an English trade should at least be investigated fell on 
receptive ears in the council houses. Many Choctaws no doubt 
hoped to emulate the Creeks, who enjoyed trade and presents 
from the French and the English. 
The leader of the Choctaw pro-English party was the war 
chief of Couechitto, Shulashummastabe. Known to the French 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
133 
and English as Red Shoe, the symbol of his office, he 
originally gained prominence in the wars against the 
slave-raiding Chickasaws. Although he was a red or war chief, 
in a departure from tradition, Louisiana 1 s acting governor 
Baron de Crenay made him a medal chief in 1732, no doubt 
hoping to control him through his medal to keep him active 
against the Chickasaws. But sometime during the late 1720s 
or early 1730s, Red Shoe began to see the benefits his nation 
could derive from an English alliance, and began to court 
English traders through their allies, the Chickasaws. As one 
of the Choctaws• greatest warriors and a French medal chief, 
Red Shoe commanded great respect. But during the ensuing two 
decades he would show himself to be no less a diplomat. 2 
Despite a long history of warfare with the Choctaws and 
a more immediate history of raiding them for slaves, the 
Chickasaws were also ready to consider a diplomatic and 
commercial realignment with old enemies. Slave-raiding 
against the Choctaws had been lucrative commercially and in 
war honors, but times had changed. With the dramatic increase 
in Negro slavery in Britain's middle and southern colonies, 
demand for the far less dependable Indian slaves had made this 
traffic steadily less profitable. But there were great 
profits to be made as middlemen and facilitators of an 
Anglo-Choctaw trade. If such a trade were developed, 
warehouses would have to be built in the Chickasaw villages, 
there would be more traders traveling through, and overall 
business would increase significantly. 3 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
134 
The role of facilitator of the Anglo-Choctaw trade was 
available to the Chickasaws only because the Creeks 
emphatically rejected it. The Creeks understood that a 
balance of power in the Southeast between France and England 
was vital to their continued security. They understood fully 
that their role as the fulcrum of that balance would be 
destroyed if the Choctaws and English concluded an alliance 
and France was eliminated from the region. Thus they 
implicitly, and at times explicitly, supported the French 
alliance with the Choctaws. 4 
The presence of the Natchez among the Chickasaws served 
as a convenient pretext for the Franco-Chickasaw war of the 
1730s, but the war's true purpose was to prevent the creation 
of an Anglo-Choctaw alliance. Because the Creeks would not 
allow English traders to pass through their country to reach 
the Choctaws, the only possible path lay through the Chickasaw 
country. But the English traders could travel to the Choctaws 
in safety only if the Choctaws and Chickasaws were at peace. 
Thus, a Choctaw-Chickasaw peace was the sine qua non of an 
Anglo-Choctaw trade. During the early 1730s there were more 
than enough Choctaws who for a price were willing to do 
violence to the Chickasaws, so it was initially not very 
difficult for the French to ruin a Choctaw-Chickasaw 
rapprochement. As time wore on, and the Choctaw pro-English 
faction grew, however, it took ever greater efforts to keep 
the Choctaws and Chickasaws at war, not peace. 5 
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Jean-Baptiste le Moyne de Bienville was appointed to his 
third term as governor of Louisiana in 1732 because he was 
considered the only man who could restore France's honor in 
the Southeast. He knew the colony better than any man alive, 
and the circumstances demanded a leader who already knew the 
Indians, particularly the Choctaws, and how to manage them. 
Bienville was the one man who had the confidence of the 
colony's habitants and Indian allies.6 
Bienville's immediate task was to restore calm in the 
colony, which the news of his reappointment began to do even 
before his arrival in Louisiana. But his most important 
mission was to intercept and terminate all British trade with 
the Indians of Louisiana. He had two options in doing this. 
He could, if possible, make a peaceful accommodation with the 
Chickasaws that would reassert French primacy in the region. 
But if the Chickasaws needed to be subjugated or destroyed by 
force of arms, the governor was to take every step necessary 
to accomplish this quickly and efficiently. 7 
Bienville's task was not easy. The Chickasaws and 
Natchez responded to continual attacks from Louisiana and her 
Indian allies by waging their own guerilla war on the colony. 
With the encouragement and support of the English, the 
Chickasaws made raids on the Mississippi and Ohio River 
convoys, attacked Choctaw villages, and even raided the lower 
colony for Negro slaves for sale to the British. Despite 
almost four years of warfare against the Natchez, at least two 
hundred Natchez warriors survived. Some lived with the 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
136 
Chickasaws, but others lived with their families near their 
old home on both sides of the Mississippi River. 8 To make 
matters worse, some of Louisiana's major allies were almost 
as troublesome as the Natchez and Chickasaws. After seven 
years of poor manaqement by Perier, the Choctaws were 
considered by many veteran officers to be more surly and 
difficult to manaqe than usual. Perier had qreatly increased 
the number of Choctaw chiefs to auqment his influence in the 
nation, but the move had backfired. Each chief formed his own 
little party; the more chiefs and parties there were, the more 
difficult it was to manipulate the nation. The qrand chief, 
throuqh whom the French qoverned the Choctaws, had scarcely 
any infl'Uence at all. Presents due in November 1732 had not 
been delivered because there were none to qive; now the 
Choctaws expected double presents for 1733. Bienville knew 
it would be impolitic to disappoint their expectations, 
especially when the British were ready to meet all theii needs 
and more. 9 
Other major allies qave worry as well. The Illinois, 
faithful allies since La Salle's day, could not satisfy their 
needs by the French, so they traded with the British for the 
difference. If they decided to forsake the French entirely, 
they would effectively sever Louisiana's lifeline to Canada. 
Farther south, amonq the Alabamas, affairs were disordered as 
the result of the murder committed by an Alabama aqainst a 
member of the small Mobile tribe. The commandant of Mobile 
had foolishly become involved in the quarrel, alienating 
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Bienville found other areas 
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of the colony's 
administration as discrdered as her Indian relations. The 
colony lacked money, supplies, and merchandise. Because of 
the continuing Indian war, Louisiana's meager population had 
declined further. Problems in the Illinois country 
necessitated building a new fort there and augmenting the 
garrison, but Bienville had no troops to spare. 11 
While Bienville studied the situation in Louisiana, his 
Indian allies harassed the Chickasaws and Natchez from north 
and south. From the north, the Weas of the Ohio River carried 
out most of the attacks, but parties from as far away as the 
st. Lawr.ence intermittently raided the Chickasaws for hair and 
horses. From the south, Choctaws and natives from the small 
nations attacked Chickasaw villages, corn fields, and hunting 
parties. Despite these attacks, however, English convoys 
continued to get through to the Chickasaw villages. 12 
As hoped, the continuing attacks of Choctaws from the 
south and Weas from the north prompted the Chickasaws to sue 
for peace soon after Bienville's arrival in Louisiana. At 
first, hoping to limit attacks from the north, they offered 
to make a separate peace with Canada. When this was 
decisively rebuffed, the Chickasaws sent a chief to the 
Alabama fort with a letter from the nation, dictated to and 
written by a French prisoner, offering to make peace. The 
letter hinted that the Chickasaws were as contemptuous of the 
Natchez as the French were and treated them little better than 
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slaves. This offered the hope that the Chickasaws would 
finally hand over the Natchez living among them as the price 
of their own survival. 13 
The Chickasaws possibly were willing to hand over the 
Natchez living among them because there were actually few of 
the remnant Natchez in the Chickasaw villages. The Natchez 
were split into three bands. Only one lived near the 
Chickasaw villages, in a small village of its own. The other 
two bands lived near the ol~d Natchez lands, one band on each 
side of the Mississippi River. During summer 1733 Bienville 
sent two separate parties to de~troy these camps. Although 
the camps were destroyed and a few Natchez, mostly women and 
children, were killed or captured, the majority fled to the 
Chickasaw villages to join the rest of their kindred. This 
swelled the Natchez population of the Chickasaw villages to 
almost two hundred warriors and their families. 14 
But Bienville was indisposed to accept the Chickasaw 
offer to make peace. The honor of France demanded more, and 
he knew the Chickasaws well enough to know that they would 
not remain peaceful if they were in a position to prosecute 
war. Far from calling off the Choctaws and Weas, Bienville 
increased the attacks. His plan was to weaken the Chickasaws 
into paralysis or force them to abandon the country. The 
Abihkas had invited the Chickasaws to settle with them, and 
Bienville hoped to see it happen. If the Chickasaws left 
their present territory to live with the Creeks, the French 
would be able to use the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers in almost 
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complete safety. 15 Maurepas agreed that the voluntary 
withdrawal of the Chickasaws was the ideal solution to a 
vexing problem. 16 
The Choctaws supported Bienville 1 s anti-Chickasaw 
policies, but revealed growing dissatisfaction with Louisiana. 
One chief, considered by Bienville one of the most pro-French 
Choctaws, was sent to the Chickasaws on a bogus peace mission 
to div~rt Chickasaw attention from an impending attack. 
Courted by English traders, he not only betrayed Bienville's 
plan to the Chickasaws, but on returning home · lobbied his 
nati.:.m on behalf of the Chickasaws and English. Many Choctaws 
wished to trade with the English and were angry that Bienville 
wished to deny them that privilege while his subordinates were 
trading with English ships on Mobile Bay. Presents that were 
years ovardue did not help France's position with the 
Choctaws. Some Choctaws refused to join attacks on the 
Chickasaws, while others who joined the expeditions deserted 
along the way or simpl~· refused once battle was joined to 
attack the Chickasaws. 17 
Despite the nation 1 s growing ambivalence, Choctaw parties 
continued to take the field against the Chickasaws and won 
some impressive victories. Although the Chickasaws were known 
as the best fighters of the Southeast and the Choctaws were 
considered indifferent warriors when away from their villages, 
in a reversal of usual practice it was the Chickasaws who 
cowered in their fortifications and refused to fight. A late 
1733 attack resulted in the deaths of over forty Chickasaws, 
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with only five Choctaws killed in the battle. But one was the 
son of the grand chief and another was a brother of Alabama 
Mingo, one of the senior medal chiefs. Their gains and losses 
only made the Choctaws all the more determined to continue to 
attack the Chickasaws. 18 
The Choctaws• belligerency toward the Chickasaws did not 
extend to British traders or their Indian emissaries. During 
the spring and summer of 1734 the Choctaws were the objects 
of a diplomatic blitz by the traders. During springtime one 
or more English traders visited Seneacha, one of the Six Towns 
division villages, and reportedly brought ten horses charged 
with presents and merchandise. Seneacha 1 s grand Fanimingo was 
invited to accompany the traders on a goodwill tour of the 
Chickasaws, Abhikas, Talapoosas, Kappas, and Shawnees. 19 
During the summer, an Abihka representing British traders 
spread as much propaganda as possible to alienate the Choctaws 
from the French. 20 
The English traders 1 diplomatic offensive gained at least 
a psychological advantage in summer 1734 with the visit of the 
Choctaw chief Red Shoe to Charlas Town. Although Red Shoe had 
apparently been dealing with the representatives of Georgia 
Indian agent Patrick Mackay, the chief was courted in South 
carolina. The older colony was better able to afford the 
entertainment and inducements befitting such an important 
guest. 21 Negotiations proceeded smoothly and both sides were 
reportedly happy with the agreement to begin a regular 
Anglo-Choctaw trade. 22 
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In the end, however, Red Shoe's visit was not the great 
success hoped for by the English or feared by the French • 
.... 
Red Shoe had gone to the English without his nation's 
authorization and returned home to a chilly reception. 
Although the chief returned from Carolina loaded with 
presents, an Euglish flag, and a fine scarlet suit bordered 
with gold braid, he did not have everything he had hoped for. 
He did arrange for a trade at good prices compared to those 
of the French. But because they did not fully trust the 
Choctaws, British merchants would not trade with the Choctaws 
directly but only through the Creeks. Moreover, Red Shoe 
returned just as Bienville sent the Choctaws more trade goods 
than they could possibly afford to buy. Seeing the diplomatic 
winds blowing against him, Red Shoe made sure that he would 
be allowed to receive his annual presents at Mobile with the 
rest of the tribe. He also assured everyone that it was not 
his intention to disavow the French entirely, but rathe:i:· to 
trade with both France and England, as the Creeks did. 23 
IIi the fall of 1734 the Chickasaws once more offered to 
make peace, but asked for time to deliver up the Natchez, 
during which there would be no attacks by the Choctaws. 
Bienville agreed to this all the more readily because the 
Choctaws had already told him they did not have the food 
reserves necessary to make winter attacks. 24 But Bienville 
decided to hold one of the Chickasaw ambassadors in Mobile 
as a hostage for the good behavior of his tribesmen. In the 
summer of 1735 the Chickasaws attacked an Illinois-bound 
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convoy in order to obtain their own hostages. But the attack 
miscarried, and nine of eleven Frenchmen in the convoy were 
killed. All possibility of a peaceful settlement had 
evaporated. 25 
The Chickasaw attack on the Louisiana convoy was a 
convenient insult on which Bienville could hang a declaration 
of war, but the governor's real concern as usual was the 
British effort to open a Choctaw trade. During the winter of 
1734 two British traders almost succeeded in establishing a 
warehouse in the Alabama village of Oukouitamopa, barely one 
league from Fort Toulouse. A disaster for Louisiana was 
averted only by the presence of French troops and a delegation 
of pro-French Choctaw notables. 26 But even more worrisome to 
Bienville, he learned in the spring of 1735 that the English 
planned to make several settlements near the Alabamas. 
Although Bienville had earlier dismissed "New Georgia" as no 
real threat to Louisiana or Florida, 27 he now concluded that 
they would stop at nothing to penetrate French territory. 28 
By the fall of 1735 Bienville accepted that war was the 
only solution to his Chickasaw problem. Bienville did not 
trust his allies completely, even though the Choctaws had 
rejected Red Shoe's Carolina trade arrangements. Bienville 
knew that the British traders would not give up so easily and 
that once a trade was begun it would be difficult to end. 
Furthermore, the unrelenting efforts of the English to arrange 
a Choctaw-Chickasaw peace made a Choctaw-Chickasaw war all the 
more imperative. Bienville knew that if a Choctaw-Chickasaw 
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peace were ever concluded, Louisiana and all her people would 
be lost. 
By December 1734 the court had already come to the same 
conclusion. Maurepas was worried that war with England could 
break out at any moment. He wanted Bienville to move against 
the Chickasaws immediately to neutralize the British in 
southeastern North America. The minister advised Bienville 
that three hundred Frenchmen plus the Choctaws should be 
sufficient to the task. Bienville was to practice all economy 
possible in planning the campaign, but at the same time he 
should make any expenditure necessary to ensure its success. 29 
With the decision for war Bienville requested and 
received permission to build the long-discussed Choctaw fort. 
Located on the Tombecbe River fifteen leagues upriver from a 
bend known as Tascaloosa, Fort Tombecbe was designed to serve 
tactical as well as strategic goals for the region. The fort 
would not sever all Anglo-Choctaw contact, but it would serve 
as a valuable watch on English activities. More i~~ediately, 
it would serve as the springboard for Bienville's Chickasaw 
campaign if the attack was launched from the Mobile River and 
Choctaw country. 30 
Despite the need for a war against the Chickasaws, 
Louisiana was in no way ready to mount a major military 
effort. supplies and merchandise were at an all-time low. 
Supplies were badly needed by colonists, the army, and the 
government, but merchandise for the Indians was no less 
crucial. Lack of trade goods made the Indians difficult to 
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manage even in the best of times~ without presents it was 
almost impossible to enlist the Indians in small raiding 
parties, much less major campaigns. 31 
The garrison was as undermanned as its supply room was 
poorly stocked. The thirteen French and three swiss companies 
marshalled on paper lacked 142 men, almost three complete 
companies. Since most of the troops would have to be left at 
their posts to protect the colony, the 250 men needed for the 
expedition would have to be completed with militia and 
Negroes. Diverting this manpower from the fields would do 
great damage to the colony's agriculture, but there was little 
else Bienville could do. He did not trust the Choctaws enough 
to employ them in his main attacking force. Instead, he 
planned for them to divert the Chickasaws 1 attention by 
attacking another village while he carried on the main 
assault. 32 
As if to underscore the urgency of his preparations, 
Bienville had his hands full of British traders and their 
intrigues in the very heart of Louisiana in the summer and 
fall of 1735. Two visits by English treders to the Choctaw 
grand village, sponsored by Red Shoe and Alabama Mingo, were 
disrupted, but it required the active participation of a 
French officer to b:~ak up the second visit. Such obvious 
manipulation of the nation was unusual and revealed the 
desperation of the French position. 33 During the winter of 
1735, English traders attempted to advance their commercial 
initiative all the way to the Red River through ambassadors 
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from the Chakchiumas, allies of Louisiana who were also 
friendly with the Chickasaws. Bienville was able to prevent 
the scheme from taking place and almost destroyed the 
Chakchiumas, whose survivors were forced to take refuge among 
the Choctaws, in the process. At the same time, a report that 
the English were simultaneously courting and threatening the 
small nations around Mobile pushed the commandant and many of 
the settlers into a panic. The governor knew he could not 
fight the trader-inspired brush fires forever.~ 
By the fall of 1735 Bienville had formulated a plan to 
destroy the Chickasaws. Leading an army of five hundred 
soldiers, voyagers, habitants, and Negroes, Bienville would 
ascend the Mobile toward the enemy villages, accompanied by 
an army of Choctaws. Pierre Diron D'Artaguiette, commandant 
of Illinois, was supposed to gather all the forces and 
supplies he could from that quarter and meet Bienville four 
leagues from the Chickasaw villages at the end of March 1736.35 
Bienville found raising enough troops and outfitting his 
army to be difficult tasks. The governor stripped all posts 
of everyone but the infirm and recent arrivals, and still had 
to raise three volunteer companies. One of the companies was 
composed entirely of armed Negroes, with free Blacks as their 
officers. 36 Arms and food were also in short supply throughout 
the colony. Provisioning the campaign reduced reserves to 
practically nothing. 37 To make matters worse, the royal supply 
vessel arrived in Louisiana a month late and without the badly 
needed mortars Bienville had ordered.~ 
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Even transportation was a problem. Bienville ordered a 
number of batteaux and piroques built for the campaign, which 
he expected to be ready for October 1735. The contractors 
were still working on some of them in mid-January 1736. 
Bienville had planned to leave Mobile by March 1, but because 
of the lack of vehicles and contrary winds, he could not set 
out for the rendezvous until April 1. 39 
When the governor realized how great a delay would occur 
in his arrival at the rendezvous, he dispatched a pirogue to 
instruct D 1 Artaguiette to put off his departure for the 
Chickasaws until the end of April. 40 But it was already too 
late. By March 4 D'Artaguiette and his army were already at 
the Prudhomme Bluffs. Bienville's delay would cause both the 
Frenchmen and the Indians in D'Artaguiette•s army to become 
impatient. Not only would they have to wait, but to do so 
they would have to hunt for food continually. 41 
Actually, Bienville's delay would have far more 
catastrophic consequences. D 1 Artaguiette 's force included 
not only the Kaskaskia Indians, but some Iroquois, Cahokias, 
Michigameas, Arkansas, and Ohio River natives as well. When 
D 1 Artaguiette learned of Bienville's delay, he called a 
conseil de guerre of his officers and the chiefs of the 
various Indian detachments. The Indians were without 
provisions for an extended campaign and instinctively 
preferred to make war quickly and go home. But scouts had 
reported that there was a small village of about thirty cabins 
on the edge of the great Chickasaw prairie, separated from the 
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main villages. The Iroquois proposed taking this village, 
where they expected to find provisions, fortifying themselves 
within it, and there wait for the southern army. Since almost 
all of his officers approved of this plan, Dartaquiette agreed 
to try it. The attack was made on Palm sunday morning, 
1736. 42 
According to the English trader William McMullain, who 
was present when D'Artaquiette attacked the Chickasaws, the 
villagers were not at all surprised by the appearance of the 
French army. In January 1736, Chickasaw hunters learned about 
the impending French attack from Shawnees they met on the 
creek trail. The Chickasaws put themselves into a defensive 
posture and waited. When D'Artaquiette•s attack came, the 
besieged Chickasaw villagers were quickly assisted by several 
hundred of their fellow warriors. The suddenness of the 
counterattack caused almost all the Indians except the 
Iroquois and Arkansas to flee in panic. D'Artaguiette 
attempted to conduct an orderly retreat, but he, his chaplain, 
and almost all his officers were captured by the Chickasaws. 
To make matters worse: English traders found letters on the 
field of battle which outlined the entire French plan. 43 
Unaware of D'Artaquiette•s defeat and death, Bienville 
did not leave Mobile until May 1. The tedious upriver passage 
was made more miserable by continual rain. Bienville did not 
reach the planned rendezvous until May 2 3 • After several days 
without any sign of D'Artaquiette or his forces, the governor 
decided to launch his attack unaided. Unfortunately for the 
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French, the Choctaws had their own plans for the battle; when 
they could not convince Bienville to go along with theirs, 
they simply ignored his. Because of the lack of coordination 
and the Chickasaw's advance preparation for the attack, 
Bienville was defeated almost as decisively as Dartaquiette. 
The French force was almost abandoned by the Choctaws, who 
only helped bring out the wounded because of the intervention 
of the grand chief and Alabama Mingo. In the process of 
extracting the French from an otherwise hopeless situation, 
the Choctaws lost twenty-two warriors. The operation fueled 
much resentment of the French by the Choctaws and convinced 
many Choctaws that the French could accomplish nothing without 
them. 44 
Bienville tried to put the best face possible on this 
double defeat. He cited D'Artaquiette's decision to attack 
the enemy unaided and his subsequent defeat as the most 
important cause for the campaign's failure and the loss of so 
many officers and men. But the defeat made all the Indians 
of the colony eager for satisfaction, and the Choctaws even 
declared that they were ready to return to the field by 
autumn. Knowing that his majesty would want to vindicate the 
glory of his arms, Bienville requested arms and ammunition for 
his own forces and all the Indian allies. 45 
Bienville directed some of his frustration on the 
governor of South Carolina. When he realized there were 
Englishmen in the Chickasaw village he was attacking, he 
directed his men to direct their attack instead at the 
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neighboring village. Despite this, however, the Englishmen 
had followed the Chickasaws to the new scene of battle, and 
after the battle was over, encouraged the Chickasaws to kill 
rather than spare their prisoners. such conduct was contrary 
to the peace subsisting between the two crowns, and Bienville 
demanded justice against such acts.~ 
The governor did, however, place some of the blame on 
the Ministry of the Marine. He was particularly vexed about 
the defeat because of the cowardice of his soldiers, which 
exposed their officers to death and dishonor. But not much 
more could be expected of the soldiers sent to Louisiana. Of 
recent recruits, Bienville complained, only two or three were 
over five feet, ten inches tall, and over one-half of the 
fifty-two had already been flogged for theft. 47 
An angry court agreed with Bienville at least that 
another campaign was necessary. Maurepas ordered Bienville 
to begin preparations immediately. 'l'he king would help by 
replacing missing soldiers from the French and Swiss 
garrisons, send 750 marine troops, and supply artillery 
officers, bombardiers, artillery, and canon for the campaign. 
Maurepas had already directed Canadian governor-general 
Charles de la Boiche, Marquis de Beauharnois, to enlist the 
northern tribes in the campaign. He wanted Bienville to be 
ready to march by September 1737. 48 
Maurepas involved himself in every aspect of the 
campaign's planning to ensure its success. The minister had 
recruiters in the field in France to enlist men in the 
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campaign. He also appointed officers to coordinate artillery 
for the campaign, to obtain the different kinds of equipment 
and supplies that would be needed, and even to devise plans 
for attacking the Chickasaw villages. 49 He even convinced 
Bienville to mount the expedition from the Mississippi rather 
than the Mobile River. 50 
Choosing the Mississippi River as a base of operations, 
however, necessitated delaying the campaign until 1739. The 
campaign would require a tremendous number of large bateaux 
and smaller pirogues to transport supplies and men, including 
sick soldiers and their replacements, between New Orleans and 
the field. There were few workmen in Louisiana and they were 
not very productive. 
unavoidable. 51 
Thus the two-year delay was 
Part of the reason for choosing the Mississippi was based 
on Bienville 1 s belief that cannon and artillery would be 
necessary to defeat the Chickasaws. In addition to his own 
experience at the enemy villages, he obtained valuable 
intelligence concerning the Chickasaw villages, their 
fortifications, and the surrounding terrain from an Abenaki 
who lived among the Alabamas. According to the Abenaki the 
Chickasaws did not fear bombardment because they did not think 
the French could get the war machines to their villages. The 
Mobile River was too shallow to support the large vehicles 
necessary to carry them. The terrain between the Mississippi 
River and the villages was. crisscrossed by many creeks in 
summer and swampy in winter. 52 
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The Chickasaws would have felt even more secure had they 
known the trouble Bienville would have in discovering a route 
capable of supporting his cannon from the Mississippi River 
to their villages. Because the Chickasaw country was not well 
known, Bienville immediately began to search for a location 
for his base camp and a route from it to the enemy. He sent 
several experienced officers on reconnaissance expeditions 
over the next two years. A reconnaissance in the late fall 
1737 brought back encouraging information, but it conflicted 
sharply with the little that was definitely known about the 
region's geography. 53 A spring 1738 effort led only to the 
death of the intrepid De Lery in an ambush and the decision 
that :further parties should be sent out to obtain more 
definite knowledge of the country. 54 
To maintain pressure on the Chickasaws, Bienville kept 
his allies continually in the field against the enemy and paid 
handsome rewards for scalps and prisoners. Constant attacks 
kept the Chickasaws close to their villages, which in February 
1737 were undergoing a famine. The men were forced to leave 
their women and children in their villages under the 
protection of English traders while they went out to hunt. 55 
In the fall of 1737 a Franco-Choctaw party of five hundred 
destroyed the Chickasaws• grain fields. The Choctaws killed 
ten Chickasaws and took one prisoner, despite the fact that 
the Chickasaws refused to leave their fortifications for 
battle. 56 
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such a great victory inspired imitation, even in Red 
Shoe's pro-Chickasaw western division villages. Seeing 
Choctaw ardor for war rising to a feverish pitch, French 
officer De Lery offered to lead one more war party before 
winter set in. Nine hundred Frenchmen and Choctaws took the 
field. This time the Choctaws killed twelve Chickasaws, took 
ten scalps, and killed or captured fifty-three horses. For 
all this they suffered only one killed and five wounded. 
Bienville noted to Maurepas that this was remarkable conduct 
for a people who formerly trembled at the name Chickasaw. 57 
In early 1738 Maurepas appointed marine captain Louis de 
Nouailles D'Ayme as military commander of the expedition. 
Once in Louisiana, D'Ayme would have command of the troup~s 
detachees de la marine, the regular French and swiss garrison, 
and the militia. Although the captain had no experience with 
either land warfare or American Indians, according to Maurepas 
he had "the talents and experience necessary to command this 
expedition," and Bienville was directed to work closely with 
him. 58 In fact, D'Ayme's contribution to the campaign would 
prove minimal. 
Red Shoe's influence seemed on the rise even as his 
nation ostensibly turned more ardently anti-Chickasaw. But 
even though his own pro-English and, by extension, 
pro-Chickasaw partisans remained numerically small, many 
Choctaws who would not help him make peace with the enemy 
seemingly were not going to hinder him either. 59 In 1738 he 
traveled widely in pursuit of an English alliance, arriving 
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unexpectedly in Savannah in February and in Charles Town in 
May. The Choctaws were well-entertained in both colonies and 
William Bull of South Carolina spared no expense to impress 
them with the power and grandeur of George II. Although the 
Choctaws were frank this time in admitting that many of their· 
headmen were still in the French interest, the prospect of a 
Choctaw trade animated many Englishmen.~ 
Bull was keenly aware of the economic and strategic 
benefits that would accrue to England from a Choc~aw alliance. 
A ~hoctaw trade would increase South Carolina 1 s economy 
significantly. But more importantly, he knew that without the 
Choctaws Louisiana could not long survive. An Anglo-Choctaw 
alliance would not only deprive Louisiana of the bulk of her 
fighting force, but would sever all overland communications 
between Louisiana and Canada. It would be an expensive but 
imperially worthwhile relationship. 61 
In the early summer of 1738 Red Shoe brought ten 
Chickasaw chiefs into the eastern division villages, where 
the two groups ratified a Choctaw-Chickasaw peace treaty. 
According to its terms the Choctaws were required to end all 
hostilities against the Chickasaws, help the Chickasaws 
against all their enemies, and report to the Chickasaws on 
all the movements of the French. In return, the Chickasaws 
were required to give all the wives and children of the 
Natchez to the Choctaws as slaves. 62 
Red Shoe was able to conclude such a treaty because of 
basic dissatisfaction with the French alliance. In the first 
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place, the French could not supply the Choctaws with the trade 
goods they needed, while the Chickasaws' English allies 
apparently could. Moreover, at least some Choctaws correctly 
suspected that the French were deliberately keeping them at 
war with the Chickasaws to weaken them, resulting in an ally 
that was easier to control.~ 
Bienville immediately offered large rewards to any 
Choctaw who would break the peace, but there were no takers. 
Alabama Mingo, formerly one of Red Shoe's most ardent 
supporters, was interested, but could do nothing. Red Shoe 
had wisely sent hostages to the Chickasaws for Choctaw good 
behavior and no one wanted to put them at risk.M 
The English tried to enhance Red Shoe's position by 
circulating the story that the French had invited the English 
to join them in the destruction of all the southeastern 
Indians which, according to the story, the English had 
naturally refused. They even had the Abhikas call a general 
meeting of the Creeks to spread the story, but the move 
backfired. At the conference, the Alabamas learned that the 
Choctaws were reportedly getting ready to break completely 
with the French~ several Alabama chiefs went to the Choctaws 
to defend the French. They inquired about the Choctaws' 
dissatisfaction with the French and explained what they saw 
as the evils attendant upon a Franco-Choctaw split. The 
Alabamas had a reputation for wisdom as well as strength and 
their talk undoubtedly impressed many Choctaws. 65 
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Bienville used both a carrot and a stick in trying to 
keep the Choctaws within the French orbit. He showed his 
stick in the summer of 1738 when he forbade French traders to 
supply Red Shoe's villages as usual. This ploy did not work, 
however, as it only fueled the villagers• resentment of France 
and their determination to ally with the English. 66 By January 
1739, when Bienville decided to attract Red Shoe back into the 
fold, the chief was on one of his periodic visits to 
Carolina.Q There he and the chiefs of sixteen towns, along 
with several Chickasaw dignitaries, were wined, dined, and 
entertained by the governor, council, and militia.M 
In November 1738 Bienville went to Mobile for the annual 
ritual of distributing the Indian presents. An always onerous 
task was this time doubly difficult. At the same time that 
he was recruiting for his spring 1739 campaign against the 
Chickasaws, the Choctaws had more than the usual number of 
complaints for Bienville to satisfy. Presents, as usual, were 
far behind schedule. More than that, however, two Choctaws 
were missing and two Creoles were suspected of killing them. 
The two Creoles, brothers, were tried and found guilty of the 
murders and were executed in the presence of the Choctaws.~ 
Bienville 1 s diplomacy seemed to be working, because 
between February and May 1739 Choctaws brought Bienville 
fifteen scalps, for which generous bounties were paid. To 
further stimulate hostilities, Bienville announced to the 
nation that he would not distribute the annual presents until 
the Choctaws had signified their loyalty to France by bringing 
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in more scalps. By mid-May, most of the Choctaw villages had 
announced their opposition to the Chickasaws. 70 They were 
joined in this by warriors from the Ofogoulas, Chakchiumas, 
Avoyelles, Tensas, Apalachees, Arkansas, and Caddoes. 71 
Despite two years of preparations, however, the projected 
summer 1739 expedition against the Chickasaws did not leave 
New Orleans until September. Not only were D'Ayme and his 
troops and supplies months late in reaching Louisiana, but 
there were fewer men and supplies than anticipated. D1Ayme 
had to put 70 men in the hospital on arrival, and only five 
of those were expected to leave with the army.n Even worse, 
powder and flour were in short supply and the supply boats 
carried no goods for Indian presents. 73 News that another ship 
carrying presents might arrive in a few weeks or a month was 
not much consolation. The Indians could not be stirred 
without presents, and any delay could force them into a winter 
campaign. Mobile commandant Henri de Lauboey prophetically 
warned that a winter campaign would be difficult on the draft 
animals and would make many of the normal routes of 
communication impassible.~ 
While the army prepared to move out from New Orleans, 
advance parties were preparing their field position. 
Bienville had chosen the Prudhomme Bluffs on the Mississippi, 
near the mouth of the Wolf River, as his base camp. It was 
chosen for its proximity to the enemy and its convenience as 
a central supply depot.~ The fort was finished on August 15, 
1739, and named for the day, the feast of the Assumption.n 
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The largest army ever seen to date in North America 
assembled at Fort Assumption in October and November 1739. 
The first large contingent to arrive was that of Canada. Led 
by Bienville's nephew Charles Le Moyne, Baron de Longueuil, 
the detachment of over 700 officers, soldiers, civilian 
volunteers, and Indians reached camp on October 10, 1739.n 
A month later~ D'Ay.me and Bienville arrived from the south a 
few days apart leading their own mixed force of French and 
Swiss soldiers, civilian volunteers, Negroes, and Indians.~ 
Bienville's army consisted of approximately 1,500 Europeans 
and almost 1,300 Indians.~ 
The preparations for such a grand campaign did not escape 
the notice of the English or the Chickasaws. South Carolina 
was apprised of New France's war preparations by a letter from 
New York that reported on the departure of the Longueuil 
expedition. Correctly estimating the size of the force, its 
target was known only to be some British-allied Indians 
situated "near some Branches of the Messasippi [sic] River." 
Bull in turn notified Georgia and the Creeks about it and 
warned them to be on their guard.~ 
The Chickasaws did not need letters from Englishmen to 
tell them of the mortal danger the faced. They had offered 
to make peace with Louisiana before, and in hopes of avoiding 
their complete destruction they decided to try again. On 
October 13 the French found letters in two different locations 
around their camp. Written for the Chickasaws by French 
prisoners; the letters offered to make peace and return all 
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prisoners. The Chickasaws also left traditional tokens of 
peace in the area, perhaps to make sure France's native allies 
were aware of their willingness to make peace. These included 
a war club with the top broken off, white feathers, an ear of 
corn, tobacco, a bear skin, and medicine. By this the 
Chickasaws signaled that they wanted to sit at the same mat 
with the French, to eat together and smoke the same pipe, and 
that they wanted the trails to be white, not bloody. 81 
But when Bienville called his Indian forces together at 
Fort Assumption, he talked of war, not peace. The Indians 
pledged their devotion to France and their desire to strike 
the Chickasaws and go home. Bienville told them he planned 
to make the assault in three weeks, after the horses and draft 
animals had arrived.~ But such optimism was to prove 
unfounded. The draft animals and horses arrived late and many 
were lost along the way.~ 
Even worse was the lack of a road on which the animals 
could carry supplies, mortars, and artillery to the enemy 
villages. As the search for a road dragged on, camp life 
became more and more of a strain for the French and Indians 
lodged in Fort Assumption. Supplies were a constant 
preoccupation. Despite the periodic arrival of foodstuffs 
from the Illinois and Arkansas departments, Indians had to be 
sent out continuously to hunt for meat. By the middle of 
January food was being rationed.M 
The seemingly endless waiting was difficult on everyone, 
with potentially explosive results. On December 18, a drunk 
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Canadian volunteer killed a drunk Potawatomi chief. Lonqueuil 
a~d Bienville managed to keep matters from escalating, and in 
traditional Indian fashion the Canadian made his peace with 
the offended tribe by "covering" the dead chief with necklaces 
and merchandise. 85 A few days later a group of Iroquois 
harangued Bienville concerning its weariness of camp life and 
its desire to know just when they would leave for the 
Chickasaw villages.M 
By mid-December D'Ayme feared that the campaign was lost 
even before it could begin. 87 On the day after Christmas 
Bienville, D'Ayme and Longueuil had a long discussion about 
the state of the campaign. They had as yet found no road, 
supplies were critically low, the weather was worsening, and 
so was morale.M By New Year's Eve, the road still not found, 
Bienville and D'Ayme decided to accept the Chickasaw offer to 
make peace. Bienville dictated a letter, to be brought to the 
Chickasaws by a swift runner, stating his terms: he would give 
them peace if they fulfilled the pledge made five years 
earlier to kill all the Natchez living with them.$ 
On January 11, Bienville received the long-sought news 
that a practical route to the enemy had at last been 
discovered. It followed the crest of several ridges, and 
required the building of no bridges, only the clearing of 
brush. Bienville put one hundred men in the field clearing 
the way, and in five days they broke through the dense 
underbrush to the clear woods.~ 
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By this time, however, it was too late to mount the 
campaign so long planned: there were not enough supplies or 
draft animals, and food was almost gone. Bienville did 
approve the request -of the Iroquois for a joint 
Iroquois-canadian attack on the Chickasaws, but this was 
mainly a face-saving gesture. Even while preparations were 
being made for the march, the painful but obvious decision 
was being made to terminate the campaign. On February 15, 
after almost a week of subtle maneuvering by D'Ayme and other 
ranking officers, a council of war formally decided to end the 
campaign. 91 Once the decision was made, decampment began 
immediately. On February 16 the first boatloads of 
volunteers, Negroes, and the sick departed for New Orleans. 92 
The decision to terminate the campaign changed the 
canadian-Indian expedition, led by Captain Pierre Joseph 
,.,., 
Celoron De Blr.l.inville, into an advance peace party. 7.~ But 
they were joined on the march by some Choctaws who had no 
peaceful intentions in mind. While Bienville was encamped at 
Fort Assumption, a group of Choctaws had gone to the 
Chickasaws after repeated invitations to ratify the peace and 
trade. Although they were initially well treated, the 
Chickasaws began to act surly after an English trader arrived 
in the village and began to speak ill of the French and their 
Choctaw allies. The trader was also quite liberal in 
dispersing powder and shot. As the Choctaws were leaving for 
home the Chickasaws fired on them, killing sixteen out of 
twenty. The four survivors managed to escape to the nearest 
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Choctaw town, from which they alerted the entire nation of the 
Chickasaws• treachery. Feelings ran so high even Red Shoe 
declared his intention to join the French in the destruction 
of the Chickasaws.~ 
Despite the best efforts of the Iro~~ois and Choctaws to 
engage in a full-scale battle, peaceful contact was made with 
the Chickasaws. After several days of negotiations, it was 
arranged for two Chickasaw chiefs to go to Fort Assumption to 
make peace with Bienville. And the peace was a hard one. 
Bienville demanded that the Chickasaws kill or deliver up the 
Natchez among them; kill their allies the Koroas, who harassed 
French traffic on the Mississippi; and renounce all commerce 
with the English. The Chickasaws agreed to all of these 
demcmds, and asked only that Bienville put an end to the 
continual raids of the Choctaws. This Bienville refused to do, 
on the grounds that the Choctaws made their own decisions 
regarding warfare. At the same time, however, he admitted 
that he would continue to pay for Chickasaw scalps. Despite 
the inequities in this arrangement, or perhaps because the 
Chickasaws knew that the French could not really enforce it, 
the treaty was ratified on March 31. As a pledge to the 
Chickasaws of his pacific intentions, as Bienville left for 
New Orleans the next day he torched Fort Assumption.~ 
In spite of the pro-forma conclusion of a peace treaty 
that was ostensibly highly favorable to France, not many on 
the French side thought too highly of the campaign or its 
results. 96 In the end, as Maurepas had warned in the 
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beginning, Bienville would have to accept responsibility for 
the costly failure. In the minister's opinion, the campaign 
was characterized throughout by "irresolution and 
uncertainty," and the lack of any plan, general or specific, 
to guide its execution. The king was allowing Bienville to 
retire, but only after he had worked to restore the security 
of the colony, and to repair the damage done by two defeats 
at the hands of the Indians. 97 
The Chickasaw campaign of 1739-1740 was an important 
event in Louisiana history, but its consequences were neither 
obvious nor immediate. Bienville claimed at least a partial 
success for the expedition for having humbled the Chickasaws, 
which it had in fact done. True to Bienville's prediction, 
never again would the Chickasaws significantly trouble the 
colony. 98 
Far from reestablishing the reputation of France, 
however, the Chickasaw campaign damaged France's standing in 
the Southeast where it counted most, among the Choctaws. 
Despite their late entry into the campaign and even the reason 
behind it, the Choctaws came away from the campaign convinced 
of their increased power relative to the Chickasaws and the 
French. The seeds of pride sown in the campaign against the 
Chickasaws would bloom within less than a decade into civil 
war among the Choctaws. 
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Chapter VI 
The Choctaw civil war, 1746-1752 
By the late 1740s the Choctaws had become so dependent 
upon the French that they experienced something practically 
unthinkable in Indian culture: civil war. Unable to obtain 
the European goods they needed from Louisiana, they turned to 
South Carolina for trade and allian.~e. They honestly hoped 
to emulate the Creeks by "holding" both France and England as 
allies. But the Choctaws were not the Creeks, and the Choctaw 
villages did not occupy the borders of three imperial systems 
as did the creek towns. When faced with Louisiana's 
opposition to their new policy, the Choctaws, unable to 
reconcile all the different demands placed on them, saw the 
bonds that held their society together dissolving under the 
strain. 
The Choctaw Civil War was the result of internal and 
external factors. Externally, it was a product of the 
relationship between the Choctaws and Louisiana. After more 
than four decades of alliance with Louisiana, the Choctaws 
depended upon Louisiana traders not only for guns and 
ammunition, but for a whole range of European manufactured 
170 
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goods t.h.at had replaced their native equivalents. In one 
sense, the French and English were correct to label Choctaw 
policy of this period a revolt: the war stemmed from a revolt 
against Louisiana's endemic inability to supply the Choctaws 
with the European goods they could no longer do without. 1 In 
the aftermath of the Chickasaw war, Louisiana was no longer 
a priority with the French court and the budget suffered. 
Despite a general increase in commercial shipping to Louisiana 
in the late 1740s, inflation and declining allocations for 
Indian presents and trade goods had a drastic impact on the 
Choctaws in the early 1740s. The Choctaws knew whom to turn 
to for their wants if Louisiana could not supply them. 
There were, of course, cultural and political reasons 
for the Choctaw civil War as well. The Choctaws emerged from 
almost a decade of war with the Natchez and Chickasaws with 
a changed opinion of themselves and the French. They were 
formerly considered somewhat desultory warriors off their home 
turf. Now they were veterans of a decade of war that saw the 
Chickasaws, fiercest warriors of the Southeast, repeatedly 
driven into their fortified villages in terror of the 
Choctaws. The Choctaws had served as frontline troops in 
Louisiana's desperate war for survival and appreciated their 
importance to the chronically beleaguered colony. Knowing 
their value to Louisiana, the Choctaws expected to be rewarded 
accordingly. 2 Not satisfied with their treatment by 
Louisiana, they sought satisfaction elsewhere. 
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Politically, the ambitious and gifted Red Shoe was the 
chief architect of the initiatives that resulted in civil war. 
A great warrior and a skilled politician, Red Shoe was able 
at various times to attract a majority of Choctaws to his 
policy of trading with England as well as France. In doing 
this, Red Shoe acted outside his sphere as a red chief and 
diminished the authority of the white chiefs who usually 
determined such policies. As the push and pull of rival 
European powers increased, the fabric of Choctaw society was 
progressively weakened and was finally ripped apart. 
Officials in the colonies invariably blamed commercial, 
political, and diplomatic setbacks with the Indians on their 
European rivals, but it is clear that Red Shoe's English 
initiative was his own idea and was designed to serve his own 
ends. Red Shoe did not need Englishmen to tell him how 
indigent he was, even if they_did so at every opportunity. 
Red Shoe also did not need a Tory politician to tell him of 
the influence he would have with his nation if he engineered 
a bountiful British trade. He and his nation stood to gain 
significantly if he could imitate the Creeks and steer a 
neutral course between Louisiana and South Carolina. 
Tribal politics were not conducted in a vacuum and basic 
political decisions were made with an eye toward native and 
European friends and enemies. All Choctaws were formally 
allied to Louisiana, but with regard to their native neighbors 
the nation 1 s three divisions each had a different orientation. 
These different friendships were largely determined by 
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geography and involved the divisions in peacetime with 
neighbors that other divisions considered highly unfriendly. 
Thus, the Western division had many ties with the Chickasaws 
and Chakchiumas, including marriage alliances, while the 
Eastern division was particularly friendly to the Upper 
Creeks, especially the Alabamas. The Six Towns division, plus 
the independent villages of Chickasawhay and Yowani, had 
similar ties to the small nations of the Gulf Coast. 3 
These external alliances had a major impact on the origin 
and course of the Choctaw Civil War. Red Shoe had made his 
reputation fighting the Chickas3ws, but his division's basic 
friendship with the Chickasaws made it easier for him to make 
contact with and cultivate the Chickasaws• British traders. 
At the same time, Eastern division allies the Upper Creeks did 
not want to see the Choctaws end their French alliance. Upper 
Creek support of Louisiana and continuing encouragement of 
anti-British sentiments among the Choctaws was a considerable 
stumbling block to Red Shoe 1 s plans to initiate a British 
trade for his nationo And even after the assassination of Red 
Shoe, the first Choctaw party to shed Choctaw blood was not 
led by a Choctaw, but by a Six Towns ally, the chief of Grand 
Tohome. 
Europeans from both sides of the imperial frontier had 
their partisans in each of the major nations of the 
southeastern marchlands and attempted to manipulate the 
nations according to their own plans and goals. When Red Shoe 
resumed his efforts to open a British trade and alliance in 
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the mid-1740s, the old alarm bells went off in Louisiana. The 
engine of Louisiana diplomacy was cranked up to prevent the 
formation of a Choctaw-Chickasaw-south Carolina alliance that 
could destroy the colony. South Carolina responded to Red 
Shoe's initiative, but instead of putting the full weight of 
the government behind this golden opportunity to weaken or 
destroy their rival, the governor and assembly placed the 
Choctaw trade in the hands of private traders who were 
woefully inadequate to the commercial as well as the political 
and diplomatic tasks required of them. Like the Chickasaws 
in the 1730s, the Choctaw British party would be left on its 
own by South Carolina in its contest with Louisiana. Unlike 
the Chickasaws, however, the Choctaws were never adequately 
supplied by the Bri~ish and they could not break the French 
alliance without a dependable British replacement. 
The catalyst for the Choctaw Civil War was Europe's War 
of the Austrian succession. French officials feared that 
Louisiana would be dragged into the war as an active 
combatant. At the beginning of the war, Maurepas feared less 
that England would invade Louisiana directly than that she 
would have her Indian allies do it for her. 4 The English 
apparently hoped to do so through an Abihka chief, but the 
Upper Creeks warned the English and their partisans that the 
Upper Creeks would not allow their land to become stained with 
French blood. 5 The capture of a French ship carrying 
Englishmen who had been arrested on the Mississippi River made 
Maurepas anxious that they might be employed in some 
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expedition which could put their knowledge of Louisiana to 
good use. 6 James Oglethorpe' s preparations for war caused two 
years of worry for Louisiana before it was learned definitely 
that his target was st. Augustine and not Mobile or New 
Orleans. 7 
South carolina had reason to fear the European war as 
well. coastal south carolina was particularly vulnerable to 
attack. Much of her population and many of her larger 
plantations was situated on the coast and coastal waterways, 
easy to strike from the sea. French and Spanish privateers 
knew the waters well. They had preyed on the coastal 
plantations during the War of Jenkins' Ear, and everyone 
expected them to return in due course. 8 
The lack of formal warfare between the Europeans did not 
mean that the Southeast was unaffected by the war. During the 
1740s the Choctaws, never oversupplied by the French, had good 
cause to be dissatisfied with their Gallic allies. Due to 
warfare and a worsening financial situation the crown could 
not satisfy the commercial needs of Louisiana 1 s colonists, 
much less the Indians. From 1741 to 1749, the crown sent an 
average of only 1.5 ships to Louisiana per year, and several 
were seized before they could reach the colony. Private 
merchants did a little better at 2.8 ships per year during the 
same period, but they charged prices that often brought them 
from 100 per cent to 500 per cent profit on their goods. At 
these prices few of the colony's private traders could afford 
to buy goods for resale to the Indians. As a result, goods 
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for the Indian trade was always in short supply. 9 
French officials in Louisiana were well aware of the 
political and diplomatic consequences of their continued 
inability to supply the Indians. Governor Pierre de Rigaud 
de vaudreuil, scion of one of Canada's most distinguished 
families, was chosen to succeed Bienville as governor in 1743 
precisely because of his lifetime of experience with the 
Indians. 10 
vaudreuil was initially quite hopeful that he could order 
affairs in the Mississippi Valley to France's advantage. He 
met the Choctaws in Mobile in December 1743 for the annual 
distribution of presents and came away feeling that he had the 
Choctaws right where he wanted them. Some chiefs, such as 
Red Shoe, were chided for lack of devotion to France and had 
their authority diluted. Other chiefs, considered more 
faithful, were rewarded in goods and marks of esteem, which 
in turn bolstered France's standing with the nation. Contrary 
to previous reports, the governor found the Choctaws docile 
and quite attached to France. Indeed, he believed that if 
France could provide enough trade goods, all the nations of 
the region would embrace the French and reject the English. 
vaudreuil proposed that Maurepas send to Louisiana one hundred 
million livres in well-chosen merchandise over the usual 
annual allotment. Because the goods would attract all the 
peltries normally traded to the British, the advance would 
immediately be repaid out of the profits of the trade. With 
present stocks, however, Vaudxeuil could accommodate only the 
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Choctaws for the year and the Chickasaws for perhaps a few 
months. 11 
vaudreuil's hope that Bienville's peace with the 
Chickasaws could be confirmed was dashed by the lack of goods 
to trade as well as the contradictions of Louisiana's 
Chickasaw policy. On the one hand, the Chickasaws were told 
that if they could make peace with the Choctaws, Louisiana 
would accept that peace. 12 On the other hand, Louisiana 
officials understood that if the Choctaws and Chickasaws did 
make peace, the road would be open for English entry into the 
Choctaw nation, which would eventually result in the exclusion 
of the French from the lower Mississippi Valley. 13 Vaudreuil 
realized that without enough goods to satisfy both the 
Chickasaws and Choctaws, a general peace was untenable for 
Louisiana. 14 In December 1744 the governor made plans to 
reignite the war with the Chickasaws by France's northern and 
southern Indian allies. 15 
vaudreuil's grand design to implement the old Iberville 
pan-Indian peace was thus quickly replaced with a more 
realistic, if scarcely less challenging task: to preserve the 
Choctaw alliance. The governor, like his predecessors, 
realized that a bountiful trade with the Choctaws had to be 
a key element of any plan. He soon took up the old litany, 
which he repeated in letter after letter for almost a decade. 
Vaudreuil tried to convince Maurepas tha.t if the French could 
not supply the Choctaws all their needs, the English would and 
Louisiana would be lost. The only sure way to preserve the 
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Choctaw alliance--the sine qua non of Louisiana's existence-
-was to supply adequately the Indians. 16 
As Vaudreuil predicted, the meager amount of trade goods 
sent to the Choctaws were not enough to keep the Choctaws from 
inviting English traders to their villages. Initial 
indications were that vaudreuil had successfully brought Red 
Shoe back into the French fold through a combination of carrot 
and stick rewards and punishments that sent the chastised 
chief into the field against the Chickasaws. 17 In March 1745 
Red Shoe and his chief lieutenant Mongoulacha Mingo each 
brought a Chickasaw scalp to Mobile to prove their fidelity. 
But even as the French were congratulating themselves for 
having convinced Red Shoe to war on the Chickasaws, the wily 
war chief was wooing his nation in favor of South Carolina. 
At a national meeting at Yanabe village in July 1745, Red Shoe 
and Mongoulacha Mingo convinced their fellow chiefs that they 
should invite English traders to their villages to relieve 
them of their dependence upon the French, who promised 
everything and delivered nothing. Red Shoe was authorized to 
send a deputation to the English to call traders to the nation 
and to negotiate for regular commerce. 18 
Louisiana relied on its old e:ipedients to break up Red 
Shoe • s Chickasaw peace. Whenever Vaudreuil or his lieutenants 
learned of the imminent arrival in the Choctaw villages of a 
delegation of Chickasaw ambassadors or English merchants 
bearing goods, they enlisted Choctaw warriors to attack them. 
If the attack resulted in the deaths of Chickasaws or 
.. ~"~ 
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Englishmen, so much the better. But even if none of the enemy 
was ~illed, they were usually deflected from their mission by 
the attack. For the Choctaws, such forays were golden 
opportunities. Not only were they paid for their efforts by 
the French, but there was the chance to obtain scalps, war 
honors, and perhaps significant amounts of booty as well. 
Early in the conflict, this practice seemed an efficacious and 
relatively inexpensive strategy. 19 Maurepas supported the 
policy fully. 20 
Vaudreuil demonstrated the value of well-timed presents 
early in his administration. To frustrate Red Shoe's plans, 
presents were sent to the nation and an assembly was held at 
Concha, Alibamon Mingo's home village. The Choctaws were 
reminded of all the benefits they derived from the French 
alliance and no doubt about the part the British had played 
in the old Chickasaw slave trade. The presents paid off, 
because in early october 1745 Choctaws attacked a Chickasaw-
bound carolina convoy, killing two English traders. 21 
Not all French officials appreciated the political 
importance of the Indian trade, however. During the fall of 
1745 commissaire-ordonnateur Sebastien-FranQois-Ange Le 
Normant de Mezy undoubtedly strengthened Red Shoe • s pro-
British talk when he suddenly raised the price of goods sold 
to the Indians. Trade goods were obtained by post commandants 
from the royal warehouses, and the profits made on those goods 
helped support the posts. Because of the crucial importance 
of the Choctaw post, whereas most posts charged 50 per cent 
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above the French price of goods, the Choctaws were allowed to 
buy goods at French prices. When Le Normant raised the cost 
of all goods by 100 per cent of their French price, without 
consulting vaudreuil, he threatened to undermine the entire 
French program. Soldiers and Indians alike complained about 
the new pricing structure. The new prices threatened not only 
to alienate the Indians, but also to cause wholesale desertion 
of the frontier garrisons to the English and Spanish. 22 
Le Normant•s policies threatened Vaudreuil's Indian 
diplomacy in other ways as well. Governors used goods from 
the royal warehouses as presents when needed in diplomacy, 
but those warehouses were under the administrative control of 
the commissaire-ordonnateur. Unlike his predecessors, Le 
Normant would not allow post commandants to withdraw goods as 
needed but required prior notice of the request from the 
governor. As Vaudreuil and Le Normant were in New Orleans 
and the situation at the frontier posts was so fluid, such a 
system threatened to undermine French control of the 
Choctaws. 23 
Le Normant further alienated Vaudreuil when he refused 
to speedily distribute goods which arrived in Louisiana on a 
royal vessel in october 1745. Le Normant not only delayed 
sending the goods to the Choctaws but according to the 
governor, sold some of the goods at excessive prices through 
his partners who owned "boutiques" in New Orleans. So much 
merchandise had been sold this way that Le Normant had 
afterward less than half of what Vaudreuil had ordered for 
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the Choctaws. Furthermore, due to Le Nor.mant•s new prices, 
the Choctaws refused to come for their presents, and most of 
the traders had threatened to abandon commerce with the 
Indians as unprofitable. Vaudreuil threatened to exercise 
his authority over the warehouses if Le Normant•s policies 
put the colony in any more danger. 24 Louboey seconded 
Vaudreuil by informing Maurepas that extraordinary measures 
were absolutely essential under the circumstances for the 
colony's surviva1. 25 
Maurepas supported Vaudreuil in the controversy with Le 
Normant over prices. The crucial importance of Indian 
diplomacy to the colony and the impact changing prices could 
have on the results of Indian diplomacy necessitated that the 
governor be forewarned of anything that could cause unrest 
among the Indians. Only with advance warning could Vaudreuil 
instruct his officers on how to prepare the Indians for any 
changes. 26 
But Maurepas recognized that post commandants often used 
goods from the royal warehouses for personal gain under the 
guise of Indian diplomacy. In spring 1746 the commandant of 
Fort Tombecbe put the warehousekeeper in jail on specious 
pretexts, took over the royal warehouse, and obligated himself 
for almost 3000 livres. Under Louisiana's dual system of 
administration, the commandant had no right to manage the 
warehouse, whatever the actions of the warehousekeeper. The 
commandant was suspended for three months as an example to his 
fellow officers. 27 
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It is not surprising that the Choctaws sought to 
establish an alliance with South Carolina, considering the 
problems Louisiana experienced in supplying the Indians. 
James Adair claimed to have first inspired the Choctaws to 
abandon the French for the English, at the direction of 
Governor Gleno Working through some Chakchiumas, who were 
friendly with both the Choctaws and Chickasaws, Adair 
offered the Choctaws peace and commerce with the English. 
Adair attributed Red Shce's willingness to respond to this 
offer to the rape of one of his wives by a soldier of the 
Tombecbe garrison. 28 According to Edmond Atkin, however, Red 
Shoe approached the British entirely on his own. Atkin 
credited Adair's partner John Campbell with facilitating Red 
Shoe's 1738 opening to the British, and campbell and Adair 
together for helping to get talks started again in 1746. 
Atkin styled Red Shoe as "King of the Choctaws," but like the 
post of French medal chief, this was probably a creation of 
the English and not a traditional Choctaw designation.~ 
vaudreuil was not able to deliver the 1745 present to 
the Choctaws until March 1746, but the governor flattered 
himself that he was in firm control of the Choctaws. Red Shoe 
did not accompany the nation to Mobile. which made Vaudreuil's 
job easier. Vaudreuil used his presents to obtain assurances 
of fidelity from the Choctaws and promises that they would 
press the Chickasaw war more vigorously than ever. The 
governor could not directly ask the Choctaws to make war, as 
that would have required many more presents. Instead, he 
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talked informally with those chiefs and considerees who 
favored war anyway and simply fanned their sentiments. 30 
Despite all Vaudreuil and his lieutenants could do or 
say, the Chickasaws had a message that many Choctaws were 
apparently eager to hear. In their negotiations with the 
Choctaws, Chickasaws used several persuasive arguments in 
favor of making peace. The Chickasaws ~~ew that th~ French 
had threatened to withdraw their traders if a Choctaw-
Chickasaw peace were concluded, so they told the Choctaws not 
to worry, that the English would supply them with everything 
they needed. In addition, if peace were made, the Choctaws 
could redeem Choctaw slaves held by the Chickasaws. The 
Chickasaws also appealed to the Choctaws as "red men, 11 and 
hoped that despite what the French wanted, the Choctaws and 
Chickasaws could live together in peace. 31 
In early November 1746 Red Shoe formally presented the 
nation with his plan. While the majority of the chiefs were 
away at Mobile receiving their annual presents, Red Shoe 
convened a council to propose peace with the Chickasaws. A 
delegation of thre1e Chickasaw men and one woman traveled to 
Bouctoucoulou village to arrange further peace talks, but on 
the second day of their visit the grand chief's partisans 
killed three of the four envoys. To avenge this latest 
insult, as well as the two traders killed the year before, 
Red Shoe decided that Frenchmen must die. Red Shoe's 
partisans, lying in wait along the roads commonly used by 
Frenchmen, whether by accident or design killed Cadet Henri 
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de Verbois and two French traders passing from one Choctaw 
village to the next. Verbois allegedly had been involved in 
the rape of one of Red Shoe's wives. 32 
Adair claimed at least some of the credit for the deaths 
of the three Frenchmen. He said he had wooed Red Shoe and the 
Choctaws with "well-adapted presents," which he lamented were 
too often the springs of government "even in the Christian 
World." He also, of course, took every opportunity to 
denigrate the French and elevate the English. He contrasted 
the freedom of the Chickasaws, whom great French armies could 
not destroy, and the misery of the Choctaws, who could get 
nothing from the French except for the blood of Chickasaws and 
Englishmen. He compared his enemies to dangerous snakes, and 
gave the Choctaws vermilion and scalping knives with which to 
strike the French snake. According to Adair, the Choctaws 
soon thereafter killed Verbois and his companions. 33 
Red Shoe hoped to bring other English allies into his 
plans, so he sent part of the three French scalps to the 
Abihkas and Talapoosas. Wanting no part of what looked like 
the onset of a war with Louisiana, the Upper Creeks treated 
Red Shoe's emissaries with contempt and instead sent the 
scalps back to the French with marks of distinction. They 
even reportedly offered the French a force of seven-to-eight-
hundred men to help seek satisfaction. When the English went 
to Coweta to propose the destruction of the Alabama fort, the 
emperor informed them that if the English spilled the blood 
of even one French child, the Creeks would make war on them. 
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To underscore their support for the French, the Alabamas, 
Abihkas, and Talapoosas sent deputies to the pro-French 
Choctaws urging them to give satisfaction to the French.~ 
By preserving the Choctaws• alliance with Louisiana, the 
Creeks were protecting their role as the neutral 
arbiter of the southeastern borderlands. The pro-British 
faction favored war with Louisiana, but the pro-French and 
neutral parties opposed the war on strategic grounds. The 
Creeks were able to balance France and England partly because 
they not only separated the European antagonists, but also 
because they separated the Choctaws from the English. Trade 
between south carolina and the Choctaws would not only 
strengthen a traditional Creek enemy, but could also lessen 
their military and diplomatic value to South Carolina. 
Diplomatic weakening could easily result in less favorable 
economic arrangements with South Carolina, and the Creeks knew 
all too well that Louisiana could not take up the slack. 35 
The Choctaw Little King's visit to Charles Town in April 
1747 offered South Carolina a chance to strike a mighty blow 
against her old enemy Louisiana. Speaking on behaJ.f of his 
brother Red Shoe and the nation, Little King offered to 
destroy the French fort at Tombecbe with a force of Choctaws, 
to join with the Creeks to destroy the Alabama fort, and to 
help the English build a fort in thei! nation. But Little 
King insisted that to do this, the Choctaws needed an 
immediate supply of ammunition to finish what they had begun 
and to advance their program. The chief requested that South 
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carolina send at least one trader back to the nation with him 
under his protection with needed ammunition and other goods.~ 
Governor James Glen readily assented to this proposal 
and put forward Charles McNaire, "then a stranger lately come 
to South Carolina,~-= as the best man to supply the Choctaws. 
McNaire was not experienced in the Indian trade, but Glen 
assured the Assembly that he had the backing of men who did. 
McNaire•s relative Matthew Roche, an experienced trader, would 
furnish him with the goods and horses necessary for the 
business. In addition, he would have as assistants an 
experienced trader and an interpreter who spoke Choctaw. 
McNaire was almost ready to go and he offered to carry the 
government present, which amounted to nine horseloads of 
merchandise, free of charge. Because McNaire seemed "a more 
sober decent sort of Man" than the usual Indian trader, these 
arrangements were speedily approved. 37 
A company was formed to conduct business with the 
Choctaws under the name of Charles McNaire and Company. 
Members included Matthew Roche, Jordan Roche, and James 
Maxwell, with the actual trade to be conducted by McNaire, 
Thomas Maxwell, Arthur Harvey, and John Vann. Unknown to the 
Assembly was another, silent partner: nominally Dr. Thomas 
Glen, but in reality his brother the governor. From the 
beginning Glen attempted to arrange a monopoly for McNaire and 
Company, but as South carolina operated under a free trade 
regulated by licenses, he was stymied when some objected to 
this manipulation of the Choctaw trade.~ 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
187 
Glen's handling of the Choctaw "revolt" against Louisiana 
reflected his general approach to governmental affairs before 
1750. From 1743 to 1749 Glen held himself aloof from the 
existing political parties in the province and tried to create 
one of his own. In the same way, Glen used McNaire, a 
newcomer to South carolina with no experience in the Indian 
trade, to foster trade with the Choctaws. Both policies would 
fail in the long run, but for different reasons. His decision 
to ally himself with the colony's great families was no sign 
of defeat, just a change in strategy. But after the failure 
of McNaire and Company to succor the pro-British Choctaws 
there was no chance to retrieve a golden but missed 
opportunity to steal away Louisiana's most important ally. 39 
In response to the killings of Verbois and his 
companions, Vaudreuil sent Mobile major Jadart de Beauchamps 
into the nation in September 1746 to learn the Choctaws' 
reaction to this unprecedented situation. In a series of 
meetings held in Chickasawhay village, beyond which the safety 
of his party could not be guaranteed, Beauchamps met with most 
of the influential leaders of the nation. The Choctaws 
revealed that they were well aware that what the French seemed 
to want from them could easily result in civil war. Rather 
than obtaining satisfaction themselves in traditional fashion 
through limited war, the French proposed that the Choctaws 
give satisfaction by delivering the heads of their own people 
to the French. For this there was simply no vehicle in 
Choctaw culture. Beauchamps expected the meetings to result 
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in real bargaining that would lead to some consensus. 
Instead, the Choctaws used the meeting to stress their loyalty 
to France but at the same time to show why they could not do 
what was being asked. 40 Beauchamps and Vaudreuil both failed 
to understand the message. The Choctaws' fears for their 
nation if they met the French demand was proven tragically 
correct. 41 
Unlike Glen, Vaudreuil put the full weight of his office 
behind his Choctaw faction. Despite Beauchamps' talks with 
the Choctaws, Vaudreuil decided that the one sure way to smash 
Red Shoe's pro-English schemes was to destroy Red Shoe 
himself. In early 1747 the governor called an assembly of the 
principle Choctaw chiefs and warriors at Tombecbe. vaudreuil 
demanded the head of Red Shoe and his two principle adherents, 
Mongoulacha Mingo and Chicacha Oulacta. After the assembly 
the Choctaws sent runners to the Chickasaws to warn all 
English traders that they would be pillaged if they tried to 
go into the Choctaw nation. 42 
Vaudreuil realized that the Choctaws' willingness to come 
to terms depended upon two important factors. one was 
internal national politics. Red Shoe headed a large party 
and it took time to marshal the forces necessary to reach such 
a decision. Secondly, Red Shoe had been unable to deliver on 
his promises of a bountiful English trade. Without goods to 
deliver, he lost many of his followers to the French party. 43 
Because delivering the heads of their own people was so 
abhorrent to the Choctaws, members of the French party 
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proposed giving the heads of two English traders as 
substitutes for Mongoulacha Mingo and Chicacha Oulacta. 
vaudreuil accepted this proposal as a good way to keep the 
English out of the nation. Vaudreuil was well aware that the 
pro-English western party opposed the killing of any traders. 
He reasoned that the adoption of this policy would strengthen 
the Eastern, pro-French party.~ Louis XV and Maurepas fully 
approved this pol icy. 45 
French calls for the head of Red Shoe took some time to 
answer. In october 1746 two young warriors from Petit Yazoo 
and Chickasawhay tried to ambush Red Shoe. Failing this they 
set fire to his cabin, but missed the chance to kill him as 
he fled. The two young men then went straight to Tombecbe and 
informed commandant FranQois Hazeur of their actions and their 
determination to succeed at it. To encourage them, Hazeur 
placed two piles of goods, each equivalent to a chief's annual 
present, on the grounds of the fort. Between the piles was 
left a place to put Red Shoe's head. The two warriors were 
promised a chief's present annually for the rest of their 
lives if they produced the head. To effect this they were 
given powder, shot, flintstones, butcher knives, and 
vermilion. The young men abandoned their mission, however, 
when they learned that Red Shoe was being guarded day and 
night. 46 
Red Shoe was killed, by whom it was never known, on the 
night of June 22, 1747 as he escorted the trader Henry Elsey 
from the Chickasaws toward the Choctaw villages. Red Shoe· 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
190 
was ill and, according to native cut>tom, 'Was sleeping apa.&:t 
from the rest of the convoy. Unfortunately for the French 
the attack miscarried. Elsey, the rest of his escort, and 
all his goods escaped unharmed and the convoy successfully 
reached Red Shoe's village of Couechitto. There the trade 
goods were given out as presents, and Imataha Pouschouche, 
Little King, was acknowledged by the pro-British Choctaws as 
Red Shoe 1 s heir and successor. 47 
The assassination of Red Shoe prompted the Western party 
to take the developing war to those who were responsible for 
starting it, Louisianans. In September 1747, Western party 
chiefs led an attack on Mobile-area settlements that resulted 
in the deaths of several Frenchmen and a Negro slave, in an 
attempt to rally recent converts and bind them more fully to 
the British.~ In March 1748, after receiving an infusion of 
English munitions, a party of Choctaws struck the German 
Coast, just a few miles upriver from New Orleans. The 
attackers killed one farmer, wounded his wife, took their 
daughter prisoner, and carried off the family's five Negro 
slaves. In both attacks the countryside was abandoned, with 
settlers fleeing in fear to Mobile and New Orleans 
respectively. To make matters worse, in the aftermath of the 
German Coast attack a French soldier was killed when French 
forces pursued the perpetrators and instead attacked a party 
of friendly Choctaws out hunting. A greater disaster was 
averted only by the courage of the Choctaw hunting party 
leader, whose bravery in identifying himself and his party 
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prevented the skirmish from leading to casualties.~ 
The arrival in the western division of several shipments 
of ammunition in the summer and fall of 1748 resulted in more 
attacks against Louisiana. In October, Western division 
Chakchiuma partisans made two attacks on the Natchez post 
which resulted in the deaths of several soldiers and French-
allied Indians. 50 In November another attack was made on the 
German Coast. The inhabitants fled again in terror, but this 
time local defense forces made a better show of it. French 
forces pursued and engaged the attackers, most of whom were 
killed, and all the prisoners and booty were recovered. 51 
Having experienced two attacks in six months, the area was 
virtually abandoned for several years. 52 
The assassination of Red Shoe did not itself spark the 
civil war, perhaps because the identity of the actual 
perpetrator was never revealed and perhaps never known even 
by those who carried out the attack. Red Shoe 1 s assassination 
was avenged by the deaths of Frenchmen at Mobile and Natchez, 
which satisfied his clan 1 s need for revenge. Up to this 
point, retaliation by both sides had, except for Red Shoe 
himself, been extracted from non-Choctaws. But in october 
1747 a party of Choctaws led by the French ally, the chief of 
Grand Tohome, attacked a party of English traders and their 
Choctaw escorts. One Englishman and the Choctaw chief leading 
the escorts were killed. In response to this murder of a 
Choctaw by a Choctaw party, Western party Choctaws attacked 
the Conchas village, home of the Grand Tohome 1 s Choctaw 
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warriors. The civil war had bequn. 53 
Choctaw society and the entire course of the civil war 
was no doubt affected by the smallpox epidemic that ran 
through the nation during 1747. As many as 1,200 Choctaws 
died. such mortality would have been devastating at any time, 
but during 17 4 7 the Choctaws were becoming increasingly 
divided over Red Shoe's attempt to initiate trade with south 
carolina. So many deaths, including many chiefs and 
considerees, weakened the fabric of Choctaw society and made 
resolution of the conflicting demands of Louisiana and south 
carolina difficult to achieve. The smallpox epidemic possibly 
killed three times as many Choctaws as the civil war. 54 
At the end of December 1747 McNaire returned to Charles 
Town with the Little King, who was unaccompanied by anyone 
except a lone Chickasaw warrior. The arrival of so important 
a chief without an entourage was a great surprise. More of 
a wonder to many was the fact that he was entertained and 
dismissed without the council being called to consider his 
appearance. Later, Matthew Roche stated that while McNaire 
and the Little King were negotiating in Charles Town, McNaire 
expre~sed the opinion to Glen that too many traders would 
spoil the Choctaw trade. Glen thereupon promised to prevent 
that from happening and gave McNaire a proclamation, signed 
by the governor and bearing the colony's seal, that was to be 
published in the Creek and Chickasaw nations. The 
proclamation stated that McNaire was conducting official 
colony business with the Choctaws, and that all persons were 
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strictly forbidden to enter the Choctaw nation until his 
return. 55 
McNaire left Charles Town in January 1748, ostensibly to 
deliver the ammunition and trade goods sought by the Little 
King. But when he arrived at the Choctaw villages in March, 
he had no ammunition with him. He had stopped at the Creeks 
and the Chickasaws to publish his proclamation. But he had 
traded all his ammunition to the Chickasaws, so when he 
arrived at the Choctaw villages he had none except a small 
amount left behind from his earlier visit. According to 
McNaire • s own testimony, he and John Campbell stayed among the 
Choctaws for four months trying to bring over as much of the 
Choctaw nation as they could to the British interest. 56 
In the meantime, Little King stayed among the Creeks 
waiting for the ammunition which was supposed to be ~oming 
right behind McNaire. Considering the promises that had been 
made, the lack of supplies, and the artful diplomacy of the 
French, it would have been highly impolitic for him to return 
to the nation without ammunition. The ammunition made it as 
far as the Creeks in Auqust, whereupon several traders and 
Creeks set out to bring it to the Choctaws. Instead of taking 
the long but safe path through the Chickasaws, however, the 
party passed by the shorter route that took them near the 
Tombecbe fort. When they reached within two days of the 
Choctaws, however, they stopped and sent for an escort. They 
waited for their guide and escort for twenty-one days, then 
returned to the Creeks. The Choctaws, desperate for 
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ammunition in their growing war against the French, had 
obtained only a few pounds of powder and ball which McNaire 
had been able to buy from other traders at the Chickasaws. 
By the end of August, Campbell and Little King finally arrived 
among the Choctaws. They carried with them no guns or 
ammunition. Whatever became of the public present that had 
made it to within two days of the Choctaw villages was never 
known. 57 
During the summer of 1748 the Choctaws were forced to 
improvise for ammunition in their civil war, as they had run 
out of lead shot. The nation did not receive any goods at 
all until November or December 1748. Despite his monopoly, 
when McNaire finally left the nation his competitors quickly 
entered the nation to trade for the skins that had been piling 
up in anticipation of McNaire 1 s arrival. 58 
To meet the escalating threat from South Carolina, 
vaudreuil demanded ever more retaliation by the pro-French 
Choctaws. He hoped in this way to eliminate the pro-British 
leadership. Red Shoe 1 s head and the scalps of the two traders 
were delivered to Vaudreuil, but only after the attacks on the 
German Coast and Mobile. Vaudreuil rejected the two British 
scalps as immaterial to his demand for satisfaction, and now 
demanded the scalp of Little King. He hoped to end the war 
by eliminating South carolina 1 s new "king of the Choctaws. 1159 
In traditional Indian culture, the aggrieved party itself 
was responsible for extracting revenge. But the French 
demanded tha:·: the Choctaws themselves give satisfaction for 
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the murder on the German Coast. vaudreuil sent word to the 
Choctaws that if satisfaction were not given immediately, the 
French would abandon the Choctaws entirely.~ The chief who 
led the attack was killed on his return home by his own 
brother and their village chief. 61 A few months later 
Mongoulacha Mingo was killed for his part in Red Shoe 1 s 
schemes by five of his own warriors.Q 
The deaths of individual Choctaws at each others hands 
opened the floodgates of civil war. When the French demanded 
satisfaction for the German Coast attack, the Choctaw grand 
chief and Alibamon Mingo led an attack on Couechitto and 
Nuskobo, both Western party villages. Both villages were 
burned, their inhabitants taking refuge inside their fort. 
The chief of Nuskobo, two Couechitto considerees, and six 
Chakchiumas were killed in the attack. In response, on August 
16 the Western party attacked Oulitacha, home of the supreme 
medal chief. over one hundred fell in battle there. The 
attackers had the worst of it, and lost the captain of 
Boucfouca, one of their main leaders.~ At the beginning of 
November 1748 Vaudreuil claimed that not one member of Red 
Shoe's family remained alive, not even a child.M 
Each attack and each death led almost inevitably to more 
killings, especially when they involved Frenchmen. By the 
time Alibamon Mingo brought the "rebel" scalps to Vaudreuil 
at Mobile in November, the second attack on the German Coast 
had been made. Vaudreuil now demanded that this attack be 
avenged as well before he forgave the Choctaws. To do this 
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warriors from the Six Towns, Chickasawhay, and Yowani attacked 
a Western village, taking a scalp and several prisoners. 65 
The end of the war of the Austrian Succession had 
important consequences for the Choctaw Civil War. With the 
European war over, imperial concerns shifted to other problems 
and other theaters. Neither London nor Paris sustained much 
interest in what was happening on the southeastern frontier. 
As soon as the fighting ended, Maurepas notified Vaudreuil 
that he could cease all extraordinary expenditures until he 
received further orders.~ 
In South Carolina, the failure of McNaire and Company to 
supply the Choctaws was not fully understood. Where private 
enterprise had failed, the council and assembly were hesitant 
to step in. Glen • s maneuvers in favor of McNaire and Company, 
which because of its inscrutable dealings became known as the 
Sphinx Company, exacerbaLted his already strained relationship 
with the council. on September 30, 1748, after McNaire•s 
second return from the Choctaws, Glen attempted to call local 
council members out to a country plantation to discuss some 
"proposals" of Maxwell and McNaire. Atkin protested for 
himself and two other council members that the meeting was 
inappropriate for several reasons, including the gravity of 
anything concerning the Choctaws being discussed or decided 
by less than the full council. A few days later, Glen 
informed the council that there were some Choctaws at Fort 
Moore who wished to descend to Charles Town and asked their 
advice. Atkin replied that the council could not advise him, 
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as council members knew nothing concerning the Choctaws' 
number, quality, or errand. Atkin would not even advise that 
a meeting of the council be called, in case the matter 
concerned only "the private purposes of some Traders. 1167 
A council meeting was called on October 19, but although 
McNaire was nearby, nothing was discussed officially 
concerning the trader or the Choctaws. Outside of the 
meetings, however, Atkin first learned from trader John 
Pettycrow that the previous year's present of guns and 
ammunition had not been fully delivered. Atkin proposed to 
Glen that an inquiry be made into this, but the governor 
balked at the idea and did not ask McNaire for an explanation 
of the affair. 68 
Despite all Glen could do to keep the affairs and 
failures of the Sphinx Company secret, Pettycrow•s muttering 
and other signs indicated that all was not well in Choctaw 
country. The sixteen Choctaws who arrived at Fort Moore in 
1748 had been sent there by Adair, unknown to them, to act as 
hostages for the good conduct of the nation. The council, 
never eager to spend money on Indians, viewed them as beggars 
at best. In January 1749 the Little King sent chief 
Pouchimataha with twenty headmen and considerees to Charles 
Town to plead for the survival of their nation. Pouchimataha 
told the Carolinians that all the headmen of Little King's 
village were dead and that if his delegation did not soon 
return with guns and ammunition they would all die at the 
hands of the French party. Not knowing all that had been done 
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to enforce a monopoly for the Sphinx Company or of McNaire•s 
failure to deliver the public present of ammunition, the 
council could not accept the simple truth that there were no 
goods to be had in the nation. According to Atkin, however, 
discussing the matter among themselves after the Choctaws had 
gone, council members agreed that the situation undoubtedly 
concerned "a piecE' o~, private Management. 1169 
In January 1749 McNaire presented the council with a 
memorial concerning his trade with the Choctaws and a request 
for a reimbursement of his expenses. The governor objected 
to part of the memorial which stated that in 1747 Glen had 
directed McNaire to spare no expense "to promote the Publick 
Welfare," for which he would be duly reimbursed. McNaire 
stuck to his story, however, and Glen allowed the request to 
go forward. The council was not so easy on McNaire. 
Councilors could get no clear answer on what had happened to 
the 1748 public present of 100 guns, 1,500 pounds of powder, 
and 3,000 pounds of balls. Ful:-thermore, the council was led 
by John Vann, Matthew Roche, and others to believe that there 
was no one but McNaire willing to trade with the Choctaws. 
There was apparently some talk of Glen's connection with the 
Sphinx Company, because McNaire sought out Edmond Atkin to 
assure him that the governor was in no way involved. Despite 
maneuvers by Glen, McNaire, and their confederates, the 
council would not be forced to confer a monopoly on McNaire 
and Company or to reimburse any of its agents for their 
11 expenses • 1170 
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With the council suspicious of Glen's handling of the 
Choctaw trade, relations were deteriorating between Glen and 
McNaire. In May 1749 McNaire presented the General Assembly 
a memorial asking for reimbursement of his expenses and losses 
in furthering the Choctaw revolt. He also submitted 
separately to the Assembly an account for £7048.50 currency 
in e~ens~s and. £4 7 oo currency losses in the affair. Although 
McNaire could claim no official sanction from the governor for 
his part in the Choctaw revolt, the memorial and the 
circumstances of its submission by the governor to the 
assembly created a strong impression on many in the assembly 
that McNaire had a valid claim on the public treasury. Jordan 
Roche and James Maxwell were members of both the Sphinx 
Company and the assembly, and they courted their fellow 
assemblymen assiduously in favor of McNaire. Atkin believed 
that some of them were owed money by members of the company 
and stood to lose personally if McNaire was not given the 
requested relief. 71 
A committee of the assembly was appointed to consider 
the request. After consulting only documents put forward by 
McNaire and Company, the committee validated McNaire•s claim 
to responsibility for engineering the Choctaw revolt. 
Although it did not find the colony liable for his losses, 
which it calculated at £1678 sterling, it did direct that the 
colony's agent in London assist McNaire in seeking 
reimbursement from the king. The committee also recommended 
that he be awarded £200 currency, which was later reduced to 
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£100, for his services to the colony, and that the colony 
support a petition for a £1,000 currency reward from his 
majesty, which amounted to about £143 sterling.n 
The council was opposed to rewarding McNaire for what, 
even with their limited knowledge of the affair, they knew to 
be unjust claims. To prevent McNaire•s claim for a reward 
from Ioeing forwarded to the king, they agr«!ed to pay him 
£1, 000 currency in final compensation for all his claims. 
Despite this, with the support of the assembly McNaire would 
press all his claims in south Carolina and England.~ 
Glen had supported McNaire • s petition reluctantly, as 
the only way to recover his investment in the Sphinx Company. 
With the assistance of his friends in the assembly, and the 
unwitting cooperation of a council that Glen had purposely 
kept ignorant of so much coucerning ';.he Choctaws, McNaire 
transformed a request for reimbursement of expenses to a 
recognized claim of sole credit for having engineered the 
Choctaw revolt against France. As much as this galled Glen, 
he could not oppose McNaire•s pretensions without endangering 
his own financial interests. 74 
Having seen McNaire rob him of credit for one of his 
proudest achievements as governor, Glen made his final break 
with the Sphinx Company in the summer of 1749. On May 31, 
the assembly sent a message to the governor and council that 
if they decided that it lias necessary to send ammunition to 
the Choctaws while the commons was adjourned, it would approve 
the expenditure of £1,000 currency for that purpose. The 
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Choctaws were in dire need of ammunition, and Glen chose John 
Pettycrow to carry the present to the Choctaws. Because of 
the delay in arranging for proper authorization from the 
council and assembly for sending the present, Pettycrow did 
not leave for Indian country until late August 1749. 
Transportation problems and the activities of pro-French 
scalping parties further delayed the arrival of the ammunition 
in the Choctaw villages until January 12, 1750. When 
Pettycrc,w arrived in the nation he found the British party 
negotiating a possible settlement with French officials.~ 
South Carolina's response to the Choctaw initiative was 
probably affected by the economic recession that the colony 
experienced from 1744 to 1748. French and Spanish privateers 
did their work well and preyed on South Carolina's rice ships 
particularly hard. Freight and insurance rates skyrocketed 
and the price of rice fell by two-thirds. The dislocation of 
shipping affected colonist in other ways as well. The cost 
of imported goods rose and provincial taxes doubled to support 
military expenditures. 76 Under such circumstances, it is easy 
to understand that the assembly, which did not distribute 
presents annually as did Louisiana, would be reluctant to 
spend much money on far-away Indians who had always been in 
the French interest anyway. 
Both factions in the Choctaw Civil War were poorly 
supplied during 1749, but fighting continued. Little King 
died in spring 1749, apparently of natural causes, and was 
succeeded as leader of his party by Pouchimataha. Despite 
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the fact that Red Shoe's entire family had been killed along 
with all the other leaders specifically condemned by the 
French, the requirements of retaliation led to ever more 
killings. As the war wore on, it divided not only divisions, 
but towns and districts also. Seneacha was particularly 
divided by the conflict and suffered grievously as warring 
factions within the towns fought on different sides of the 
war.n 
vaudreuil came to realiz,e by fall 1750 th.at if the French 
did not end the war decisively the Choctaw nation would fight 
on until it destroyed itself. In September 1750 commandant 
Joseph Boucher de Grand Pre of Tombecbe, leading an army of 
French soldiers and Eastern party warriors, attacked the 
villages of Cushtusha and Caffetalaya. The towns lost many 
of their cabins to fire, and twenty-five western party 
warriors were scalped. As the Choctaws had requested four 
years earlier, the French had finally taken the field and 
extracted satisfaction for themselves.~ 
Eastern and Western-party partisans ratified a treaty of 
peace between the warring factions on November 15, 1750. The 
treaty, dictated by Grand Pre, contained four main provisions: 
the Choctaws themselves were responsible for avenging the 
deaths of any Frenchman; English traders and their Choctaw 
sponsors were to be killed with no revenge obligation; the 
Choctaws would once again take up the Chickasaw war; the 
Western party villages would destroy their forts and exchange 
their prisoners with the Eastern division. English 
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commissions of the Western party leaders were sent to 
vaudreuil, and the Western division was once again admitted 
into the French fold.N 
For Louisiana and south Carolina, the end of the Choctaw 
civil War amounted to a return to the status quo ante bellum. 
The Choctaws remained in the French camp, the Chickasaws 
remained enemies of Louisiana and the Choctaws, and the Creeks 
maintained a stance of friend of all, enemy of none. With the 
onset of 11the next war," just a few years later, the balance 
of power between the Europeans remained largely the same as 
it had been one or even two decades earlier. 
From the native perspective, however, a return to the 
old status quo was impossible. As many as twelve hundred 
Choctaws had died from smallpox. Over four hundred Choctaws 
died in the civil war, and whole villages had been destroyed 
or abandoned. The civil war revealed that when faced with 
the loss of European trade, the only option the Choctaws had 
was to do without. The Choctaws were forced to acknowledge 
that they could refuse their French "allies" nothing, not even 
their own blood. The Choctaws were neither the first nor the 
last to learn this painful lesson. 
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Chapter VII 
wars and Rumors of Wars: 
The Imperial Frontier, 1750-1759 
The southeastern marchlands were the scene of turmoil, 
tension, and war during the 1750s. The Southeast was the 
scene of several regional conflicts during the early 1750s; 
in 1754 the Seven Years' War began in the Ohio Valley, 
although it was two years before war was officially declared 
between England and France. 1 While war raged from the Ohio 
Valley to the Gulf of st. Lawrence and beyond, however, the 
forces that had shaped a status quo between European and 
Native American powers in the Southeast held firm. Europeans 
on the colonial frontier experienced the same divided councils 
at home and lack of support from their metropolitan capitals 
that had prevented them from improving their relative 
positions for decades. Native Americans who tried to change 
the balance of power continued to find Creek neutrality an 
effective barrier to shifting alliances. The balance of power 
would change forever after 1763, but not because of anything 
that took place on the southeastern marchlands. 
209 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
210 
Florida was spared an active role in the seven Years' 
war, but it was affected by the conflict nonetheless. Florida 
was dependent upon seaborne traders for the majority of her 
food supply: wartime disruption of shipping led to hunger and 
a continual preoccupation with food supplies in St. Augustine 
and Pensacola. Like thA French in Canada and Louisiana, 
Floridians solved their supply problem largely through illegal 
trade with the British. Harassment hy Indians was also a 
probJ.em. The attacks l~Tere so bad that Spaniards at st. 
Augustine had difficulty cutting firewood, and many Florida 
Indians had to be transported to Cuba for safety. 2 
For Louisiana, the 1750s was a decade of almost constant 
danger. The Choctaw civil War still raged when the first 
rumblings of the Great War for Empire were heard in the Ohio 
Valley. British traders had entered the Ohio Valley during 
the late 1740s, and by 1750 they had begun to trade with the 
Miamis, perennially under-supplied French allies. Reports of 
British traders in the region sent shock waves through canada 
and Louisiana. Chickasaw war veteran Joseph Celeron de 
Blainville was sent into the Ohio Valley in 1749 to bolster 
France's claim to the region and to assess the British 
threat. 3 Celeron's presence in the region, in turn, prompted 
the British to increase their activities there. 4 
By October 17 50 a number of Miamis had formally renounced 
their French alliance and taken up the British standard at a 
new village. The new Indian "republic," as the French styled 
the "rebel" encampment derisively, attracted warriors and 
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their families from almost all regional French-allied tribes, 
which made suppressing the "rebellion" a potentially explosive 
undertaking. The British-allied Indian enclave was destroyed 
by a French-led force of Ottawas and Chippewas in June 1752, 
but the episode highlighted French vulnerability in the Ohio 
Valley, the crossroads of eastern North America. 5 In response 
to these and other problems, Vaudreuil was made governor-
general of Canada and the government of Louisiana passed to 
naval captain Louis Billouart, ·chevalier de Kerlerec. 
Kerlerec had spent most of his life in the French navy, 
in the course of which he had served in the Natchez campaigns 
of 1730. 6 Kerlerec • s instructions accurately stated that 
governing the Indians would be his primary task as governor. 
He was warned that supplying the Indians was always costly and 
difficult and that it was necessary to lead the Indians 
carefully, especially the Choctaws, to keep them happy and to 
spoil English intrigues among them. 7 But in his ten years as 
governor, Kerlerec would find that the greatest difficulties 
in managing the Indians would stem not from British intrigues, 
but from neglect by his home government and opposition from 
fellow officials inside Louisiana. 
Louisiana was perennially short of merchandise and 
presents for the Indians during the 1750s. While this was 
usual for Louisiana, the advent of the Great War for Empire 
increased shortages at the same time that wartime exigencies 
made the need for merchandise and presents all the greater. 
Kerlerec was denied communications with and supplies from 
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France and the French west Indies almost from the beginning 
of the conflict in 1754. Louisiana and canada obtained most 
of their licit commercial goods from the French West Indies, 
with the lion's share going to more prosperous Canada. But 
the total volume of trade between the mainland and the islands 
was reduced in 1756 to half of its 1755 level; in 1757 tonnage 
was reduced by half again; and in 1758 the trade was so 
insignificant that figures were not even compiled. 8 With the 
French navy largely chased out of the West Indies, it required 
only a small patrol of privateers to block almost completely 
the supply of Louisiana. 9 
Between 1755 and 1759 Kerlerec was almost totally cut 
off from his superiors in France becausa most of Louisiana's 
incoming and outgoing mail was intercepted by the British. 
Mobile-area Indians were Kerlerec•s only source of news during 
most of the war. In June 17 59, desperate for news and support 
from France, the governor pleaded with French officials in 
Paris to evade the British blockade by sending aid and mail 
by way of Pensacola. 10 The ministry reestablished regular 
contact with Louisiana late in 1759. 11 By then, with Quebec 
captured, the American war was effectively over. 
Kerlerec•s supply problem was the greatest single 
constraint on his Indian diplomacy, but compounding this was 
the obstructionism of a string of commissaire-ordonnateurs. 
All four men who served in that office under Kerlerec, like 
their predecessors, were admonished at times to cooperate with 
the governor, and sometimes specifically reminded that all 
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matters relating to the Indians were under the direct control 
of the governor. 12 
The commissaire-ordonnateurs, however, controlled the 
goods used for Indian trade and presents. Jealous of the 
prerogatives of their office, these officials regularly 
refused to give the govez,-nor a statement of just what was 
available to him. 13 At~ dthar times, ~:.j:le ·commissa ire-
ordonnateur•s subordinates at the posts delivered either less 
goods to the governor's agents than ordered, or a different 
quality or style than specified by the governor. The Indians 
were very particular about their presents, and the wrong color 
or pattern could turn even the delivery of a present into a 
diplomatic disaster. 14 
Kerlerec sought to avoid supply problems through creation 
of a reserve of goods for use in Indian diplomacy. such a 
reserve would regularize the distribution of presents and 
thereby strengthen his position vis-a-vis the Indians. A 
reserve might also help conceal the colony's isolation when 
regular supply shipments were intercepted by the British. 15 
Far from augmenting the colony's budget in this way, however, 
successive ministers demanded increasing economy from 
Louisiana officials. 16 
But planned economy was not possible, because royal 
supply ships could not get through the British blockade. 
Louisiana officials were forced to buy goods for the Indian 
trade from private merchants at highly inflated prices. 17 
Some goods we~~ purchased from British cartel ships that 
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sometimes blatantly traded in contravention of both French 
and British law. Because Louisiana officials had no other 
source of goods, they were forced into trade with the enemy. 18 
so great was Louisiana's supply problem before 1760 that 
Kerlerec delivered the "annual" presents to the Choctaws and 
Alabamas, Louisiana's most important allies, only in 17 53, 
1755, and 1759. Kerlerec was well aware of the common wisdom 
that the allegiance of the Indians was available only to him 
who could purchase it. Because of this he gave small presents 
whenever he could, promised extra presents whenever he missed 
a deadline, and put his most diplomatic foot forward at every 
meeting with the Indians. To his superiors in France Kerlerec 
begged for assistance in almost every letter home. 19 
Kerlerec's problems with the Indians were not confined 
to keeping them supplied. In the summer of 1754 Kerlerec was 
forced to prevent war between the Choctaws and Upper Creeks. 
A Choctaw-creek war would have been disastrous for Louisiana. 
To avoid a two-front war, the Choctaws would have had to make 
peace with the Chickasaws, which would have eventually allowed 
British traders entry into the Choctaw nation. English agents 
among the Upper Creeks tried to foster just such a Choctaw-
Chickasaw rapprochement. Six months of artful diplomacy and 
the distribution of generous presents to all concerned parties 
by Louisiana officials averted not only a war, but for the 
colony a dangerous peace as we11. 20 
Even masterful diplomacy could not take the place of 
trade. In 1759, after four years without regular trade and 
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presents from Louisiana, the Choctaws concluded an alliance 
with south carolina. Louisiana had lost so much support in 
the nation by this time that Kerlerec found himself almost 
powerless to prevent the Choctaws from opening the British 
trade that many Choctaws had sought since the 1720s and over 
which they had fought a civil war. 
Kerlerec•s other great preoccupation was his pursuit of 
a Cherokee alliance. Cherokee emperor Old Hop first broached 
the possibility of an alliance in July or August of 1753 by 
sending his French slave L1Esprit, whom the British knew as 
"French John," to the Alabama fort with the offer. Kerlerec 
immediately sent the news to Vaudreuil with a request for help 
in wooing the Cherokees. But Vaudreuil was already at war in 
the Ohio Valley and had no help to send. 21 Kerlerec had no 
trade goods and few presents for the Cherokees, but he did 
have an able diplomatic corp5 for the endeavor. In addition 
to L1 Esprit, Kerlerec employed the services of Antoine Adhemar 
de Lantagnac. As a noble cadet of thirteen, Lantagnac 
"wandered away" from Fort Toulouse and was taken by Indians 
to South Carolina. He stayed in South Carolina for seven 
years, during which time he entered the Cherokee trade, before 
returning to Louisiana. 22 He spoke Cherokee and English 
fluently, as well as a smattering of other native languages, 
and knew many influential Cherokee leaders.~ 
Kerlerec had an Indian agent as well, the Abihka chief 
Yashastanage. Known to Europeans variously as "Mortar," 11 Le 
Loup, 11 and "the Wolf Warrior of Okchoy, 11 he was an extremely 
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valuable agent for Louisiana. Mortar was a steady Francophile 
among the Upper Creeks, where he helped balance the larger 
Anglophile faction. Just as important, he had access to 
Cherokee councils through his brother, who was married to a 
Cherokee from Settico. In 1758 Mortar established a 
settlement on Coosawaitee Creek, near the Cherokees, from 
which he could more effectively lobby the Cherokees in favor 
of a French alliance. 24 
Developing the Cherokee alliance ran into the same 
obstacle that had always prevented the successful conclusion 
of a Chickasaw alliance: the inability of Louisiana to supply 
trade goods. Kerlerec concluded a treaty of alliance with the 
Cherokees in January 1757, but to make it effective required 
not only presents but merchandise. 25 The governor received a 
small number of goods from France in response to this need 
almost two years later, but much of it had spoiled by the time 
it reached Louisiana. 26 
Kerlerec did not have enough merchandise and presents 
for his new or old allies, but he did have a range of 
diplomatic devices to use in his "management" of the Indians. 
Diplomatic practices included positive actions, continual pro-
French propaganda, and even disinformation campaigns. 
Louisianans were very careful in all their dealings with the 
Indians lest the Indians discover obvious attempts to 
manipulate them. No policy was to be implemented that might 
compromise Louisiana's standing with the Indians. 27 
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Frenchmen realized that every contact between themselves 
and the Indians was a diplomatic contact and strove to create 
as much good will as possible between themselves and the 
Indians. According to this way of thinking, providina 
- J 
blacksmith and gunsmith service to the Indians at government 
expense was a subtle but valuable diplomatic device. 28 
Officials in South carolina and Georgia recognized the 
benefits Louisiana derived from this practice and sought to 
have their respect~v~ governments do the same. 29 
As always, the commissioning of medal chiefs was an 
important part of Indian diplomacy. Kerlerec even brought 
the Cherokees into this system by granting a medal to 
Oconostota, a chief of the overbill town of Tomatly. 30 Poor 
communications between Louisiana and France made even this 
process less effective, however. Kerlerec ordered medals in 
November 1753. 31 The ministry did not commission artisans to 
produce the medals until October 1755. 32 The medals finally 
reached Louisiana late in 17 59 • 33 
Kerlerec and his frontier post commandants used the words 
of diplomacy to advantage in their talks with the Indians. 
Frenchmen were in some instances able to reinforce anti-
British feelings by telling the natives what they already 
"knew.•• When the seriously ill Coweta emperor believed in 
1754 that the British were poisoning him, Frenchmen encouraged 
that belief. 34 Frenchmen also harped on the Indian 1 s well-
developed fear that South Carolinians and Georgians wanted to 
take their lands. Georgia Indian agents were instructed in 
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1755 not to make a quid pro guo connection between presents 
and land concessions because of this French line. 35 Edmond 
Atkin admitted to William Pitt in 1760 that this French 
propaganda was very easy for the Indians to believe.~ 
Anti-British propaganda varied according to particular 
situations and audiences. At a time of general illness among 
the creeks, Frenchmen spread a rumor that the British 
knowingly spread illness through the nation by sending them 
contaminated goods. 37 From time to time Frenchmen also accused 
the British of wanting to make slaves of all the Indians. 38 
On one occasion, at least, the Indians were told that the 
British had proposed that the Europeans together destroy the 
Indians, but that the French had of course refused. 39 
Kerlerec worked diligently after 1753 both to defend 
Louisiana and to increase his colony's position relative to 
the British colonies. Ironically, when Louisiana was finally 
resupplied in 1759, the tide of war turned against France. 
Despite increases in supplies, troops, and merchandise and 
presents for the Indians, Kerlerec still found himself on the 
sidelines of war, powerless to help the Cherokees in their war 
against the British. 
For South Carolina, the 1750s were years of economic 
prosperity, frontier struggles, and political turmoil. The 
economic prosperity was largely due to Great Britain's 
increasing mastery of the seas. There were no foreign 
privateers to prey on coastal plantations or shipping during 
the 1750s; the only brake on the colony's exports was the 
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Rice production 
increased while the price for rice remained stable, and indigo 
production boomed. South Carolina's prosperity was largely 
limited by the failure of the slave trade to keep up with 
demand. 40 
south Carolina, like Louisiana, began the decade 
preoccupied with northern Indians. The British problem, 
however, was making peace between the Catawbas and Iroquois, 
two fellow allies. The Catawbas had long been subject to 
raiding by the Iroquois, but by the late 1740s and early 1750s 
this Indian enmity was threatening the general peace. The 
Iroquois were passing dangerously close to frontier 
settlements, causing numerous alarms; as Anglo-French tensions 
mounted in North America, Englishmen feared that the French 
might somehow use this irregular warfare to cause trouble all 
along the frontier from South Carolina to New York. The 
Iroquois and Catawbas made peace at a conference held in New 
York in July 1751, although it took over a year for all treaty 
provisions to be honored and a firm peace established. 41 
South Carolina's political turmoil during the 1750s was 
the result of internal political trends and the intrusion of 
outside influences on the colony. Internally, the three loci 
of political power--governor, council, and commons--all 
struggled to maintain or increase their power relative to the 
others. Governor James Glen saw his authority and position 
assailed from almost every quarter. The most serious 
challenge came from the Board of Trade. During the 1730s and 
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1740s colonial governors were largely left alone by the board, 
which left colonial affairs to be handled by the Duke of 
Newcastle, secretary of state for the southern department. 
Glen used his large discretionary authority to chart an 
independent course as governor. When the Earl of Halifax 
became president of the Board of Trade in 1748 he began to 
exercise strictly the Board's authority, which fell quickly 
and heavily on Glen. In 1750 Glen lost almost all latitude 
in exercising his authority when a cabinet shuffle gave 
Halifax complete control over colonial affairs. 42 
Glen found following royal instructions to the letter 
even more difficult because of opposition from the Council 
and the Commons. Glen neutralized the council's opposition 
largely through compromise and forging political alliances 
with the powerful families that controlled it. 43 But the 
opposition of the Commons was harder to overcome. The Commons 
was involved in a political struggle to determine its own 
affairs, and its main tool was its control over the public 
purse. The Commons was an inescapable partner in Indian 
policy because it controlled expenditures for presents, and 
gift-giving was the sine qua non of Indian diplomacy. Glen 
considered Indian diplomacy his special province and no doubt 
doubly resented the "interference" of the Commons in Indian 
affairs. 44 
The Commons manifested clearly its ability and 
willingness to interfere in Indian affairs in 1751 when it 
ordered an embargo on the Cherokee trade. In the spring of 
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1'151 the theft of some deerskins by a party of Carolinians 
quickly degenerated into frontier warfare when it appeared to 
the Cherokees that frontier officials would protect the guilty 
parties. Glen responded favorably when Cherokee headmen 
attempted to end the disturbances, but the commons did not. 
Ignoring the fact that Carolinians were responsible for 
starting the trouble, the Commons ordered an embargo against 
the Cherokees over the strenuous objections of Governor Glen. 
Tensions remained high until November 1751, when a treaty 
between South carolina and the Cherokees adjusted differences 
over depredations and instituted tighter controls over 
frontier trading. But the treaty did not end all problems 
between South Carolina and the Cherokees. 45 
The treaty of 1751 required that South Carolina build a 
fort in the Cherokee country. Thomas Nairne had urged the 
establishment of an Overbill fort as early as 1708. 46 Each 
time the project was discussed over the next four decades, 
however, its implementation was stymied by lack of funds, 
political squabbles, and metropolitan indifference. A fort 
was approved in March 1752, but because of political 
differences between the governor and Commons, it was not built 
until November 1753. Named Fort Prince George for the Prince 
of Wales, it was more than the Commons bargained for and less 
than Glen or the Cherokees wanted. 47 
In 1754 Glen became embroiled with Virginia in a struggle 
for control of the southeastern Indians. Before the mid-
1750s, Indian affairs in the British colonies were controlled 
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mainly by New York in the north and South Carolina in the 
south, with very little interference from the middle colonies. 
By the late 1740s, however, Virqinians formed the Ohio Company 
and beqan to plan for the settlement of trans-Appalachia.~ 
French officials began to fortify the Ohio Valley and Great 
Lakes region because of the Ohio Company's activities, but 
Glen felt scarcely less threatened. Despite the fact that few 
Virginia traders had ever shown sustained interest in the 
Cherokees, Glen interpreted Virqinia•s western policy as an 
attempt to divert the Cherokee trade and the management of the 
southern Indians away from South Carolina. 49 
Dinwiddie's leading role in the emerging conflict with 
France after 1754 seemed to confirm Glen's suspicions. 
Dinwiddie spurned Glen's offer to help enlist the Cherokees 
and Catawbas in the defense of the frontier and employed 
traders to approach the Cherokees and catawbas directly. Glen 
responded to Dinwiddie's ascendancy with an essentially 
obstructionist policy which was supported by the Council and 
Commons. 50 
Some colonial officials blamed Glen's lone-wolf Indian 
policy for General Edward Braddock • s defeat by an army of 
"French and Indians" on July 9, 1755. Glen had been 
instructed to enlist the southern Indians in the campaign, 
but when Braddock began his doomed march Glen was holding a 
conference with the Cherokees at Saluda Old Town. Glen 1 s 
strategy was to bring the Cherokees firmly under British 
control by breaking their ties with the French. He obtained 
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from the Cherokees an acknowledgement of British sovereignty 
and permission to build an overbill fort in return for £500 
worth of presents, trade concessions, and steady supplies of 
ammunition. But Glen's negotiations took so long that the 
Cherokees missed Braddock's march. Governors Dinwiddie and 
Arthur Dobbs of North carolina blamed lack of Cherokee numbers 
for Braddock 1 s devastating defeat. Glen's troubles were 
compounded when the assembly failed to honor immediately 
Glen's commitments to the Cherokees, rendering the Indians• 
submission to the British crown null and void. 51 
Dinwiddie further offended Glen over the building of an 
overhill fort. The home government sent £10,000 sterling for 
various defensive measures in America, including the Overbill 
fort, but put the fund under Dinwiddie's control. Glen, 
working from a very different set of assumptions than the 
Virginian, planned a fort that required a construction budget 
of £7,000. Dinwiddie, however, would release only £1,000 for 
the fort. Glen was leading an expedition to the overbills to 
build his long-sought overbill fort when in July 1756 his 
successor arrived; precipitating one last delay in the 
construction of the fort. 52 
William Henry Lyttleton succeeded James Glen as governor 
of South carolina in July 1756. Lyttleton experienced few of 
the problems that had plagued Glen during the early 1750s. 
Lyttleton was an aristocrat with family and personal ties to 
leading members of the government and was therefore totally 
in step with the administration on the governance of South 
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carolina. He quickly gained control of the Council when he 
removed its most outspoken member and replaced him with the 
first of many royal placemen. The governor's position 
relative to the assembly was strengthened further by the 
British declaration of war against France in May 1756. With 
the nation formally at war and the French expected to attack 
the frontier at any time, the assembly was hesitant to impede 
the war effort. 53 
After Braddock's defeat South Carolina along with other 
colonies became increasingly t..lbordinated to imperial 
authority. After the declaration of war between England and 
France in 1.756, the government sent a British army to North 
America for the first time. To provide for the support of 
the army and navy in North America, Parliament passed the 
Quartering a11.d Mutiny acts and other legislation which 
required that colonial governors and assemblies cooperate with 
royal army and navy officials as needed. 54 
The British government also began for the first time to 
erect governing structures outside and above the separate 
colonies with the creation of the Indian superintendencies. 
The need for a common approach to In1iian affairs had been felt 
for many years in some quarters on the grounds that many 
problems experienced with the Indians could be traced to a 
lack of unified control over Indian affairs. Conflicting 
claims of jurisdiction over major nations, different systems 
for regulating the Indian trade, and growing encroachment on 
Indian lands caused major problems for all the frontier 
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colonies in peacetime: in wartime, they threatened to 
undermine the entire war effort by destabilizing the frontier. 
A plan for an Indian superintencency was put forward at the 
Albany Congress of 1754, and in 1755 Sir William Johnson was 
appointed superintendent for the northern colonies. 55 
In May 1756 the Board of Trade appointed Edmond Atkin 
superintendent for the southern colonies. Atkin was in 
England at the time, where since 1750 he had produced two 
major "reports" on southern Indian affairs, one a history of 
the Choctaw Revolt, the other a general plan for the 
administration of Indian affairs in North America. 56 Despite 
his enthusiasm for the job, due to his own slow nature, 
several bouts of illness, and lack of cooperation from 
imperial officials in North America, Atkin did not reach 
Williamsburg until the spring of 1757. The Earl of Loudon, 
commander in North America, severely handicapped Atkin from 
the start when he made the superintendent dependent for his 
budget on the southern governors. Loudon probably did not 
realize that the governors resented the superintendents and 
could not be counted on to support generously a man who robbed 
them of their traditional control over the Indians. 57 
Atkin 1 s record as southern Indian superintendent from 
1757 to 1760 was not universally praised by his 
contemporaries. He faced a difficult task in strengthening 
Anglo-Indian ties, especially as his sometimes abrasive manner 
often irritated his own countrymen as well as the Indians. 
Atkin was able in Virginia in 1757 to consolidate control of 
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all allied Indians under one official and to reconcile the 
Cherokees at a time when their defection would have severely 
affected the war effort in the Ohio Valley. Responding to 
Choctaw initiatives in 1758 Atkin reestablished ties with 
Louisiana 1 s closest neighbor. 58 
Atkin worked to strengthen the Anglo-Creek alliance in 
an almost uninterrupted diplomatic offen.sive that lasted from 
October 1758 to February 1760. But Atkin's diplomatic foray 
was indeed offensive to many southerners, red and white. To 
strengthen his bargaining position with the creeks, Atkin 
withdrew all the nation's traders to Augusta and did not allow 
them back in until he was ready to enter the nation himself 
six months later. Becn.use the superintendent took so long to 
begin his mission, his recall of the traders constituted an 
unprovoked and unwarranted embargo on the Creeks. The embargo 
angered Indians and traders alike, and Atkin's secrecy 
concerning his movements and activities were unsettling to 
colonial officials as well. Atkin was almost assassinated 
while in the middle of talks at the Talapoosa town of 
Tuckabatchee by one of Mortar's agP-nts, but he survived and 
turned the situation to his advantage. The Anglo-Cherokee war 
added a note of urgency to Atkin • s negotiations, but by 
February 1760 the Creeks had confirmed their neutrality. 
Georgia Governor Henry Ellis did not give Atkin much of the 
credit for Creek neutrality. Ellis credited Atkin only with 
"having left Matters there in a settled state, after he had 
greatly disturbed and embarrassed them. 1159 
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Part of the worry experienced by British colonists on 
the southeastern marchlands was due to a greatly distorted 
impression of Louisiana • s ability to threaten her British 
neighbors. In the spring of 1752 a Louisiana deserter 
informed Virginia officials that there were 12,000 troops in 
Louisiana and that New Orleans contained 8, 000 tihi te and 1, 2 00 
Negro inhabitants; at the time there were only about 8000 
whites and blacks in the entire colony.~ British officials 
recognized that those figures were "probably" an exaggeration, 
but they worried nonetheless. 61 Officials received "reliable" 
reports in 1754 that the French were sending 8,000 troops and 
their families to North America, with 3,500 of those going to 
Louisiana.~ These reports undoubtedly made the general lack 
of news more frustrating than usual. Henry Laurens complained 
in 1755 that south carolina did not receive news concerning 
Louisiana "but once in an age. 1163 
In 1757 intercepted correspondence indicated that 4,000 
Alsatian men, women, and children were bound for Louisiana•s 
Illinois country.M British officials had enough confidence 
in the report to send the Jamaica man-of-war to the Bahama 
Channel and the Windward Passage to block the transport of 
troops and supplies to Louisiana.~ In an effort to have the 
most reliable information possible, Pitt ordered that two 
subjects with particular knowledge of Louisiana be sent to 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, for consultation with imperial military 
and naval officials.~ 
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The thought of such a large military establishment in 
Louisiana naturally excited the imagination of officials in 
South carolina and Georgia. Although the British appreciated 
the difficulty of an overland invasion of the southeastern 
colonies, they experienced almost yearly alarms of just such 
a project. 67 At the same time, the threa.t from Louisiana 
prompted some officials to propose an invasion of their enemy 
to end the French menace once and for all. In the spring of 
1758 both Pitt and Forbes considered launching a coordinated 
naval attack on Mobile and New Orleans, which Pitt suggested 
should be accompanied by an overland attack against Fort 
Toulouse.~ In response, in November 1758 Lyttleton outlined 
how he could lead an army through Creek country to the French 
without exciting the fear and jealousy of the Indians.~ In 
t.he fall o:f 1759, however, both the capture of Quebec and the 
eruption of the Anglo-Cherokee war put at least a temporary 
halt to such plans. 70 
For Georgia the 1750s was a decade of promise and peril. 
It was a decade of promise because in 1754, after two decades 
of proprietary control, Georgia became a royal province. 
Freed from the paternalistic and moralistic control of the 
trustees, Georgians looked forward to growth, peace, and 
prosperity. Georgians greeted the arrival of royal governor 
John Reynolds in October 1754 with a feeling of deliverance. 
But Reynolds disappcinted almost everyone on both sides of the 
Atlantic. The governor was charged not only with the 
demographic and economic development of Georgia, but its 
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defence as well. To build up the defenses of Britain's most 
exposed colony required settlers; but settlers would not 
emigrate to a colony threatened by France, Spain, and the 
Indian allies of both. Reynolds was faced with a two-horned 
dilemma and got hung up on both. 71 
Georgia's role as the southern buffer of British North 
America required a strong military presence in the colony but 
there was none. Unable to raise adequate men and revenues to 
build and garrison the frontier forts needed, Reynolds did not 
do much more than beg London for his colony's needs. 
Recognizing Georgia's dependence on the Indians and the 
continual efforts of Louisiana to seduce them from the British 
alliance, Reynolds requested that imperial officials supply 
him with men, money, and supplies with which to fortify and 
defend the colony.n The assembly chose not to raise taxes for 
defence and, like the governor, pleaded poverty and begged for 
help from London.~ Despite the lack of favorable response to 
general pleas for assistance, in January 1756 Reynolds 
proposed the establishment of a system of forts at the head 
of the colony 1 s rivers manned by fixed garrisons and augmented 
by patrol boats on the coast and rangers on the frontier, all 
to be paid for by the crown. The plan was not implemented.~ 
Given Georgia 1 s total dependence on the Indians for 
defense, Reynolds most important task as governor was ensuring 
good relations with the Indians. In this as in other things, 
however, Reynolds depended upon his former shipmate and friend 
William Little. Reynolds conferred on Little the post of 
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Indian commissioner along with six others positions in the 
Georgia government. After a brief and unhappy experience 
meeting the Creeks upon first becoming governor Reynolds left 
Indian diplomacy totally to his favorite. The Indians were 
upset at being ignored by the governor, and Little's total 
lack of experience in Indian diplomacy could have led to grave 
problems. 75 Fortunately for the colony the crown reqularly 
sent goods to be given to the Indians as presents because with 
the installation of a royal governor the Indians visited the 
colony more often, and often it was only to profess their 
friendship, i.e., to collect presents.~ 
Reynolds' mismanagement of defence and Indian relations 
was compounded by his clumsy attempts to manipulate political 
affairs in the colony. In 1757 he was recalled due to popular 
discontent and replaced with Henry Ellis, another British 
gentleman with no experience in colonial government. But 
Ellis was as effective and popular as Reynolds was inept. 
Despite his inexperience, Ellis quickly grasped what was 
necessary for the preservation and advancement of Georgia, and 
he pursued policies and practices suitable to the successful 
implementation of his program.n 
Henry Ellis realized from the beginning of his service 
in Georgia that the colony• s welfare rested mostly in the 
hands of its two most important neighbors, i.e. , South 
Carolina and the Creek confederacy. Ellis spent some time in 
Charles Town establishing a good relationship with Lyttleton 
before going on to Georgia. During the next three years, the 
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two governors remained in constant and mostly harmonious 
correspondence with each other. Ellis established equally 
amicable and frequent contacts with the creeks as well. The 
govenor 1 s close attention to both allies-- was designed to 
afford Georgia the most security she could have. South 
carolina was Georgia 1 s only hope if the Indians turned against 
her; close identification of Georgia with South carolina made 
an Indian war with the colony much less likely.~ 
Ellis's subordination to Lyttleton did not indicate an 
abdication of the Georgia governor 1 s role as an important 
Indian diplomat. Ellis was stroking Creek headmen offended 
by Reynolds' indifference to them even before taking over as 
governor. Within days of taking over the government of the 
colony on February 16, 1757, Ellis was holding conferences 
with creek headmen, dealing with the aftermath of the Ogeechee 
incident, and mediating problems between traders and Indians. 79 
In April the governor went on a tour of the southern frontier 
to learn about its problems first-hand and to make his 
presence felt by the Indians.~ 
Ellis assumed a more prominent role in Creek diplomacy 
in the fall of 1757 when Creek headmen, refusing to meet with 
Lyttleton in Charles Town, met with Ellis at Augusta. At the 
end of October and the beginning of November Ellis treated the 
Indians to a conference held with all the pomp and ceremony 
befitting a solemn meeting between important allies. There 
were troops under arms marching and prominent Georgians 
mounted to lead the Indians into the conference, cannons 
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booming, flags flying, and of course several days of talk, 
food, drink, and presents. The meeting produced a treaty 
which reconfirmed all past treaties with the "Great Squire,'' 
meaning Oglethorpe; considered all past grievances forgotten; 
agreed to consider all insults as the act of individuals to 
be adjusted by the governor and duly deputized headmen; agreed 
to a common definition of friends and enemies; and decreed any 
supposed land grant to the Bosomworths as invalid. Aware that 
the Francophile party would never accept a declaration of war 
against Louisiana, Ellis did not press for one. 81 
Ellis also helped bring a measure of stability to the 
Georgia-Indian frontier with a final settlement of the 
Bosomworth claims. A savvy politician, Ellis first coaxed 
the Creeks in the treaty of November 1757 to pronounce the 
supposed donation of land to Bosomworth as never having taken 
place. Then to keep Mary and her emperor cousin Togulki 
happy, Ellis confirmed Mary's ownership of st. catherine's 
Island, where she had cattle and other considerable 
investments, and granted her £2000 sterling in compensation 
for all her services to Great Britain. With this settlement 
Mary ceased being a thorn in the side of Georgia and once 
again was able to help keep the Creeks in friendship with the 
British.82 
Georgians knew that treaties and displays of mutual 
affection alone would not keep peace with the Indians. From 
1755 to 1758 the legislature passed several acts to prevent 
trouble between the colony and its neighboring Indians by 
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separating Indians and colonists as much as possible. One 
act aimed at preventing colonists from settling on lands not 
specifically granted them, as squatters usually encroached on 
Indian territory when they did so. 83 Another bill made it 
illegal to trade with Indians within the boundaries of the 
colony, or even to encourage Indians to come into the colony 
for that purpose.M To strengthen both of these laws, in 1758 
the legislature made it a crime for private persons to 
purchase land from the Indians and for anyone to trade with 
the Indians without a license. 85 
During the 1750s the European colonies on the 
southeastern marchlands sat on the sidelines of a great 
imperial conflict. Each of· them struggled to strengthen their 
defenses with what they all considered were inadequate 
financial and human resources. Just when the Great War for 
Empire reached its military climax in North America, the 
southeastern marchlands erupted in war. Ironically, that war 
took place between two erstwhile allies, South carolina and 
the Cherokees. The British worked very hard to bring the 
Cherokees into their war against France, but neither the 
British nor the Cherokees found wartime cooperation a positive 
experience. 
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Chapter VIII 
The Indians on the Marchlands, 1750-1759 
The 1750s was a decade of turmoil and trouble for the 
Indians as well as the Europeans of the southeastern 
marchlands. southeastern nations had to cope not only with 
traditional enmities, but also with a rising tide of European 
settlement and growing dependency relative to the Europeans. 
By the end of the decade the entire alliance system of the 
Southeast was threatened as never before. Factions within 
each of the major nations of the region tried to change the 
balance of power in the region by shifting their own or 
another nations European alliances. Through all the changes, 
the Creeks collectively continued to hold everyone else in 
balance, but they found that balance increasingly hard to 
maintain. The 1750s was truly a decade of wars and rumors of 
wars for the Indians of the southeastern marchlands. 
The same problem plagued the Chickasaws in the 1750s as 
it had in the 1730s and 1740s: the enmity of Louisiana and 
its chief result, the continuing Choctaw-Chickasaw war. Of 
French enmity there was never any doubt; that the Choctaw war 
might end there was always hope. The French had required the 
241 
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Choctaws to accept war with the Chickasaws as the price of 
peace in their civil war. Despite this, many Choctaws 
maintained close contacts with the Chickasaws throughout the 
decade. 1 The appearance of British traders in the Choctaw 
villages periodically throughout the 1750s was possible 
largely because the Chickasaws served as intermediaries 
between British traders and the Choctaws. 2 
To forestall a Choctaw-Chickasaw peace, Louisiana kept 
the Choctaws and Chickasaws at war. The number and size of 
Choctaw parties varied according to the season and French 
resources, but their continual pressure affected the 
Chickasaws gravely. The Choctaws made few frontal attacks on 
Chickasaw villages, but they burned Chickasaw cabins; raided 
Chickasaw fields and orchards; picked off Chickasaw hunting 
parties in the woods; killed or captured Chickasaw men, women, 
and children near the villages; and stole Chickasaw horses. 3 
The Chickasaws did not need the excuse of a European war 
to fight either Frenchmen or Indians. As part of their on-
going war with Louisiana and her allies, the Chickasaws 
periodically harassed French convoys on the Mississippi. In 
1753 they attacked a Mississippi convoy, possibly with the 
help of Cherokees and other British allies. 4 In 1754 they 
attacked the Natchez area. The Natchez attack was probably 
aimed at Ofogoulas living near the fort rather than the 
French, but several Frenchmen were killed when they pursued 
the retreating Chickasaws contrary to Ofogoula advice. 5 The 
Chickasaws also brought their war against the French to Fort 
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Massiac at the forks of the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers. 
canadian In?ians used the fort as a staging point fer. attacks 
against the Chickasaws. 6 
The Chickasaws made war on other French allies the 
Arkansas as well. During the summer of 1753 an attack on the 
Arkansas resulted in several enemies killed and taken captive, 
and some of them were sold by the Cherokees in Carolina. 7 The 
Chickasaws also attempted to create trouble between the 
Arkansas and French by trying to frame the Arkansas for the 
killing of a French officer. The French discovered the ruse 
and took measures to strengthen ties to the Arkansas. 8 
The Chickasaws suffered more than just the loss of their 
people in the long war with the Choctaws. Attacked frequently 
from north and south, Chickasaw warriors had to stay home to 
protect their families and could not hunt for deerskins. 
Deerskins were their only source of trade goods, and British 
traders would not advance credit to any warrior too often. 
In 1756 the Chickasaws complained to Henry Lyttleton that the 
war against France had reduced them to poverty. 9 Lyttleton 
responded by sending the Chickasaws a present of ammunition, 
paint, and sundry goods. Having spent so much on one present, 
however, Lyttleton let the Chickasaws know that they should 
not make the long and tiring journey to Charles Town to thank 
him; it would only have cost South Carolina another present. 10 
A year later the Chickasaws were still unable to buy their own 
ammunition and requested more, fearing another attack from 
Canadians and Indians at Fort Massiac. 11 
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The Chickasaws had problems with their Cherokee allies 
during the early 1750s, but nothing serious enough to threaten 
the alliance. In 1752 the Cherokees .-.~!lowed Shawnees to pass 
through their country to attack the Chickasaws. 12 In 1756 a 
party of Cherokees that had failed to find any Frenchmen to 
fight killed three Chickasaws instead and stole their skins. 13 
In September and october of 1756 a party of Chickasaws went 
to war against the Cherokees in retaliation for the loss of 
ten warriors to the Cherokees. '4 
The Chickasaws did not take a large part in the other 
regional wars or the European conflict, but they were not left 
totally undisturbed. The prospect that a southern front might 
open in the Europeans' war had ramifications for the 
Chickasaws no less than other nations. The most distant of 
British allies, the Chickasaws could easily be cut off from 
their British suppliers by the sort of north-south pincer they 
had experienced in the Franco-Chickasaw war of the 1730s. 
Because of this fear it was widely rumored in the southeast 
in 1754 that the remainder of the Chickasaws might withdraw 
to the safety of the Carolina frontier to join the Squirrel 
King on the savannah River. 15 The Chickasaws did not move, but 
they did ask Glen to send the Squirrel King's warriors back 
to their own country to help defend it against their many 
enemies. 16 In January 1757 the South Carolina Gazette reported 
that the Chickasaws wanted a fort and that it should be built, 
if for no other reason than gratitude. 17 
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The Squirrel King's warriors were as valuable to South 
carolina and Georgia as they were to their fellow Indians. 
The Chickasaw village, which was located only twelve miles 
from Fort Moore, was the main defensive force of the Georgia 
back country. 18 Captain Daniel Pepper, South Carolina 1 s Creek 
agent, stated in March 1757 that in case of an attack from 
Louisiana the seventy Chickasaws at New Savannah "would be of 
more Service to us than four Hundred other Indians. 1119 Eve r 
attentive to an opportunity to end the Choctaw war, in 1756 
the Chickasaws sought to conclude a Chickasaw-Creek-Choctaw 
peace. The project was supported by South Carol ina, and Creek 
headman Gun Merchant agreed to coordinate the talks. 20 Because 
of opposition from the French and Francophile creeks, however, 
the project fell through. Frustrated, the Chickasaws branded 
the Creeks as no friend of the Chickasaws or South carolina. 21 
The Choctaws also struggled with an old dilemma during 
the 1750s: France's inability to supply them, and their own 
inability to forge an alliance with Great Britain. Even 
before the beginning of the Europeans• war, Louisiana was not 
able to supply the Choctaws adequately with either trade goods 
or presents. Barely a year after Louisiana had forced them 
to renounce trade with the British, some Choctaws maintained 
contact with the Chickasaws and British because French traders 
could not supply all of their needs. Vaudreuil give the 
chiefs enough presents to keep them happy, but not enough for 
the chiefs to take care of all of their warriors• needs. 22 
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Louisianans were unable to supply adequately the Choctaws 
and were unwilling to allow Carolinians to do so either. 
vaudreuil and Kerlerec were attentive to any ne'W·s of British 
traders headed for the Choctaws, and used every means at their 
disposal to prevent them from reaching their destination. For 
a fee Louisiana officials could always find Francophile 
Choctaws to waylay British traders coming from the Chickasaws. 
But this was an uncertain and expensive exercise. Choctaw 
ambushes sometimes succeeded, costing the traders much in 
lives, time, and money.~ Occasionally, however, some traders 
made it through. 24 
The Choctaws became dissatisfied more than ever with the 
French alliance after the beginning of the Europeans• war. 
Despite Kerlerec•s promises of plentiful trade goods, he did 
no better than Vaudreuil in supplying the Indians. 25 Whenever 
possible French officials prevented the Choctaws from 
receiving British traders, yet they never had enough trade 
goods or presents of their own for the nation. Kerlerec was 
unable to deliver the annual present during the fall of 1754, 
but the Choctaws excused this failure because the governor 
promised double presents in the fall of 1754. 26 This promise 
was kept, and Kerlerec delivered presents to the Choctaws and 
Alabamas on schedule. 27 Because of a British blockade, 
however, Louisiana 1 s two most important allies would not 
receive their "annual" present again for over four years. 28 
The Choctaws did not accept the lack of trade goods and 
presents in stony silence. In 1754, headmen publicly told 
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Kerlerec that if they did not receive their presents, they 
would seek out the British.~ In 1756, after missing their 
•. annual presents, some Choctaws actively solicited British 
traders, 30 and Kerlerec feared that several villages were 
wholly in the British interest. 31 In the spring of 1757 
several Choctaw headmen held a meeting with South Carolina's 
Creek agent Daniel Pepper, in which they formally proposed 
forming an alliance with the Chickasaws and the British. 32 
In October 1757 more than fifty Choctaw headmen tried to meet 
with British traders at the Talapoosa villages, but French 
officers successfully scuttled the meeting. 33 
French officials suspected that the attempt to forge a 
Choctaw-Chickasaw-south Carolina alliance was the motive for 
aggressive moves by Western Division Choctaws against the 
Upper Creeks in summer 1754. A Choctaw war chief on a party 
against the Chickasaws attacked two Talapoosas, killing one. 
The chief claimed that it was an honest mistake, as he had 
not expected to find an allied nation so close to the enemy 
villages. But the killing may have been deliberate. If the 
Choctaws went to war with the Talapoosas the other Upper 
Creeks and Cowetas would be forced to take part as well. 
Because the Francophile Eastern Division lived closest to the 
creeks, the war would necessarily fall hardest on them. The 
Choctaws would be forced to make peace with the Chickasaws to 
survive a Creek war, which the Western Division favored 
anyway. 34 Kerlerec was able to prevent the affair from 
starting a Choctaw-Creek war, but maintaining this precarious 
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peace was a day-to-day exercise. 35 
Late in 1758 growing disenchantment with the French among 
all Choctaw villages gave the Anglophile party an opportunity 
to talk peace with the Chickasaws once again. Choctaws and 
Chickasaws concluded a peace in December 1758.M The arrival 
in February 1759 of the first French present in four years did 
nothing to cool the Anglophile party's ardor for a British 
alliance. Thirty Choctaw headmen traveled to the Upper Cre-aks 
in the spring of 1759 seeking an alliance with South 
Carolina. 37 During the summer of 1759 Choctaws met with 
Edmund Atkin at the Upper Cr~ek village of Mucullassas, where 
in early September they concluded a treaty of peace and 
alliance.~ Within a few months the first convoy of goods was 
on its way to the nation. The Anglophile party had so much 
support in the nation, as well as the tacit support of the 
Creeks, that even though the British traders and their Choctaw 
escorts passed within earshot of the Alabama and Chocts.w 
forts, the French were powerless to interfere. 39 The British 
trade that some Choctaws had sought since the 1720s seemed 
finally to be realized. Like so many other initiatives, 
however, this one was interrupted by the Anglo-Cherokee 
war. 
The Creeks continued to hold the balance of power during 
the 1750s, but found that balance increasingly difficult to 
maintain. At various times all of their neighbors put 
pressure on the Creeks to make changes in their basic policies 
that would affect the regional balance. The Creeks began the 
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decade at war with the Cherokees, and several times almost 
went to war with the Choctaws. After 1754, the seven Years• 
War intensified Anglo-French competition for the Creek 
alliance. Against all European-American f!ommon wisdom the 
Creeks did not abandon Louisiana after the colony found itself 
without trade goods and presents for half a decade. When at 
the end of the decade a major war threatened to engulf the 
entire Southeast, the Creeks continued the policy of 
neutrality they had embraced a half-century earlier. 
The Creeks were faced several times during the 1750s with 
the possibility of war with the Choctaws. The Choctaws 
committed attacks on Creeks in 1751, 1754, and 1756 which 
easily could have resulted in war between the Choctaws and 
the entire Creek confederacy. The Creeks, already at war 
with the Cherokees and Iroquois, were reluctant to wage a two-
front war; for some Creeks, moreover, a war with the Choctaws 
threatened to embroil them with their allies in Louisiana. 
Each time the Choctaws threatened to start a war, Creeks and 
Frenchmen worked with their friends among the Choctaws to make 
peace. 40 
The Creeks were preoccupied with the Cherokees for much 
of the 1750s, but not always for the same reasons. At the 
beginning of the decade Creeks and Cherokees fought a war over 
the Cherokees' friendship with the Iroquois. The Iroquois 
periodically waged war on the catawbas and Creeks, which they 
were able to do only because the Cherokees allowed the 
northerners to pass through and be supplied in Cherokee 
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country. The war lasted for four years and was fought mainly 
between the Lower Creeks and Lower Cherokees. The war itself 
was not particularly debilitating by Indian standards, but it 
eventually threatened interests in south Carolina and the 
creek nation itself and had to be terminated. 41 
The Creeks and Cherokees were both allies of South 
Carolina, and parties from each side brought their war to 
Charles Town itself. In the spring of 1751 a party of 
Cherokees and Senecas attacked and pursued a party of Creeks 
into a trader's store. In the confusion the attackers killed 
not only· some Creeks, but also two Englishmen and several 
Chickasaws. Then, in April 1752, the Creek chief Acorn 
Whistler arranged the killing of several Cherokees just 
outside the gates of Charles Town. South Carolina, still 
embroiled with. the Cherokees over the store insult, now 
demanded satisfaction of the Creeks. The Creeks did give 
satisfaction, but it had to be handled as diplomatically as 
the Creeks knew how. The killing of Acorn Whistler, who had 
partisans in the Upper and Lower towns, could have led to 
civil war, as the killing of Red Shoe did with the Choctaws. 
To put an end to such disturbances, chiefs from throughout the 
nation deputized Malatchi, mico of Coweta and senior creek 
chief, to make peace with the Cherokees. Because of continued 
Cherokee-Iroquois incursions, however, the peace was not 
confirmed until 1754. 42 
The Seven Years• War placed additional strains on the 
Creeks after 1754. From the French came pressure to join 
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intensified after 1758 when elements 
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This pressure was 
of the Overbill 
Cherokees, long courted by Mortar, formed an alliance with 
Louisiana. Despite Mortar's continuous efforts to turn both 
the Creeks and Cherokees away from the British, the Creeks 
knew that the French could not supply even the Choctaws with 
all their commercial needs, much less the Creeks as well. 
The creeks thus continued to "hold" both England and France 
as allies. 43 
During the 1750s the Creeks experienced problems with 
the British alliance as well. One problem was what the Creeks 
believed were unfavorable commercial arrangements with British 
traders. Despite almost a century of sustained trade and 
alliance with Europeans, the Creeks still viewed trade as a 
political and diplomatic act, not as an exercise in supply and 
demand between private individuals. Thus, when Creeks saw 
Cherokees getting higher prices for their leather they grew 
dissatisfied; the fact that the Cherokees 1 deerskins were 
thicker and thus commanded higher prices in Europe meant 
nothing to the Creeks. It took almost three years, but in 
January 1756 Anglophile Upper Creek headman Gun Merchant 
signed a treaty with Glen that was supposed to lower the price 
of British trade goods and to strengthen the Anglo-Creek 
alliance. Lowered trade prices were granted in exchange for 
the right to build a fort among the Upper creeks, a promise 
the Creeks would not harm settlers on the Ogeechee River, and 
a promise that the Creeks would either force the Choctaws to 
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make peace with the Chickasaws or join the Chickasaws in a war 
against the Choctaws.~ 
The Creeks did not buy according to price alone and they 
would not sell the balance of power in the Southeast for a few 
extra strouds and duffels. As badly as most Creeks wanted 
more favorable prices, they could not accept a British fort 
in the nation, no matter what the cost. A British fort in the 
Upper Creek country would necessarily lead to fighting between 
it and Fort Toulouse, which would have forced the Creeks to 
take sides in the Anglo-French contest. The Upper and Lower 
Creeks decisively rejected Gun Merchant's treaty. Headmen 
from throughout the nation declared themselves happy with the 
trade as it stood and protested the extension of English 
settlement on the Ogeechee River. 45 
The ever-rising tide of British settlement into the 
interior, closer to Creek hunting grounds and villages, was 
the Creeks' second major British problem. On September 3, 
1756 a clash occurred between frontiersmen and horse-stealing 
Creeks. Three Creek.s died in the encounter and tempers flared 
on bo, ~1 sides. Georgians were sensitive to the intrusion into 
Indian territory and the possibility of an escalating series 
of revenge killings. Georgia officials consciously led the 
Indians to believe, falsely, that two Englishmen had died as 
a result of the fight. The Creeks, fearing that the incident 
might lead to problems with the trade, and fearing punishment 
for the killing of Englishmen, were willing to accept 
commercial satisfaction. Georgia authorities quickly agreed 
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that presents be given to the families of the slain warriors. 46 
There were other frontier incidents between settlers and 
Indians in several districts over the next several years, but 
nothing serious enough to threaten the Anglo-Creek alliance. 47 
For the Cherokees, the major issue of the 1750s was 
growing disenchantment with the British alliance. The decade 
began with economic warfare between the Cherokees and South 
Carolina in the form of a Carolina embargo on the Cherokees 
and ended in military conflict between the erstwhile allies. 
The Cherokees, like the Creeks, experienced problems with 
traders and encroaching British settlement. The Cherokees 
were not satisfied with South CaroJ.ina 1 s response to their 
problems and attempted to solve them through a combination of 
appeals to Carolina 1 s British allies and imperial enemies. 
Unlike the Creeks, however, the Cherokees did not remain 
neutral in South Carolina's affairs and became enmeshed ever 
deeper in the conflicts that raged around them. At the 
beginning of the 1760s the Cherokees learned that rejection 
of the British alliance would cost them dearly. 
Relations between the Cherokees and South Carolina broke 
down so completely in 1751 that the Cherokees made war on the 
carolina frontier and the colony placed an embargo on trade 
with the Indians. The problem stemmed in part from Cherokee 
distrust of Carolina justice. In the spring of 1751 a party 
of Carolinians stole some deerskins from a party of Cherokee 
hunters. Cherokees became convinced that local justice James 
Francis protected the guilty men from punishment. Cherokee 
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resentment of particular traders and generally poor trading 
conditions boiled over into war hysteria. Only two South 
Carolinians were actually killed by Cherokees in retaliation 
for the thefts, but rumor swelled several unsuccessful 
assaults on traders into a massacre. Cherokee headmen quickly 
made peace overtures to Governor Glen but the Commons House 
was in no mood for compromise. The Commons placed a total 
embargo on the Cherokee trade over Glen's objections.~ 
The abortive uprising highlighted increasing Cherokee 
resentment of their relationship with South Carolina. The 
Cherokees had been at war with the Creeks for several years, 
which had prevented them from hunting and increased their debt 
to British traders. 49 Traders also provoked the Indians in 
many ways. They sometimes sold rum to the Indians, spread 
false information concerning other traders 1 bad intentions 
toward the Indians, and even assaulted the natives. 50 Licensed 
trader Patrick Graham's admQnition to keep "loose, idle 
Fellows" ou'l: of the Creek nation at this time was equally 
applicable to the Cherokees. 51 
The embargo of 1751, which followed a similar episode in 
1748, convinced some Cherokee headmen that they must somehow 
break Carolina's trade monopoly. In search of a British 
alternative, in the fall of 1751 uku Old Hop sent his second 
man Little carpenter to Virginia to open a trade. But Little 
Carpenter was disappointed. Virginia awaited a new royal 
governor and was not ready to move into Carolina 1 s sphere 
without higher authority. Furthermore, when Glen learned of 
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Little Carpenter's mission he intentionally misled Virginians 
into believing that Little Carpenter had no standing in the 
nation to negotiate for anything. All Little Carpenter 
received from Virginia was the vague assurance that Virginia 
traders would be told of the Cherokees• plight. 52 
The Cherokees and South Carolina attempted to adjust 
relations in a treaty signed in Charles Town in November 1751. 
The Cherokees were :.:-equi:;:ed to hand over the metis trader 
Andrew White, who had killed a C.arolinian, and Little 
carpenter; make good some trader losses; and prevent Iroquois 
from molesting the ~rontier. South carolina was required to 
institute a modified trading regime to keep traders from 
troubling each other or the Indians, to establish new prices 
and weights for goods and skins, and to prohibit the sale of 
rum in the nation. 
Cherokees a fort. 
solving problems. 
Glen also informally promised the 
The treaty was less than successful in 
Little Carpenter was sent northward on 
"national business" and not delivered to South Carolina. No 
enforcement mechanism effectively controlled the traders; rum 
continued to be sold; and the assembly failed to approve a 
Cherokee fort. 53 
Just as Indian policy in south Carolina was influenced 
by internal politics, so was Cherokee "Carolina" policy. Many 
of the decisions reached around Cherokee council fires in the 
early 1750s were the result of an internal power struggle over 
who represented the Cherokee nation to outsiders. 
Traditionally, the uku or "First Beloved Man11 of the overbill 
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town of Chota was recognized as the "emperor" of th.?. 
Cherokees. Each division had its own council and made its own 
decisions, but the uku was accorded great respect and his talk 
carried great weight throughout the nation. When Cuming 
concluded the great alliance of 1730, he recognized Moytoy, 
a senior headman of Great Tellico, as emperor. Old Hop, who 
served as uku from the 1720s through the late 1750s, resented 
the upstart Moytoy and, after 1741, Moytoy•s son and 
successor, Ammonscossittee. Old Hop worked diligently in the 
1740s and 1750s to regain his position as the senior leader 
of his nation. 54 
The political struggle between Old Hop and Ammonscossitte 
was a factor in the Creek-Cherokee war of the early 1750s. 
The war was caused mainly by the overbills' friendship with 
the Iroquois, but because of geography the war fell mostly on 
the Middle and Lower Towns where Ammonscossittee lived and 
enjoyed the most support. Ammonscossittee•s failure to 
mitigate the effects of the war, which lasted for almost four 
years, caused his supporters to look to the uku for guidance. 
Ammonscossittee was forced to acknowledge the preeminence of 
Old Hop to see the war ended, and by the summer of 1753 Old 
Hop was formally recognized by the British as well as emperor 
of the Cherokees. Once these concessions were made, Old Hop 
helped arrange an end to the war. 55 
Old Hop's increased stature in Carolina did not solve 
the problems inherent in the Carolina trade monopoly. In 1754 
Old Hop began to look for trade and alliance elsewhere. 
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Unhappy with the British alliance, he cultivated a French one. 
Using both native and European intermediaries, in the late 
summer or early fall of 1754 Old Hop sent talks to Kerlerec 
that the Cherokees were interested in an alliance with 
Louisiana. The Louisiana initiative had little support in the 
Middle and Lower Towns for the first several years. Despite 
the opposition of his fellow Indians and South Carolina, the 
emperor was able to sustain negotiations with Louisiana for 
more than half a decade before events led the nation to accede 
to his policy. 56 
Cherokee disenchantment with the British during the late 
1750s was increased, ironically, by the building of British 
forts in the nation. South Carolina built Fort Prince George 
opposite the Lower Towns village of Keowee late in 1753 and 
Fort Loudon in the fall of 1756 not far from Chota. The forts 
were intended to shore up the Cherokee alliance by serving as 
diplomatic centers and places of refuge in case of attack by 
the French or their Indian allies. The Cherokees had 
requested forts for protection and to promote trade, but when 
the forts served neither purpose the Cherokees came 
increasingly to resent them. Old Hop resented that a fort was 
built first in the Lower Towns, which had no real need for 
such an installation. When the Overbill fort was finally 
built, it was poorly placed for defence of any Indian villages 
and came at a time when general Cherokee-South Carolina 
relations were deteriorating. Thus British forts became 
symbols of encroachment and broken promises, objects of 
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resentment, not good will. 57 
The Cherokees hoped that they could turn South carolina's 
need to their advantage in the Seven Years' War. With 
Dinwiddie bidding for their favor and Glen eager to maintain 
the trade monopoly the Cherokees pressed their advantage. At 
a conference called by Glen at Saluda Old Town in June 1755, 
the Cherokees set forth their demands to enter the war effort. 
In return for a cession of their land to George II, the 
Cherokees obtained several important promises from Glen. The 
governor promised to increase the number of traders in the 
nation, to set a new and more favorable price structure, to 
prohibit the sale of rum, and to build a fort for the 
protection of the overbills. But once again the Cherokees 
were disappointed. Glen had no authority to increase the 
number of traders or to lc1wer their prices and the assembly 
would not grant him money for a fort. 58 
Old Hop remained willing to consider alternatives within 
the British alliance as well. Virginia's Dinwiddie presented 
Old Hop such an opportunity when the governor attempted to 
bring the Cherokees into the Seven Years' War without Glen's 
assistance. Old Hop eagerly responded to the Virginian's 
advances by pressing him for what Glen had promised but failed 
to deliver: a fort and better trading arrangements. Cherokees 
and Virginians met on the Lower Towns-catawba path at the 
Broad River in March 1756 and worked out a new relationship. 
The formal terms of the treaty required the Cherokees to 
renounce their French alliance entirely and to meet the French 
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only on the field of battle. Virginia was required to build 
an overbill fort, in return for which the Cherokees would send 
four hundred warriors to Virginia. Informally, the Virginians 
agreed to open a regular trade with the Cherokees. Virginians 
built an Overbill fort in the summer of 1756 but never manned 
it, increasing Cherokee resentment of the British~ 59 
The Cherokees • services to Virginia turned out to be 
negligible militarily and a disaster politically. Despite 
the opposition of James Glen, at least 250 Cherokees served 
in Virginia in 1756. But Virginia and imperial authorities 
treated the Cherokees more like enlistees than mercenary 
allies. The Cherokees considered this treatment at least 
negligent and perhaps insulting. As a result some Cherokees 
harassed frontier settlers in their homes and fields, stole 
cattle, and generally disturbed an already agitated populace. 
The Cherokees first campaign in Virginia created resentment 
on both sides of the alliance.~ 
Despite the problems with Virginia and South Carolina, 
in the spring and summer of 1757 over 250 Cherokees took part 
in the defense of the Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania 
frontiers. Little better managed than in their first Virginia 
campaign, the Cherokees again came into conflict with Virginia 
officials and frontiersmen. Thay were treated poorly by 
Edmund Atkin and his subordinates, which caused some of them 
to return home in disgust. There were more than 3 o casual ties 
among those who remained, including 15 dead, which was 
reckoned a major loss by Indian standards. Edmund Atkin made 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
260 
matters worse in July when, temporarily without an 
interpreter, he jailed several Cherokees as spies. With the 
nation already angry over its warriors treatment in Virginia, 
in December 1757 four Estatoes were killed on the Edisto River 
in North Carolina. A chain of revenge killings on both sides 
ensued. 61 
Anglo-Cherokee relations deteriorated further during 
1758. The Cherokees were considered by many imperial and 
colonial officials as essential to the defense of the frontier 
and great efforts were made to enlist them in that service. 
Once they took the field, however, the Cherokees were ignored 
by the governors of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, as 
well as by the northern and southern Indian superintendents. 
The ill treatment they received led some Cherokees to exercise 
their frustrations on the Virginia frontier, which in turn 
caused greater resentment from Virginians. General John 
Forbes lamented that because of the lack of support from 
provinicial legislatures, "if anything fail the cause may be 
attributed to the want of Indians who's [sic] presence I have 
lost for Saving a few hundred pounds, after foolishly having 
spent several thousands upon them. 1162 
The Cherokees were continually encouraged in their 
increasing ill-will toward the British by France 1 s Creek agent 
Mortar. Mortar spent most of the winter of 1758-1759 with the 
Cherokees spreading pro-French talks. In the summer and fall 
of 1759 several parties of Creeks and Cherokees visited each 
other's nations. Creek emperor Togulki and his regent 
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Ishenpoaphi journeyed to the overbills and discussed with Old 
Hop the formation of an anti-British Creek-Cherokee alliance. 63 
During the summer of 1759 Mortar saw an opportunity to 
craft the anti-British creek-Cherokee coalition he had sought 
for so long. Cherokees, especially from the Lower Towns, were 
receptive to anti-British talks in the aftermath of the 
Virginia troubles, which had spread to North and South 
carolina. But many Creeks were also unhappy with the British 
as well. Atkin's impolitic behavior, although excused by the 
strongest Anglophiles, had created resentment in some 
quarters. More than that Atkin's Choctaw peace, concluded in 
July, raised in many Creeks the old fear that if an Anglo-
Choctaw alliance and trade developed, the Creeks would lose 
their political and commercial advantage in the Southeast. 
In the summer of 1759 many Creeks and Cherokees were ready to 
consider basic realignments. 64 
In late July 17 59 Mortar, Togulki, Ishenpoaphe, and Lower 
Cherokee headmen planned for late August a coordinated attack 
on British traders to force both nations into war with the 
British. In true Indian fashion, however, tribesmen in both 
nations who did not agree with the plan wrecked it. The 
uprising was scheduled for late August, but Anglophile Creek 
headmen learned of the plot and warned traders to be on their 
guard. By August 3 even Lieutenant Coytmore of Fort Prince 
George in the Lower Cherokees had heard of it. Coytmore 
immediately apprised Atkin of the scheme, who announced it to 
all Creek headmen, effectively killing it. Anglophile 
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Cherokee headmen also ruined the plot on their end by 
threatening to .kill all the Cr.eeks in the Cherokee nation if 
the plan went forward. 65 
Despite the best-laid--and sometimes poorly-laid--plans 
of various European and Indian groups on the marchlands, the 
Southeast did not become a part of the Great War for Empire 
before 1759. The main obstacle to most of these plans was 
Cr::ek neutrality. The Creeks understood that their position 
as the neutral arbiter of the Southeast depended upon a 
balance between the Europeans, which in turn depended upon 
the alliance system that had emerged after the Yamasee War a 
half-century earlier. The Creeks would allow no conflicts to 
develop to disturb that system if they could help it. Late 
in 17 59 1 however, the marchlands erupted in war 1 and the 
Creeks were powerless to prevent it. 
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Chapter IX 
War on the Marchlands 
1 
In the fall of 1759, the Anglo-Cherokee war erupted on 
the marchlands of empire, ironically, just as the Great War 
for Empire reached its climax in Canada. The Anglo-Cherokee 
War of 1759-1761 was not a product of the Great War for 
Empire, but its by-product. The Europeans• imperial war 
exacerbated tensions between Cherokee and British allies, but 
it did not cause them. The French took advantage of Anglo-
Cherokee differences to push for a Cherokee break with the 
English. Anglo-Cherokee differences were not the creation of 
"artful French diplomacy," they were inherent in the 
relationship. In the Anglo-Cherokee war, the Cherokees would 
learn just how dependent they had become on the Europeans. 
senior Cherokee headmen, having foiled Mortar • s September 
conspiracy, were determined to come to terms with South 
Carolina. Because of their recent proof of fidelity, headmen 
felt safe going to Charles Town to deal with Lyttleton 
personally. The Cherokees proposed that in lieu of delivering 
those Cherokees who had killed whites that the guilty be sent 
267 
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instead against the French for scalps. Glen accepted such an 
arrangement in 1751 and the Cherokees saw no reason why 
Lyttleton would not as well. The peace delegation was led by 
Oconostota and eventually included important headmen from 
throughout the nation such as Wawhatchee, first warrior of the 
Lower Towns, Seroweh of Estatoe and Round 0 of Stecoe from the 
Middle Towns, and Tistoe and Wolf, headmen of Overbills 
Keowee. 1 
Lyttleton was less interested in an honorable compromise 
than in bringing the Cherokees to submission on his terms. 
Despite the fact that he knew Oconostota•s peace party was on 
its way Lyttleton decided to effect a military solution to his 
Cherokee problem. In the first week of October the governor 
' 
proposed to the Assembly that he take ~ force of 150 regulars 
and a large body of militia to the Cherokee country, where he 
would force the Indians to accept his terms through diplomacy 
or force. The Commons, hoping to avoid war, limited funding 
to only three months of campaigning. But there was not enough 
time to raise and supply the men, march them into Indian 
country, and bring the natives to terms, so the governor 
considered no other options. 2 
Given. Lyttleton•s determination to fight, Oconostota•s 
diplomatic mission had no chance to succeed. Lyttleton 
rejected the Indians• compromise proposal and informed the 
Indians that Cherokees would have to be delivered to British 
justice, the number to be determined by him at Fort Prince 
George. Lyttleton promised the Indians safe conduct t.o their 
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villages and "invited" them to accompany him to Fort Prince 
George to help fash!-on .a peace. Despite the pretense of 
protection, everyone knew that the Indians were hostages for 
the good conduct of the nation. Lyttleton and his frontier 
post commandants knew that the Cherokees would remain 
relatively peaceful while important headmen were in Charles 
Town. 3 
Negotiating a settlement was difficult for both sides. 
Lyttleton•s force was too small to fight the Cherokee nation 
united against it1 negotiations did not begin until December 
10 and his authorization from the Commons expired on January 
11 and measles broke out in the English camp, causing illness 
and desertions that reduced the governors 1 fighting force 
significantly. The Cherokees had problems as well. Old Hop 
favored a hard line against the British, but Little Carpenter 
promoted compromise and conciliation. Some headmen were 
inclined to give satisfaction, but others were prepared to 
protect the guilty to prevent their delivery to British 
justice. Growing distrust of the British based on what the 
Cherokees perceived as the unjust seizure of hostages made 
presenting a peaceful front to the British increasingly 
difficult. 4 
Lyttleton pressed for total submission from the 
Cherokees. His terms were harsh: the murderers must be 
delivered before the hostages would be freed; the hostages 
would remain in Fort Prince George until then; trad~rs would 
return to the nation only after the guilty were delivered; 
,. 
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the Cherokees would receive no Frenchmen among them; and 
anyone who fomented trouble between the Cherokees and South 
Carolina would be reported to the governor. On December 22 
Little Carpenter and other Cherokee headmen signed a treaty 
conforming to British demands, because it was the only way to 
free important national headmen. Presents, including 
ammunition which they needed desperately, were shown to the 
Cherokees but not to be delivered until all the guilty were 
handed over. Lyttleton returned in triumph to Charles Town 
early in January 1760 thinking he had put the Cherokees in 
their place. In truth, however, the governor had merely 
inflamed the Cherokees against Carolina. 5 
The willingness of Little Carpenter and other headmen to 
sign Lyttleton's treaty masked widely divergent views in the 
nation over relations with South Carolina. The majority of 
Cherokee headmen were either unwilling or unable to satisfy 
Lyttleton's demands. They were unwilling because important 
headmen, who in Indian eyes had done nothing but satisfy the 
demands for retaliation, were among the guilty. Some of the 
guilty considered expendable by the nation were unwilling to 
be sacrificed and fled into the woods, making their delivery 
impossible. 6 
Lyttleton's campaign against the Cherokees was a serious 
blunder and was recognized as such by contemporaries. British 
treachery in seizing hostages who had been promised safe 
conduct turned formerly ardent Anglophiles into hardened 
Anglophobes. Governor Ellis considered the treaty too 
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"mortifying" for the Cherokees to observe. Although Lyttleton 
had scored a great victory on paper, in fact he had started 
a war. 7 Doctor George Milligen-Johnston, a member of 
Lyttleton 1 s army, was even more to the point. "This 
expedition, which cost the province about £25,000 Sterling, 
only increased the Ill-humor of the Cherokees.... [and] 
converted their Desire of Peace into a Rage for War" through 
gross insults and denial of redress of grievances. 8 
Lyttleton 1 s decision to leave the hostages at Fort Prince 
George created a situation that practically invited the 
Cherokees to make war on Carolina. Inside the fort were two 
things the Cherokees wanted desperately: a group of twenty-
two senior headmen and a large supply of ammunition. 
Compounding problems was the fact that the Cherokees had 
developed an intense hatred for commandant Lieutenant Richard 
Coytn~?re. 9 All that stood between the Cherokees and what they 
wanted was a decaying log fort and a garrison of less than one 
hundred men. 10 
Lyttleton 1 s peace lasted two weeks before it was broken 
by the Lower Towns. The Lower Towns had suffered the most in 
the Virginia troubles, and most of the hostages held in Fort 
Prince George were their men. Seroweh, a former hostage 
himself and once a great friend of the British, led the war 
effort. He roused his followers with the killing of Hiwassee 
tradei John Kelly and advanced to Fort Prince George to secure 
the release of the remaining hostages through diplomacy or 
war. Coytmore learned of his plan, however, and prepared. 
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Seroweh, feigning friendship was allowed into the fort with 
a small force of warriors hiding weapons. But the garrison 
was obviously prepared for violence, so Seroweh withdrew. 11 
The garrison at Fort Prince George was in some ways as 
much a captive force as their hostages; the Cherokees declared 
war against South Carolina but Coytmore and his men were 
powerless to respond. During the latter part of January over 
a dozen British traders were killed in the Lower and Middle 
Towns; more would have died but for the protection of their 
Cherokee families and friends. On February 1 the Cherokees 
attacked a train of settlers fleeing toward the safety of Fort 
More, taking almost two dozen scalps and as many prisoners. 
Only the overbills refused to take part in the war. 12 
The death of Old Hop in January 1760 led to increased 
influence for the growing Anglophobe party. Little Carpenter 
hoped to be elected uku, but too many Cherokees thought he had 
sold out his nation to Lyttleton in the December treaty. 
Connetarke, known to the English as Standing Turkey, was 
elected instead and he did not support Little Carpenter's 
treaty. Almost immediately many who had not signed the treaty 
and even some who had signed repudiated it. Little Carpenter 
and Oconostota were sent to Fort Prince George for one last 
attempt to secure the release of several Chotas among the 
hostages. 13 
Coytmore held firm on the release of prisoners, despite 
the growing indications that the Cherokees would not accept 
no for an answer. What Oconostota could not get directly he 
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sought by guile. Claiming to want an escort to Charles Town 
to meet with the governor, Oconostota drew Coytmore out of 
Fort Prince George for a parlay, then signaled for an attack. 
Coytmore fell, mortally wounded. Cannon fire repulsed an 
Indian attack. When Coytmore died of his wounds later that 
afternoon the garrison inside the fort fixed bayonets and slew 
the remaining hostages. Along with the hostages died all hope 
of settlement short of war. 14 
Having declared all-out war on South carolina, the 
Cherokees were poorly prepared for such an undertaking because 
of the long embargo. They looked everywhere for allies and 
found none. 
2 
Georgians reacted to the eruption of the Anglo-Cherokee 
war by strengthening their meager frontier forces. Rangers 
were shifted from the coast to the frontier, leaving only a 
token force to defend Savannah. 15 Ellis immediately requested 
mc~~Y for improving fortifications and the support c)f rangers 
and militia called into active duty. Ellis gave assemblymen 
a choice: they could sacrifice part of their private property 
in taxes or lose it all to the Indians. 16 The House quickly 
approved all of the governor's proposals. 17 
Georgia 1 s next concern after was to bring the Creeks into 
the war against the Cherokees. Atkin immediately sent talks 
to the Creeks officially inviting them to join the war effort. 
He instructed all t~aders to use what private influence they 
enjoyed with individual headmen towards the same end. 18 Ellis 
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told the Creeks that the war could adversely affect the 
trade. 19 Ellis also provided his Indian agents with £1,000 
sterling worth of goods to encourage the Creeks to take up the 
tomahawk against the Cherokees. The governor also promised 
£5 sterling worth of goods for every Cherokee scalp brought 
in by a Creek or a Chickasaw. 20 
The Creeks did not join the war despite lavish 
inducements to do so. Anglophile headmen affirmed their 
loyalty to the British at the same time they declined 
officially to take part in the war. 21 Ellis hoped that 
although the lavish gift-giving might not lead to war it would 
probably prevent war coming to Georgia. The governor knew 
that the Cherokees could not risk bringing the Creeks into the 
war by attacking the Georgia frontier. 22 
Ellis hoped to force a war on the Creeks that national 
lead~rs would not agree to in council. From the beginning of 
the conflict, Ellis encouraged individual warriors to take 
scalps, hoping they would in traditional fashion leave Creek 
symbols among the dead bodies to incite retalia1:ion.D Ellis 
also sent John Spencer to incite the Creeks against the 
Cherokees, even though Spencer had lost his trading license. 24 
Ellis furthermore deputized the Bosomworths to attempt the 
same end and approved a reward for any Creek party that could 
incite the nation into a declaration of war. 25 
Young Creek warriors eager for war honors did not let 
national policy stand in their way. They simply avoided 
headmen who disapproved of war and went on raids against the 
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Cherokees anyway.~ Several parties of young Creeks attacked 
Cherokee towns and returned in trivmph to Georgia to collect 
their rewards. 27 Despite all these measures, however, there 
was no Creek-Cherokee war. The Cherokees, unwilling to fight 
a two-front war, accepted the protestations of Creek headmen 
that their young men had acted without national authorization 
and declined to press for or take satisfaction for their 
losses. 28 
Mortar's Francophile faction also tried to dictate 
national policy. Mortar hoped to force his nation into the 
Anglo-Creek war on the Cherokee side, and the best way to do 
that was to kill and plunder traders. On May 16 eleven 
traders and packhorse men were killed and their stores and 
goods pillaged. The war whoop was heard in many quarters but 
the nation would not be stampeded into war. A few traders 
were saved on the day of the initial attack, and in the 
following days more traders were gathered together under the 
protection of senior headmen. The first news of the 
"massacre" caused a panic on the frontier. Several newly-
built forts were quickly abandoned as frontier settlers 
withdrew toward the coast.~ 
so many Lower Creek headmen were visiting Ellis in 
Savannah when the killings occurred that Georgians did not 
doubt the chorus of disavowals that flooded savannah from both 
Upper and Lower Creeks in May and June 1760. Gun Merchant, 
deputized by many Upper Towns headmen, expressed his loyalty 
and pointed out that if the nation had supported the plot no 
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traders could have escaped alive. He also warned Georgians 
against pushing for satisfaction because it might inflame the 
nation against the British. 30 The Lower Towns demonstrated 
their peaceful intentions by bringing the white wing to 
savannah along with the traders they had saved and protected 
from their bellicose brother&. 31 
The Georgia assembly wanted to ensure that the colony 
did nothing further to incite the Creeks, despite the fact 
that it was Indians who started the trouble. Assemblymen 
recognized that Georgia's effort to promote a Creek-Cherokee 
rupture had provoked the "horrid Massacre" and they were 
afraid that any attempts to have satisfaction might cause more 
trouble. The assembly therefore asked Ellis not to pursue any 
policy that would incite the least Indian jealousy against 
Georgia. 32 Ellis agreed with this sentiment wholeheartedly and 
absolved the Creek nation of any blame in the affair. Ellis 
told the Creeks that he had done so out of love for them and 
treaty obligations to ignore the acts of mad individuals on 
both sides of the frontier. 33 The creeks responded to this 
self-interested magnanimity by returning most of the goods 
stolen from the slain traders.~ 
During the fall and winter of 1760-1761 Georgians were 
involved in almost non-stop talks with the Creeks to cement 
the alliance. A constant stream of warriors, most of them 
with no talks to give, came to Augusta and savannah. All 
Creeks were received with open arms and none went away empty-
handed. Talks of friendship were given to all and important 
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headmen were invited to Savannah to deliver and hear national 
talks. 35 
The Choctaws profited from the frontier troubles to renew 
contacts with the British in Georgia. In October 1760 ten 
Choctaw headmen traveled to savannah to hold talks with Ellis. 
To prove their sincerity, they brought with them the white 
wing and the scalp of a Frenchman killed in retaliation for 
an Englishman slain in the nation a year earlier. .The 
Choctaws expressed the.j.r joy at meetirtg Ellis, as they had 
been prevented from doing so for two years by the French. 
Ellis confirmed Georgia's love for them and his happiness that 
they had revenged the British trader. Ellis also praised them 
for their Chickasaw peace and encouraged them to make peace 
with the Creeks as well. Once they did this, he promised, 
British traders could once again supply their nation.~ 
Indian complaints against Atkin's activities and conduct 
confirmed Ellis' opinion that Atkin did more harm than good 
to Anglo-Creek relations. Ellis gave Atkin credit for "having 
left Matters there in a settled state, after he had greatly 
disturbed and embarrassed them. Voicing the sentiments of his 
fellow southern governors Ellis complained to his superiors 
that the superintendency was an unworkable office and that 
Indian relations should be left to the separate colonies. 37 
Ellis hoped that the British would take the offensive in 
the Cherokee war by attacking and capturing Mobile. The 
capture of Mobile would mean mastery of Forts Toulouse and 
Tombecbe as well. The elimination of French influence would 
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make Britain • s allies more "submissive and manageable" and 
afford a good base for operations against the Cherokees. At 
the very least, such a campaign would improve Britain 1 s 
reputation with the Indians. Ellis realized that the capture 
of Louisiana would give umbrage to Spain. The governor argued 
that even if Louisiana had to be ceded to Spain in a peace 
treaty Spaniards were "in every view more eligible neighbors 
than the french [sic] •1138 James Wright agreed with this 
sentiment and called for the capture of the Alabama and Mobile 
forts in one of his first letters to the Board of Trade after 
becoming governor of Georgia. 39 
3 
Louisiana's already dismal fortunes sank even lower in 
the fall of 1759 when the British captured Quebec. French 
officials recognized that there was no hope of retaining the 
colony. Since Louisiana was settled and maintained largely 
to protect Canada's southern and western marches, the loss of 
Canada made Louisiana highly expendable. The only grounds for 
retaining Louisiana at all was to keep Florida from complete 
encirclement by Great Britain. 40 
Louisiana's supply problems were exacerbated in the fall 
of 1759 by the continuing feud between the governor and 
commissaire-ordonnateur. When Kerlerec went to Mobile for 
the annual gift-giving to the Indians, he left specific 
instructions that cartel-ships from all nations should be 
welcomed at New Orleans, particularly if they had goods to 
trade. An English vessel appeared and began a lively trade, 
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but Rochemore impounded the cargo according to the letter 
patent of October 1727. so grGat was the public outcry 
against Rochemore•s actions that Kerlerec quickly returned to 
New Orleans and, at the head of a body of officers and 
traders, forced Rochemore to return the goods to the English 
ship. 41 
Louisiana's situation deteriorated so much by the spring 
of 1760 that Kerlerec and his senior officers held a £QDg.eil 
de guerre, a war council, on April 22 to consider options. 
A British ship of thirty guns patrolled the mouth of the 
~ 
Mississippi River near Balize, its object to prevent supply 
ships from reaching the colony. The king's warehouses had 
not a single piece of red limbourq, the staple item in Indian 
gift-giving. To counter the British blockade two royal ships 
were ordered outfitted as well as possible with men and 
weaponry to take the Englishman or to put him to sail. 
Regarding presents, the council voted to use whatever money 
could be found to buy all the red and blue limbourq that could 
be located, as well as substitutes for the other items usually 
given to the Indians. Rochemore was also ordered to lay in 
supplies as best be could for future needs. 42 The royal ships 
and the armaments were so poor, however, that the best 
Kerlerec could do was to send one of them to guard the passes 
at the mouth of the river. 43 
Kerlerec•s fntstration at not being able to supply the 
Choctaws and Alabamas was increased by his lack of goods to 
help the Cherokees in their war against the British. The 
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governor had worked hard to foment an Anglo-Cherokee war and 
he claimed credit for the war to his superiors in France.« 
Kerlerec felt responsible for the Cherokees and he continued 
to plead with French officials for their support until long 
after they were effectively beaten. 45 The court belatedly 
decided to send goods for the Choctaws after it had already 
decided to divest itself of Louisiana.~ 
In the meantime, Kerlerec had problems closer to home 
with the Choctaws and Upper Creeks. The problem with the 
Choctaws was to keep them separated from the Chickasaws and 
the British; the problem with the Upper creeks was to supply 
them their presents as usual. Mortar's May 1760 attempt to 
force an Anglo-Creek war by killing British traders was 
unsuccessful, but it nonetheless paid dividends to Louisiana. 
The conflict caused a rupture between the Cherokees and the 
Chickasaws, which the following winter prevented the British 
from opening the trade promised to the Choctaws just a few 
months before. Kerlerec :t'ealized, however, that Mortar's coup 
would inevitably lead to increased demands for presents and 
trade goods, so he called another war council. 47 Due to the 
"total necessity" of giving goods to the Upper Creeks, the 
council ordered Rochemore and his subordinates to purchase 
everything needed to send goods to the Indians immediately. 48 
Rochemore did as ordered under protest and dispatched one of 
his assistants to Paris to complain about it to the minister. 49 
Louisiana•e supply problems continued to worsen due to 
Rochemore•s obstructionism and lack of support from France. 
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on February 9, 1761 Kerlerec called yet another war council, 
this one dedicated to the provision of Mobile, Fort Toulouse, 
and Fort Tombecbe. The Indians at these and other posts were 
the only security for the colony, and common wisdom held that 
it was presents and trade that kept them friendly to 
Louisiana. The council blamed the absence of stockpiles of 
food and merchandise for the Indians 1 needs squarely on 
Rochemore. Kerlerec orderad Rochemore to do what was 
necessary to obtain the food and guns to supply the posts in 
question. The council found the situation so critical that 
its final statement called for the forcible removal of 
Rochemore from his office if he did not move to fulfill the 
council's mandate within a week. 50 Rochemore responded to the 
council by sending to Havana for supplies. But 
characteristically, when the supplies arrived Rochemore 
refused to give an accounting of them to the governor. 51 
Ironically, Kerlerec did not receive any help from France 
until it was too late to do anything but relieve the suffering 
of Louisiana's European, African, and Indian inhabitants. 
Ministerial officials notified the Louisiana government within 
days of each other of the colony 1 s cession to England and 
Spain and Kerlerec 1 s return to France, 52 Rochemore 1 s recall, 53 
and finally the dispatch of supplies to the long-beleaguered 
colony. 54 Minister of the Marine Etienne FranQois, due de 
Choiseul-Stainville also notified Kerlerec that presents for 
the Indians were on their way as we11. 55 
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Kerlerec was generally encouraged about the war effort 
because of Spain's entry into the war in the spring of 1762. 
In April Kerlerec received offers of cooperation from the 
governor of Havana, who also forwarded mail from France. In 
response to this Bourbon cooperation, Kerlerec actively 
encouraged the Indians to treat Spaniards as alli~s and at 
the same time sought to instill more diplomatic treatment of 
the Indians by Spanish governors in Texas and Florida. 56 
Louisiana's joy at the arrival at the end of April 1762 
of the first ships from France in three years soon turned 
sour. The three ships carried the Angoumois regiment of four 
hundred men and word of further arrivals of men and supplies. 57 
on the strength of these advises, Kerlerec sent runners to the 
Choctaws, Upper Creeks, and Cherokees telling them that help 
was on the way. But the arrival of the presents brought great 
disappointment. Instead of limbourg the ships carried 
mazamet, in which the Indians were not interested; the trade 
shirts were so inferior that Kerlerec lamented they could not 
be offered to "the lowest Negro." The quantity and quality 
of the remaining goods were similarly disappointing. 58 
Despite Kerlerec • s optimism, the arrival of men and 
supplies were irrelevant to Louisiana's fate. 
4 
Lyttleton had started a war, but he was not to see its 
end. On February 14, 1760 Lyttleton learned that he had been 
promoted to the governorship of Jamaica and he left almost 
immediately for England to prepare for his new job. The Board 
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of Trade appointed Massachusetts governor Thomas Pownall as 
governor of south carolina and called him to England for 
instructions. For the interim the board appointed William 
Bull, Jr. as lieutenant governor and entrusted the colony's 
government to him. Pownall resigned his office before he 
could take up his post and his successor Thomas Boone did not 
arrive until December 1761. William Bull therefore led the 
colony through the rest of the Cherokee war. 59 
Bull's selection as acting governor was fortunate for 
the colony and for the Cherokees. Although Bull was no soft-
hearted admirer of the "noble savage," he was a political 
realist who was willing to compromise to end a war he was not 
sure South Carolina could win militarily. Bull was also a 
former speaker of the Commons House who believed th~t there 
should be few secrets between the governor and assembly. Bull 
immediately and for the duration of the Cherokee conflict 
worked closely with the assembly to bring the conflict to a 
speedy solution.~ 
If the Cherokees believed that this conflict pit~ed them 
against South Carolina alone, they were soon to learn their 
error. Jeffrey Amherst, commander of British forces in North 
America, assigned Colonel Archibald Montgomery and over 1,300 
officers and men, including infantry and grenadiers, to the 
punishment of the Cherokees. Begrudging this southern 
campaign, however, Amherst committed his troops only until 
mid-October 1760 at the latest. The army arrived in south 
Carolina in early April. By the early hours of June 2 
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Montgomery fought his first battle at New Keowee and Estatoe 
and by that afternoon had reached Fort Prince George. The 
colonel offered terms to the Cherokeef; and fully expected them 
to comply. 61 
Montgomery was sorely mistaken. British treachery in 
twice seizing hostages, a practice which had no parallel in 
Indian diplomatic or military conduct, had hardened even 
formerly ardent British friends into firm enemies. After 
three weeks at Fort Prince George, Montgomery realized that 
the Cherokees would not come to terms before being beaten 
militarily. Montgomery took his army over difficult terrain 
toward the Middle Towns. Before the army reached the first 
town, Etchoe, the troops were attacked and took significant 
casualties. Reaching Etchoe after the battle, the army found 
it deserted; Montgomery decided that he had accomplished his 
mission and set off for Fort Prince George and Charles Town. 62 
The colonel was ready to quit the province entirely but at the 
solicitation of Lieutenant Governor Bull he left four 
companies to guard the frontier. 63 
Montgomery's campaign laid waste the Lower Towns and 
Etchoe, but all South Carolinians could see was that it had 
increased overbill hatred of their colony. In the aftermath 
of Montgomery's expedition, a sizable faction of the assembly 
wanted to take war to the Overbills but Bull demurred. He 
considered Montgomery's experience proof that the war could 
not be won militarily. Bull along with Henry Ellis also 
feared that a British offensive might cause the Cherokees to 
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attack the frontier in force or that it might somehow be used 
by Mortar and his adherents to bring the creeks and Cherokees 
together against the frontier.M 
In Lyttleton's and Montgomery's campaigns Fort Loudoun 
was left alone, unaided and isolated. Given the fort's scanty 
provisions, the Cherokees did not have to wait long before the 
fort would be theirs. The Cherokees knew that Montgomery's 
retreat doomed Fort Loudoun. The garrison's position grew so 
desperate that, rather than face starvation, soldiers deserted 
at the risk of being captured or killed by Indians. Captain 
Raymond Demere tried to arrange a truce in the first week of 
August, but the CherokE\es would accept nothing less than 
surrender. In return for a surrender, the garrison was 
allowed to march out of the fort with their arms and a few 
rounds of ammunition for the return home. The morning after 
the capitulation, however, the garrison was fired on by the 
Cherokees; the only officer to survive was John stuart, who 
was rescued by Little carpenter personally. Accounts differ 
as to what precipitated the attack, but the number of officers 
killed almost perfectly matched the number of Cherokees killed 
in Fort J:Jrince George. 65 
By the winter of 1760-1761, the Cherokees had been 
without trade for almost eighteen months. They were almost 
completely devoid of guns and ammunition; food and clothes 
were in short supply; as of old they hunted with bone-tipped 
arrows. Ironically, hunger drove the Cherokees back into 
carolina to prey on stray cattle and hogs at the farms and 
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ranches abandoned because of the war. And of course they 
hunted for scalps wherever they could be found. Because of 
the Cherokees• desperate position, Little Carpenter led many 
important headmen in pushing for peace in the spring of 1761. 
As a sign of good faith, over a hundred captives were returned 
to the British, although thirty to forty settlers were kept 
in reserve against the Cherokees still held prisoner in 
Carolina. The Carolinians were adamant concerning 
satisfaction for their dead, however, and made no concessions 
to the Cherokees.M 
Britain wanted peace only on its terms and seemingly did 
not wish to avoid war. To complete the mission begun by 
Lyttleton and Montgomery over a year before, the imperial 
government sent General James Grant to chastise the Cherokees 
and to reduce them so completely that they would be forced to 
sue for peace. Grant ca~ried out his mission with ruthless 
efficiency. During June and July 1761 Grant and his army 
destroyed much of what was left of the Lower and Middle Towns. 
Sustaining minimum casualties, the army burned villages, tore 
up fields, orchards and gardens, and drove men, women, and 
children before it westward beyond the mountains. By the end 
of July the Cherokees recognized the futility of continuing 
the war and sued for peace.~ 
The price of peace for the Cherokees was initially q~ite 
high. To satisfy the original demands for British 
satisfaction, four to eight Cherokees, representing all the 
major regions, were to b«a handed over to be put to death: all 
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prisoners, livestock, and slaves had to be returned; and Fort 
Loudoun had to be returned intact to South carolina. The 
Cherokees were required to accept a new boundary that robbed 
the Lower Towns of much of their hunting grounds and respect 
it; to make peace with the catawbas and Chickasaws; to elect 
Little Carpenter emperor; to reject the French entirely; and 
in the future to kill any of their people who murdered 
Englishmen. In return, the British would return all Cherokee 
prisoners and resume the trade. These demands were drafted 
to satisfy a colonial assembly that was bent on satisfaction 
of its own; they were as unacceptable to the Cherokees as they 
were satisfying to the assembly.M 
That a peace acceptable to both parties was concluded 
without much further bloodshed was due to Lieutenant-Governor 
William Bull and Colonel James Grant. Bull did not want to 
see the war prolonged by impossible peace demands, and Grant 
was anxious to get his army out of South Carolina and back 
into the real war. To end the war decisively, the British 
dropped the vengeance requirement from eight to two, as they 
held two known killers already, and made minor adjustments in 
other requirement, such as the election of Little Carpenter 
as emperor. The treaty of peace between the Cherokees and 
south Carolina was finally ratified in Charles Town on 
December 18, 1761. 69 
Implementing the Cherokee-south Carolina peace took six 
months to complete. The Overbills concluded their own peace 
with Virginia, and showed only passing interest in the 
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Carolina treaty, which made fulfilling the latter agreement 
more difficult. With their separate peace the Overbills 
opened trade with Virginia and North Carolina, which weakened 
South Carolina • s main weapon in enforcing the treaty, the 
threat of another embargo. The final British and Afro-
American priE.!oners were delivered to Carolina officials in 
June 1762, l!7hich for Carolina ended the war. By this time 
South Carolina had already begun to implement a new trading 
system. For South Carolina and the Cherokees it was the end 
of an era. 70 
5 
The end of the Seven Years 1 war closed an era for 
everyone on the southeastern frontier, Europeans, Africans, 
and Indians. The Anglo-Cherokee War was a sideline in the 
larger struggle for North America; Great Britain's victory in 
South Carolina was but a reflection of her success worldwide. 
Among the European imperial powers of the southeastern 
marchlands Great Britain was by far the victor. Great Britain 
gained Louisiana east of the Mississippi except for the "Isle 
of Orleans," which consisted of the east bank of the 
Mississippi from the Iberville River (the present-day Amite) 
to the Gulf of Mexic:::o, and Florida as well. Spain • s loss in 
Florida was somewhat offset by her acquisition of the Isle of 
Orleans and Louisiana west of the Mississippi. France lost 
all her North American possessions except for the two small 
islands st. Pierre and Miquelon in the Gulf of st. Lawrence. 71 
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More than France and Spain: however, the real losers in 
the Seven Years• War on the southeastern marchlands were the 
Indians. From small tribes to major confederacies, they no 
longer had any choice of allies and trading partners: like the 
Indians of the Northeast, they were now dependent upon one of 
two of the surviving European powers." In the following years 
they adjusted their diplomacy accordingly, but to different 
ends. Never again would the southeastern Indians deal with 
European-Americans from such a position of strength. The once 
dominant Indians were now well on the road to dependency. 
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Conclusion 
Much like the kings and ministers of France and England 
during the first six-and-a-half decades of the Eighteenth 
century, modern u. s. historians have gene.t·ally ignored the 
southeastern corner of North America in favor of the northern 
and middle colonies of both empires from Virginia and Illinois 
northward. To be sure, in the imperial scheme of things these 
regions were more important than the 11deserts11 of either 
colonial power to the south. No great battles to determine 
the course of empire were fought in the Southeast; the little 
bit of military conflict there was in the region was largely 
irrelevant to either colonial power's strategy in the Seven 
Years' War; and the final disposition of the Southeast was 
decided by men and events far away in Canada and New England. 
Warfare by Europeans as Europeans understood it flared 
three times between 1733 and 1763. Louisiana and the 
Chickasaws fought a war between 1736 and 1741; ~~eorgia and 
Florida fought a war between 1739 and 1743; and South Carolina 
and the Cherokees fought a war between 17 59 and 17 62. Warfare 
as the Indians understood it existed between the Chickasaws 
and Choctaws for almost the entire thirty years under review; 
the Choctaws tried several times to start wars with the 
Creeks; the Cherokees made war at various times on almost 
294 
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everyone in the region. 
Far from being a region in which not much happened, the 
years from 1733 to 1763 included "hot" as well as "cold" wars 
for almost everyone concerned. For rival Europeans, the aim 
of their diplomacy was at all times directed at keeping native 
allies happy, and attempting either to seduce their rival's 
allies into an alliance or to destroy them on their own or 
with other native groups. Each European intentionally fanned 
the flames of antagonism and even war between traditional 
Indian enemies in the hopes of keeping their own allies weak 
and dependent upon patronage and support. Neither England nor 
France was at all averse to starting bloody civil wars in the 
pursuit of their goal of dominating the southeastern frontier. 
Each European colony contained various governmental and 
private interests which competed to influence Indian 
relations. In every colony the governor was the duly 
constituted official with responsibility for Indian relations, 
but in each colony the governor had to deal with other 
official and unofficial interests. In Louisiana, the 
commissaire-o~donnateur had an important, and more often than 
not debilitating, influence on Indian relations, and to a 
lesser extent posts commandants could also influence events 
in various ways. The commandant at Mobile also exerted some 
control over Indian affairs, and some did much better than 
others. In Georgia and South Carolina, governors had to deal 
with assemblies, both upper and lower houses, agents and later 
superintendents for Indian affairs, powerful trading 
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companies, licensed and unlicensed traders, and even the 
movement of settlement, both sanctioned and unsanctioned, into 
Indian hunting grounds. In addition, on the English side of 
the frontier there was also the competition for Indian trade 
between South Carolina and Georgia to further complicate 
managing the Indians. on the European side, Indian relations 
were the sum total, and sometimes the difference between, all 
these competing interests, which made successful Indian 
diplomacy on the part of those constitutionally charged with 
its conduct a most difficult task. 
Similarly, there was no such thing as a monolithic 
"Indian" block with which to confront either the Europeans or 
even other Indians. Each of the major nations, i.e., the 
Chickasaws, Choctaws, Creeks, and Cherokees, contatned 
factions which undoubtedly exist·ed long before the arrival of 
the Europeans. But contact with the Europeans exacerbated 
those internal divisions as rival Europeans played one faction 
against another in an effort to maximize their own power 
relative to their Indian allies and Indian and European 
enemies. Thus the English and French helped foment the 
Choctaw civil war by pushing their respective adherents in the 
nation to attempt the negate the other party's influence. The 
same could have happened to the Creeks and the Cherokees had 
those nations allowed it to happen. In each case, Europeans 
set out to create divisions within the nation, many of them 
knowing that the requirements of clan retaliation made murders 
committed within clans, moieties, and nations particularly 
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destructive emo·tionally as well as physically. 
The Indians, of course, were doing the same thing using 
rival Europeans to strengthen their own factions within the 
nation and the nation relative to all other native and 
European powers in the region. The creeks were known best 
for using the Europeans against each other in their basically 
unshakable policy of neutrality in the region, but every other 
nation in the region also played the Europeans as best they 
could according to their size, location, and internal 
politics. The experiences of the Yamasees, Natchez, 
Chakchiumas, Koroas, and other nations served as a vivid 
example to large and small nations alike that preserving one's 
position relative to all the powers of the Southeast was not 
just good diplomacy, it was vitally necessary for survival. 
One thing almost all the major commentators on the 
Indians agreed on was that Indian allegiance was available to 
anyone who could purchase it. The Choctaw and Cherokee 
"revolts" were supposed to be proof of this. What the 
Europeans did not understand, however, was that the Indians 
had their own aims and means, and responded to a complex 
commercial, diplomatic, and military situation to the best of 
their ability, and according to their own notions of relations 
between "sovereign" powers. The Choctaws "revolted" not just 
because the English offered them more trade and presents than 
the French, but _because French inability to supply them 
regularly gave one of their chiefs the opportunity to advance 
a policy he had pursued unsuccessfully for many years. The 
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Cherokees did not "revolt" because the French offered them 
more and better trade goods, but because a strong party in the 
nation had long suspected that the English wanted to take away 
their lands, and had bequn to do so. The Creeks did not allow 
the French to build the Alabama fort, and to remain there 
unmolested for five decades because they feared the French, 
or could not do without their presents. The French presence 
at Fort Toulouse, insignificant militarily, helped the Upper 
creeks diplomatically to preserve their position as the 
neutral arbiter of the Southeast. 
An important aspect of southeastern history from 1733 to 
1763 therefore is the continual, ever-changing diplomacy 
practiced by every power and faction of Indians and Europeans. 
Several factors shaped the contours of that history. Before 
1754 North Junerica was little more than an afterthought in the 
imperial schemes of England, France, and Spain. The colonies 
were expected to fulfill their assigned functions within the 
empire with a minimum of money and trouble. After 1754 the 
English colonies took on a new importance in the British 
empire, while Louisiana retained its long-time defensive--and 
neglected--character in the French scheme for North America. 
Du~ing their whole period, British settlement crept steadily 
westward from the coasts of south carolina and Georgia, 
worrying Indians and Frenchmen alike. Indians, growing ever 
more dependent upon European goods, especially quns and 
ammunition, became increasingly concerned about ensuring a 
steady and affordable supply of goods, while at the same time 
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preserving their independence and their land. With the 
beginning of the seven Year's War, England's growing military 
power, and the westward-moving zone of English settlement, 
might have been expected to cause the Indians to ally 
themselves with Louisiana. But an effGctive English blockade 
kept France from supplying her Mississippi colony, and 
Louisiana went for years without supplies or even news from 
France. Louisiana was thus unable to supply disaffectad 
Creeks, cherokees, and even Choctaws. 
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Appendix 
Divisions and Major Towns 
of Three Major Nations of the Southeast1 
Western Division 
Boucfouca 
Nushkobo 
Eastern Division 
Concha 
Six Towns Division 
Yanabe 
Tala 
Independent 
Chickasawhay 
Upper Creeks 
Alabamas 
Lower Creeks 
Coweta 
Lower Towns 
Keowee 
Tugaloo 
Middle/Valley Towns 
Etchoe 
overhill Towns 
Chota 
Chatuga 
Choctaws 
Custusha 
West Abeka 
Oulitacha 
Toussana 
Seneacha 
Yowani 
Creeks 
Abihkas 
cuss ita 
Cherokees 
Estatoe 
stecoe 
Great Tellico 
Tomatly 
Couechitto 
Caffetalaya 
Okalousa 
Talapoosas 
Oconees 
Conasatchee 
Hiwassee 
Settico 
1The Chickasaw nation was too small to be divided into 
significant divisions. 
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